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In order for us to understand and reconceptualize race in the early republic, we 
ought to examine the symbiotic relationship between Prophetstown and Vincennes during 
the first two decades of the nineteenth century.  The relationship between these two 
communities in Indiana Territory was not one defined primarily by racial ideo ogies.  
Though historians have often characterized both settlements as diametrically opposed, the 
settlements were in fact faction-ridden, making the relationship between th  two more a 
relationship of factions rather than races.  Vincennes and Prophetstown serve as an 
excellent example in understanding the regional, and even local, variations within racial 
constructs.  Though racial ideologies imply a hierarchy on a global scale, racial 
relationships are often not constant and differ by time and place.  Local and regional 
variables are as important to the construction and use of race as are ideologies.  Rac  
relations were not the primary reason for armed conflict between Prophetstown and 
Vincennes at Tippecanoe in November of 1811.  Divided by internal factionalism, each 
town looked toward the other as a means to vocalize and address its own internal debates.  
Contrary to the usual arguments, neither town united behind a racial identity nor attacked 
the other in order to protect their community.  When analyzed closely, it becomes 
apparent that the Shawnee Prophet (Tenskwatawa) and the governor of Indiana Territory 
(William Henry Harrison) used racial rhetoric to unite their factionalized towns.  This 
rhetoric has overshadowed the multiplicity of peculiar connections (debates over unfree 
labor, biased Indian agents, Indian manipulating the Americans) and interests hat pushed 
the towns toward conflict.  The bloodshed that erupted between the two communities at 




interests of Indian and European American cultures.  The inhabitants of both 
communities found themselves in opposition because of the peculiar and often highly 
complicated methods through which they dealt with the factionalism in their towns.   
Most historians have adopted a racial perspective when analyzing the relationship 
between Prophetstown and Vincennes because they have focused so heavily on 
Tenskwatawa rather than his town.1  They concentrate on the Prophet’s distaste for 
European Americans rather than delve deeply into his religious beliefs and the 
relationships he fostered within his town.  When historians have discussed the Prophet’s 
teachings, they often do so without fully considering the motives of Tenskwatawa’s 
supporters.  These depictions state that the Prophet not only constructed a unified town 
dedicated to the revitalization of Indian culture but that he also commanded a largermy 
of Indian warriors devoted to destroying the Americans.  This characterization ignores 
the ways in which his supporters continued to challenge and frustrate Tenskwatawa’s 
efforts to centralize authority over disparate Indian communities.  When historians used 
the Prophet’s racial rhetoric as proof of unity, they overlooked the fact that his word
were a reaction to disunity at Prophetstown.  Characterizations of a united Prophetstown 
were in fact a product of historical interpretations that have not considered thre  
important factors: the historical context of the Wabash-Maumee Valley, the factionalism 
that was rife throughout the valley, and the complicated relationships within Vincennes 
and Prophetstown. 
                                                
1 Benjamin Drake, Life of Tecumseh and his Brother the Prophet with a Historical Sketch of the Shawanoe 
Indians (Cincinnati, E. Morgan & Co., 1850); R. David Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1985); Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistances: The North American 
Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); John Sugden, T cumseh: A 
Life (Macmillan Press, 1999); Stephen Warren, The Shawnee and their Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Urbana: 




The tendency of American Indians and European Americans to resist racial and 
ethnic unification after 1800 was no where more apparent than at Prophetstown and 
Vincennes.  The atmosphere in both towns was heavily racist, but the behavior of the 
people living in both towns was often not so.  One could spend a day at Prophetstown and 
hear Tenskwatawa and his brother Tecumseh deliver lengthy diatribes about how Indians
and European Americans had been created separately and how European American 
culture was undermining and destroying Indian kind.  Yet, after hearing Tenskwatawa’s 
speeches, many of the Indians at Prophetstown ignored his stipulations and acted in a 
fashion that threatened the racial vision embodied by Prophetstown.  The town of 
Vincennes was quite similar in many respects.  Weekly newspaper sermons published y 
the ever-paranoid Elihu Stout announced the diabolical plans of the nearby Indians who 
hoped to destroy Vincennes.  Governor Harrison paraded the militia around town to 
emphasize the threat posed by the Prophet’s forces.  Nonetheless, residents of Vincennes 
willingly aided the Indians throughout the region in order to protect their cultural and 
national identities.  It was impossible for anyone to escape the racial dialogues and 
hatreds present in both towns, but it was relatively easy for both Indians and European 
Americans to circumvent the issue. 
Life in the Wabash-Maumee Valley was too complicated for people to rely on a 
hard-and-fast system of racial classification.  Racial ideology rests on a simplistic notion 
that humans originated from separate creations, but identities in the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley were often contingent on a variety of relationships unrelated to racial histories.  
Few residents thought racial theory would improve their lives.  Harrison’s and 




had to convince their supporters that their racial vision was the best possible means to 
promote peace, economic development, and political progress.  While racial violence did 
erupt periodically in the valley, it was largely due to the intra-community fac ionalism at 
Prophetstown and Vincennes.  Most communities were unable to reconcile the racial 
rhetoric of their leaders with the practical realities of life.
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Two Towns, Multiple Places: Race and Identity on the Early Republic’s Frontier: 
An Introduction 
During the opening decade of the nineteenth century, two towns on the Northwest 
frontier stood in apparent opposition to one another.  Native Americans established 
Prophetstown as a haven against the cultural assault of European Americans.  European 
Americans, in the meantime, had established Vincennes as an outpost in what they saw as 
a bountiful wilderness surrounded by savages.  This simple dichotomy, however, does 
not even scratch the surface of the complex story of divisions and factions in both 
communities.  Understanding the conflicts within and between these two communities 
reveals the intricate interactions between American Indians and European Americans and 
demonstrates the centrality of emerging notions of identity and race on the frontir in the 
early republic.  During the early years of the conflict centered around these two 
communities, ideas about identity and race were ambiguous and unclear.  But as the two 
communities moved toward overt conflict, those ideas about identity and race slowly 
clarified.  In the years after men from Vincennes destroyed Prophetstown, and as 
European American settlers streamed into the region, identity and race became 
increasingly rigid along lines of red, white, and black.  However, despite the 
crystallization of racial ideology during this period, large numbers of American Indians 
and European Americans resisted racial unification in order to protect their cultural 
identities. 
In 1808, the Shawnee leader Tenskwatawa and his followers established a new 
village along the Wabash River in present-day Indiana.  They hoped that this town would 
serve as a religious haven where Indians of all nations could visit and learn of 
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Tenskwatawa’s prophetic visions.1  Tenskwatawa believed that his town would lessen 
Indian dependencies on European Americans by facilitating the growth of an independent 
and united Indian community throughout North America.  Consuming alcohol, trading 
land and pelts for manufactured goods, and abiding by European American cultural 
mores had disrupted Indian communities and made many Indian groups dependent upon 
the French, British, and Americans.  Because Tenskwatawa based many of these ideas 
about Indian-European American relations on his religious views, European Americans 
referred to him as the Prophet.   
However, Tenskwatawa’s mission proved problematic because residents of 
Prophetstown refused to unite fully behind the Prophet’s vision, and because few Indian 
communities were willing to subvert their local interests to the pan-Indian go ls of the 
Prophet.2  From 1808 to 1811, the Prophet worked diligently to construct a community at 
Tippecanoe, but watched as the European Americans, and even his fellow Indians, turned 
against him.  Indians and non-Indians alike feared that the Prophet’s message would spur 
violence in the valley and result in the destruction of both European American and nearby 
Indian communities.   
Divisions within the Wabash-Maumee Indian nations promoted a more radical 
characterization of Prophetstown.  Although Miami, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Ho-Chunk, 
                                                
1 Gregory Dowd states that “Tenskwatawa promoted pan-Indianism not with words alone, or only with the 
elaboration of separation theology, but with the time-honored if paradoxical political device of secession.  
Like the Susquehanna Delawares and Shawnees who had fled Anglo-Iroquois by both removing to Ohio 
and settling in polygot villages in the early eighteenth century.  He did so first at Greenville (1806- ), in 
symbolic defiance of the Treaty of Greenville, and later at Tippecanoe (1808-1812) .”  Gregory Dowd, A 
Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992), 143. 
2 Local interests refer to the social, economic, and political relationships constructed between peoples and 
places in the Wabash-Maumee Valley.  These ranged from spiritual connections to specific areas in the 




and an assortment of other Indians lived at Prophetstown, they experienced and 
refashioned the Prophet’s message and guiding nativist philosophy on their own terms.  
Some lived at Prophetstown but continued to attack Indian and European American 
communities throughout the frontier region.  However, most non-Indians interpreted this 
militant behavior as a reflection of Tenskwatawa’s teachings, rather than of is inability 
to control his followers.  Furthermore, divisions within the Miami polity forced some 
Miami Indians to associate with the Prophet in order to challenge their own corrupt 
leaders. European Americans claimed that Tenskwatawa had won the Miami Indians to 
his cause when in fact the Miamis were only using the Prophet as a tool to threaen their 
fellow Indians.  In addition, many Miami provided the Americans with substandard 
intelligence that made Tenskwatawa out to be a maniacal leader bent on destroying the 
Americans.   In turn, they hoped the Americans would protect Miami interests and refrain 
from negotiating with a Shawnee leader who had little business living in Miami country.  
While the Prophet hoped to prevent Indians from associating with European Americans, 
suspicions that he wanted to destroy all non-Indians rested more on unreliable 
intelligence and ethnocentric beliefs about Indians. 
Vincennes, located on the Wabash River about 180 miles southwest of 
Prophetstown, was not a simple outpost of European American civilization.  Instead, like 
Prophetstown, it was a community riven by divisions.  As each of those divisions 
contested one another, they seized upon the image of Prophetstown as a foil for their own 
political and economic purposes.  This process of creating Prophetstown as an external   
idea intensified antagonisms that were ultimately unleashed in the Battle of Tippecanoe.  
French explorers founded Vincennes in the 1730s and it developed into a lucrative 
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trading post for Indians and European Americans throughout the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.  But American efforts to manage trade and the socio-political 
development of the town in the period after the Revolutionary War upset this balance.  As 
French and American residents wrestled over control of the local economy, they 
disagreed over the role Indians would play.3  The Americans sought to displace the 
French and Indians in an effort to expand agricultural production and to implement what 
they saw as more progressive institutions and values.   
Both the French and American visions of the frontier proved disastrous for 
Prophetstown.  The French wanted to rid the territory of Prophetstown because 
Tenskwatawa’s politics undercut their trade and the political relationship with the Miami 
Indians based upon marriage and personal connections.  The Prophet and his brother 
Tecumseh demanded that Indians stop trading with European Americans and refrai  from 
ceding lands to them as well.  French residents feared that if Indians stopped ceding 
lands, they would no longer be able to siphon off goods from annuity payments or affirm 
traditional social relationships with the Indians through the distribution of provisions.  
The French depended upon the Indian trade largely because the Americans had taken 
control of most other economic ventures.  Given the French interests in protecting trade, 
they manipulated intelligence about Prophetstown in order to make it appear more 
threatening to the Americans at Vincennes.  Indiana Territory governor, William Henry 
Harrion relied on this intelligence and based many of his policies towards the local 
Indians on his understanding of Prophetstown.  By characterizing Prophetstown as 
                                                
3 I use the term American to define European Americans who considered themselves citizens of the United 
States of America. 
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militant, the French hoped to convince the Americans to destroy the town, thereby 
protecting the needs of the French and Miami. 
The divisions within Vincennes went beyond a split between French and 
American interests and included conflict among Americans over the issue of slavery.  
Here, too, an image of Prophetstown as antagonistic to European American interests was 
also important.  Unable to compromise over the role slavery would play in the 
development of the territory, the Americans began fighting each other for control f 
territorial politics in order to institute their policies.  Much of this debate focused on 
Harrison’s governance and policies, in particular his handling of Indian affairs, and 
eventually, he associated an oppositional political faction with Prophetstown as a way to 
attack his enemies.  Harrison and his supporters continually challenged their political 
enemies by connecting them with the Tenskwatawa, his brother, and their militant 
designs on Vincennes.  The Harrisonians hoped to silence their enemies but they did not 
fully consider the extent to which they created a militant Prophetstown instead. 
The relationship between these two communities in Indiana Territory was not one 
defined primarily by racial ideologies.  Whether one was French, Potawatomi, American, 
or Kickapoo, local interests continued to shape relationships between European American 
and Indians in the Wabash-Maumee Valley rather than one’s race.  Indians and European 
Americans chose to protect their ethnic traditions over the needs of their racial g oup.  In 
order for us to understand and reconceptualize race in the early republic, we ought to 
examine the symbiotic relationship between Prophetstown and Vincennes during the f rst
two decades of the nineteenth century.  Though historians have often characterized both 
settlements as diametrically opposed, the settlements were in fact faction-ridden, making 
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the relationship between the two more a relationship of factions rather than races. 
Vincennes and Prophetstown serve as an excellent example in understanding the regional, 
and even local, variations within racial constructs.  Though racial ideologies imply a 
hierarchy on a global scale, racial relationships are often not constant and differ by time 
and place.  Local and regional variables are as important to the construction and useof 
race as are ideologies.  Race relations were not the primary reason for armed conflict 
between Prophetstown and Vincennes at Tippecanoe in November of 1811.  Divided by 
internal factionalism, each town looked toward the other as a means to vocalize and 
address its own internal debates.   
Contrary to the usual arguments, neither town united behind a racial identity nor 
attacked the other in order to protect their community.  When analyzed closely, it 
becomes apparent that the Shawnee Prophet and the governor of Indiana territory used 
racial rhetoric to unite their factionalized towns.  This rhetoric has overshadowed the 
multiplicity of peculiar connections (debates over unfree labor, biased Indian agents, 
Indian manipulating the Americans) and interests that pushed the towns toward conflict.  
The bloodshed that erupted between the two communities at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 
1811 was a product of various issues complicated by the ethnic interests of American 
Indians and European Americans.  The inhabitants of both communities found 
themselves in opposition because of the peculiar and often highly complicated methods 
through which they dealt with the factionalism in their towns.   
This is not to say that American Indians and European Americans did not 
participate within a larger racial dialogue as they defended their ethnic interests.4  Racial 
                                                
4 I identify ethnicity as a population’s shared social organization, religious faith, language, origin stories, 
and physical similarities.  Ethnicity does not necessarily include shared racial ties.   
 
7 
ideology during this period was not as rigid as it was by the mid 1850s.  While some 
people like Harrison identified Indians as biologically inferior to whites, India s like 
Tenskwatawa tended to identify themselves as a separate race through their creation 
stories.  However, for many, participating in a racial dialogue was an unintended 
consequence.  The French struggled to protect their ethnic identities by turning European 
Americans against the Prophet, yet at the same time they associated most Indians with a 
militant Prophetstown.  They characterized Indians as behaving collectively in r lation to 
the Prophet’s nativism.  Although the French intended to protect themselves and their 
Miami counterparts, they indirectly created racial fears for Harrison’s consumption.  
Harrison was a willing recipient.  His beliefs that Indians were predisposed t  war and 
unable to reason as effectively as European Americans only added to the larger racial 
dialogue.  The Prophet, too, believed that the Great Spirit had created European 
Americans and American Indians separately and that both groups should remain 
segregated.  His nativist rhetoric was inherently racial in that it identified hereditary 
differences between white and red peoples.  Whether it was Tenskwatawa’s belief in 
polygenesis, the French associating all the Indians with Prophetstown, or Harrison’s 
conviction that Indians were innately inferior, all played a part in the social construction 
of race during this period.5  Yet, few people were as willing as Harrison and 
Tenskwatawa to place racial interests first.  The unintended racial rhetoric was the 
product of certain ethno-polities protecting their history, sense of identity, and 
geographical and cultural roots. 
                                                
5 Barbara Jeanne Fields, “Slavery, Race, and Ideology in the United States of America,: New Left Review, 
CLXXXI (May/June 1990), 95-118.  In this article, Fields argues for the social construction of race. 
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It is by decentering the Prophet and Harrison from the narrative that we can best 
understand the extent to which residents of Prophetstown and Vincennes resisted racial 
unity.  Most historians have adopted a racial perspective when analyzing the relationship 
between the two towns because they have focused so heavily on Tenskwatawa rather than 
his town.6  They concentrate on the Prophet’s distaste for European Americans rather 
than delve deeply into his religious beliefs and the relationships he fostered within his 
town.  When historians have discussed the Prophet’s teachings, they often do so without 
fully considering the motives of Tenskwatawa’s supporters.  These depictions state tha  
the Prophet not only constructed a unified town dedicated to the revitalization of Indian 
culture but that he also commanded a large army of Indian warriors devoted to destroying 
the Americans.  This characterization ignores the ways in which his supporters c ntinued 
to challenge and frustrate Tenskwatawa’s efforts to centralize authority over disparate 
Indian communities.  When historians used the Prophet’s racial rhetoric as proof of unity, 
they overlooked the fact that his words were a reaction to disunity at Prophetstown.  
Characterizations of a united Prophetstown were in fact a product of historical 
interpretations that have not considered three important factors: the historical c ntext of 
the Wabash-Maumee Valley, the factionalism that was rife throughout the valley, and the 
complicated relationships within Vincennes and Prophetstown. 
The Prophet’s rhetoric has allowed historians to contextualize Tenskwatawa’s 
behavior within a larger racial dichotomy.  By focusing on his language, historians 
                                                
6 Benjamin Drake, Life of Tecumseh and his Brother the Prophet with a Historical Sketch of the Shawanoe 
Indians (Cincinnati, E. Morgan & Co., 1850); R. David Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1985); Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistances: The North American 
Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); John Sugden, T cumseh: A 
Life (Macmillan Press, 1999); Stephen Warren, The Shawnee and their Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2005). 
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connected Tenskwatawa and his town to a nativist tradition embodied by Neolin and 
Handsome Lake’s efforts to rid Indians of their dependency on European American 
culture.  Historiographical trends that emphasized biographical analyses, rath r than 
community-centered studies, have allowed race to be the determining construct i these 
studies.7  The relationship between Harrison and the Prophet was largely racial in nature 
but their rhetoric did not reflect the feelings of many of their contemporaries.  Historians’ 
willingness to concentrate on a few actors ignores the many interests and peoples who 
played an important part in the region’s affairs.  Often, these scholars evaluate the racial 
interests dividing the European American and American Indian political figures in the 
region.  Race certainly played a key role in how the major political actors related to each 
other, but the racial rhetoric between the major players did not necessarily reflect the 
feelings of their communities at large.  One historian has noted that leaders like Harrison 
and Tenskwatawa “shared a single-minded obsession with coercive, and centralized, 
authority.”8  These men believed that “a handful of leaders, united around a single 
ideology, could speak and act for thousands of others.” 9  Many historians have focused 
                                                
7 Until recently, most of the historiography has focused on the key biographical players in the Wabash-
Maumee region.  These include R. David Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1983); John Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1998); Harvey 
Lewis Carter’s The Life and Times of Little Turtle: First Sagamore f the Wabash (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1987); and Robert Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the 
Origins of American Indian Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007).  More recent 
monographs have approached the region through chronologically expansive analyses of the Indian peoples 
involved.  These monographs include Stephen Warren, The Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870. 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005); Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent 
People, 1654-1994 (Indianapolis, Ind: Indiana Historical Society, 1996); Bert Anson’s The Miami Indians, 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), and to a lesser extent Richard White, The Middle Ground: 
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes R gion, 1650-1815 (Cambridge studies in North 
American Indian history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
8 Warren, The Shawnee and their Neighbors, 19.  Warren analyzes the attempts Shawnee leaders like the 
Prophet, Tecumseh, and Black Hoof played in shaping a ational Shawnee identity, but concludes that the 
Shawnee continue to identify primarily with their vllage. 
9 Ibid.  
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chosen to focus on the ideology underlying efforts at unification rather than to examine 
more closely the actions of thousands of others. 
Such an approach ignores the various cultural interests of the region and silences 
many other Indians and European Americans who played a vital role in the region’s 
history.10  Tenskwatawa’s and Harrison’s attempts to institute a central authority in their 
towns did not produce unified communities because many of the Indian and European 
American groups refused to abandon their traditions.  The racial rhetoric of leaders like 
the Prophet, his brother Tecumseh, and William Henry Harrison reflects their inability to 
unite their communities.  In trying to forge unity, these men spoke in racial terms o 
better characterize their enemy and garner support for their cause.  Their racial language 
reveals only one layer of the dynamic between the two communities, which is why
concentrating on the peoples and the factionalism of the communities shows how 
Harrison and the Prophet became important symbols for Indians and European 
Americans alike.   
This dissertation reorients the discussion of the Prophet, William Henry Harrison, 
Tecumseh, and their relationships by placing their communities first.  Understanding the 
Prophet, Tecumseh, or Harrison means examining the communities out of which they 
emerged.  The two communities must be reevaluated outside of the racial dichotomy that 
is often applied to the relationship between the two towns.  Looking beyond the racial 
categories allows us to include groups like the French and Kickapoo who played an 
important part in the factionalism of the two respective towns rather than simply f tting 
                                                
10 Utilizing a Shawnee Indian chief or an American governor to generalize about multi-ethnic communities 
is problematic.  While such an approach may not entirely ignore the other groups involved (French, Miam , 
Kickapoo, Potawatomi), it often evaluates their motives and behavior within a interpretive framework that 
is shaped by the historical actions of the Shawnee or Americans.   
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them within the larger racial dichotomy.  Such an approach reflects Giovanni Levi’s
contention that microhistory is “the attempt to study the social not as an object inv sted 
with inherent properties, but as a set of shifting interrelationships existing beween 
constantly adapting configurations.”11 The people and conflicting interests in each 
settlement played an important part in shaping the ideals, policies, actions, and rhetoric of 
its leaders.  Yet, in many instances, leaders like Tenskwatawa or Harrison represented 
only a fraction of their larger society.  Harrison and the Prophet demanded that their 
followers adapt or leave rather than address the conflicting interests preent within each 
of their towns.  As a result, Indians and European Americans failed to unite and the 
disputes within Prophetstown and Vincennes had disastrous implications for the rest of 
the region.  Cultural differences fueled intra-community factionalism at Prophetstown 
and Vincennes, and this factionalism pushed both towns towards inter-community 
violence.  The racial violence often attributed to the Battle of Tippecanoe was actu lly 
the product of many diverse and complicated relationships that produced the factional 
strife and diplomatic negotiations.  The battle was not merely a matter of “red” Indians 
opposing the expansion-minded “white” European Americans.  Rather, the battle, like the 
relationship between Prophetstown and Vincennes, was a battle of factions often 
overshadowed by racial rhetoric.  
Framing the national and racial dialogues instigated by Prophetstown and 
Vincennes within the historical context of the Wabash-Maumee factionalism alows us to 
see how local communities used the two towns to protect their interests.  Rather th n 
abandon their traditional roles of operating, most Indians and European Americans 
                                                
11 Giovanni Levi, “On Microhistory,” in Peter Burke, d., New Perspectives on Historical Writing, 2nd. 
edition (Pennsylvania University Press: University Park, PA, 2001), pp. 114. 
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continued to defend their wellbeing.  Indian communities in the valley traditionally 
constructed socio-economic relationships through trade with European and Indian 
partners at Vincennes, Ouiatenon, and the Miami cultural center at Kekionga.  However, 
once the Americans seized control of trade by destroying Kekionga and displacing the 
French at Vincennes, Wabash-Maumee Indian communities used land cessions to protec  
their interests.  These cessions enabled some Indian communities to maintain a sem -
independent lifestyle, a strategy that became more difficult once Tenskwatawa nd 
Tecumseh sought to discipline and undermine Indian communities that negotiated with 
the Americans.  When the Shawnee brothers punished local Indian communities for 
dealing with the Americans by killing wayward leaders, they did not care that those
communities were behaving within the traditional framework of the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley in order to protect their autonomy.12  The traditional inhabitants of the valley 
found themselves caught between two growing settlements.  It is not surprising that some 
Indians saw the nativist Prophetstown as equally disruptive as the American-controlled 
Vincennes because it undermined the society that they had constructed thoughout the 
eighteenth century.  The Miami, often characterized as accomodationists, were in fact 
defending their autonomy and hegemony by opposing Prophetstown and negotiating with 
the Americans.  Their behavior was consistent with Miami history in the region: a f cus 
on individual Miami interest rather than those of Indians in general. 
For the region’s more recent native immigrants, such as the Kickapoo, and 
Potawatomies, Vincennes and Prophetstown were tools to legitimize their recent presence 
in the Wabash-Maumee Valley.  It is essential that we discuss the histories of the French, 
                                                
12 Alfred Cave, “The Failure of the Shawnee Prophet’s Witch-Hunt,” Ethnohistory Vol. 42, No. 3 
(Summer, 1995), 445-448. 
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Miami, Piankashaw, Potawatomi, Kickapoo, Delaware, and Shawnees communities in 
order to understand their motives for associating with the nativists or the Americans.  
These immigrants took advantage of the politics and language of nationalism in the 1800s 
to maintain their local autonomy, much like they had used the French and the English for 
the same purpose during the eighteenth century.  The pan-Indianism often associated with 
Prophetstown was as a much a product of the factional nature of the region as it was a 
result of Tenskwatawa’s nativist rhetoric. 
It was within these peculiar and intertwined relationships that a number of 
circumstances converged to create violence between Indians and European Americans.  
The primary relationship between Vincennes and Prophetstown was not one defined 
solely by race.  Instead, varying interests and intra-community factionalism pushed the 
two communities toward each other.  Joshua Piker argues that “colonial-era communities, 
European American and Native American alike, are broadly comparable and that eac  
people’s experiences have relevance for our understanding of the other.”13  Like Piker, I 
believe that it is important to “trace out the ties binding native and newcomer, Indian 
towns and the ‘little communities’ of Euro-America,” but also to examine and evaluate 
the identities that changed or grew out of the dialogue between these two communities.14  
While Piker compared the Creek town of Okfuskee to European American communities 
more generally, this project traces the interactions between Prophetstown and Vincennes.  
It evaluates the competing interests within each town and the ways in which those 
conflicting interests propelled the two towns towards conflict. 
                                                
13 Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Town in Colonial America (Massachusetts: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 4.  Darrett Rutman, “Assessing the Little Communities of Early America,” William and mary 




Consequently, this dissertation reexamines the relationship between the 
communities at Vincennes and Prophetstown in light of the intra-community factionalism 
within the two towns.  The first chapter, “The Factional History of the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley,” analyzes the history and profile of the region prior to American intervention in 
the area.  It traces the growth of a lucrative trading network and the rise of the Miami 
nation as the central pivot on which Indian and non-Indian peoples turned.  This chapter 
situates Vincennes and Prophetstown within a continual history of factionalism in order 
to better evaluate the interests of the various Indian and European American peoples 
involved.  The second chapter, “Two Towns, Multiple Places,” examines the foundation 
of Vincennes from 1800 to 1808 and Prophetstown from 1806 to 1808.  It identifies the 
diverse nature of both towns, specifically the ways in which residents identified each 
other and their place in the region.  Both towns existed within a much longer and 
complicated history than has been fully comprehended, and this played an important part 
in the development of two divided communities.  The following chapter, “A Town 
Divided: Vincennes Fights the Prophet,” delves deeply into the interpersonal 
relationships and disputes within Vincennes.  French traders, increasingly desperate to 
protect their remaining trading and social connections, sought to dismantle Prophetstown 
and expel the militant Indians from the region.  The Americans hoped to do the same and 
turned to the French go-betweens for help without fully realizing just how much the 
French manipulated American perceptions of Prophetstown.  Biased intelligence 
provided by the French only amplified the Americans’ obsession with Prophetstown 
because it affirmed Harrison’s rhetoric.  Harrison’s rhetoric about Indian aff irs was not 
simply the product of what the French go-betweens told him, but also the result of a 
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major dispute in Vincennes over the legality of unfree labor in the territory.  To a great 
extent, the French intelligence complemented an American town likely to confront 
Prophetstown.  The information that the French provided legitimized Governor 
Harrison’s rhetoric about Prophetstown. 
“The Prophet and His Town,” the fourth chapter, deals with the disconnect 
between the Prophet and his town.  In particular, it examines the larger problems 
surrounding the French traders and Miami Indians who sought to destroy Prophetstown.  
Studying the dynamics within Prophetstown shows how Indians throughout the region 
continued to frustrate Tenskwatawa’s vision, whether they claimed to support the Prophet 
or not.  The factionalism throughout the area makes the fifth chapter, “The Many Battles 
of Tippecanoe,” particularly important.  This chapter evaluates the tactical and historical 
importance of the Battle of Tippecanoe by looking beyond the propaganda surrounding 
the battle to uncover the actual events that framed it.  The aftermath of the battle serves as 
a tool to examine the ways in which Vincennes and Prophetstown each remained 
internally divided even after a costly and bloody battle in November of 1811.  Racial 
unity in the region remained elusive even after physical violence exploded between the 
Indians at Prophetstown and the European Americans at Vincennes.  Neither town 
enjoyed the cohesiveness necessary to function as a corporate entity. 
The conclusion of this dissertation briefly traces the two communities in the 
period up to the election of William Henry Harrison as president.  The Prophet and 
Harrison, although no longer residents of Indiana Territory, continued to construct their 
idealized communities, although in very different places.  Tenskwatawa helped remove 
Indians west of the Mississippi and finally settled in yet another Prophetstown, near 
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present-day Kansas City.  Harrison used his experiences as governor to fuel a national 
political career, fashioning himself as the hero of Tippecanoe in order to win the 
presidency.  The Prophet and Harrison moved in opposite directions literally, but not 
figuratively.  Tenskwatawa ventured west in an effort to establish his imagined 
community while Harrison moved east to the White House in an effort to do the same.    
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Chapter One: Factionalism in the Wabash-Maumee Valley 
When responding to foreign influence from the French, British, Americans and 
Indians in the region, Indian communities in the Wabash-Maumee Valley throughout the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries acted on local rather than national or racial 
interests.  The factional and increasingly competitive nature of Wabash-Maumee Indian 
society throughout this period culminated in violence due to the establishment of the 
nativist Prophetstown and an American-dominated Vincennes in the early 1800s.  The 
communities at Vincennes and Prophetstown upset relationships in the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley by reorienting previously established trade and social relationsh ps, which forced 
the traditional inhabitants of the region to find new ways to maintain stability.  Even as 
the balance of power shifted towards the Americans by 1800, the various Indian 
communities continued to protect their local interests rather than unite against non-Indian 
intrusion.  Each Indian group in the Wabash Valley filtered the nationalist dialogues 
created by Vincennes and Prophetstown through their own individual histories to achieve 
their own goals.  One cannot evaluate the relationship between Vincennes and 
Prophetstown without balancing local histories with national dialogues.  Historians 
characterize the relationship between the two settlements as racial in nature, a battle 
between Indian culture and American expansion exemplified by the violence at 
Tippecanoe in November of 1811.  This ignores the many peoples who were not thinking 
or acting nationally, and who used the national and racial atmosphere to further their own 
ends.    
This chapter places the various Indian communities of the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley in proper historical context by evaluating their local, rather than national, interests 
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throughout the eighteenth century.  A factional but peaceful society developed in the 
region due to trading opportunities with the British and French that collapsed after the 
arrival of the Americans.  This chapter situates the Miami-speaking Indians as the 
traditional inhabitants and power-brokers of the valley, but will also evaluate the r asons 
Kickapoos, Potawatomies, Delaware, and Shawnee Indians migrated into the area after 
1770.  Miami-speaking Indians, including the Miamis, Weas, and Piankashaws. inhabited 
the region from Kekionga down to Vincennes and it was through them that other Indian 
communities like the Potawatomies, Kickapoos, and Shawnees found protection and 
access to trade in the Wabash-Maumee Valley.  Contextualizing the actions of out ide 
Indian groups in relation to the Miamis is essential for understanding post-1795 
relationships in the valley when competition for resources became more heated.  L stly, 
this chapter assesses the initial ways in which post-1795 Wabash-Maumee Indians dealt 
with the nationalistic dialogues instigated by American and Indian outsiders.  Local 
Indians confronted a growing population of Americans who demanded that Indians 
assimilate into the political, economic, and social system embodied by the ideals of the 
American Revolution.  The Prophet insisted that local Indians adopt his larger ideologcal 
vision embodied by his nativist rhetoric.  Indians searched for ways to operate within 
these larger ideological systems while maintaining their traditional modes of living.  
Although the Americans and nativist Indians created massive disruption in the area after 
1795, most pre-existing Indian communities found new ways to protect their interests by 
using Vincennes and Prophetstown to their advantage. 
Placing the national dialogues instigated by Prophetstown and Vincennes within 
the historical context of the Wabash-Maumee Valley allows us to see how local Indian 
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communities used the two towns to protect their interests.  Indian groups in the valley 
traditionally constructed socio-economic relationships through trade with European and 
Indian partners at Vincennes, Ouiatenon, and Kekionga.  But once the Americans seized 
control of trade by destroying Kekionga and displacing the French at Vincennes, 
Wabash-Maumee Indian communities began to use land cessions to access annuity 
payments.  These cessions enabled some Indian communities to maintain a semi-
independent lifestyle, a strategy that became more difficult when Tenskwatawa nd his 
brother Tecumseh sought to punish and undermine Indian communities that negotiated 
with the Americans.  For other Indian groups like the Kickapoos and Potawatomies who 
entered the region as refugees, or the Shawnees and Delaware who fled to the area 
because of American encroachment in the east, Vincennes and Prophetstown provided 
diplomatic opportunities for the Indians to legitimize their newly-arrived presence in the 
Wabash-Maumee Valley.  By supporting American policies at Vincennes or Indian 
nativism at Prophetstown, Indians made their presence in the area valuable to others.  It is 
essential that we discuss the histories of the Miamis, Piankashaw, Potawatomies, 
Kickapoo, Delaware, and Shawnee communities in order to understand their motives for 
associating with either the nativists or the Americans.  Rather than examine the ways in 
which Vincennes and Prophetstown changed Indian behavior, we must identify the ways 
in which local Indians utilized the two towns to their advantage. 
The factional dynamics within the valley, including those Indian communities 
associated with the Miamis as well as those who were relative outsiders, played an 
important role in the formation of a pan-Indian identity at Prophetstown.  Kickapoos, 
Shawnees, and Potawatomi Indians comprised the majority of the Indians residing at 
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Prophetstown and settled there in order to protect their interests and not simply as a 
response to the continued encroachment of European Americans on Indian lands.  The 
pan-Indianism was as much anti-Miami as it was anti-American, and this was more a 
reflection of varying historical experiences rather than simply nativist ideals.  The key is 
to center Indian behavior in the Wabash Valley on the original inhabitants rather than 
simply to frame Indian behavior around the Shawnee nativists at Prophetstown.  Such an 
approach allows us to interpret the behavior of Indians in culturally relative terms rather 
than within an accomodationist/nativist framework.  It is quite possible that both groups 
(nativists and Miamis) thought they were protecting Indianness, but differed in practice 
because of their different histories.  
The Wabash-Maumee Valley 
One of the oldest and most powerful Indian nations in the valley was that of the 
Miamis, a small group of Indians that inhabited the lands just south of Lake Michigan.1  
They thrived in the area once dominated by the Illinois confederacy which deteriorat d 
drastically during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.2  The Illinois 
experienced a steady decline and numbered less than 1,000 by 1770.3 Raids by the 
Iroquois, Pawnees, Fox and Kickapoos, as well as diseases contracted from the Frenc , 
devastated the Illinois.4  Although the Miamis experienced a smallpox epidemic during in 
the early 1700s, they did not suffer from the disastrous raids initiated by the Iroquois and 
others.  French records state that the Miamis confronted a measles epidemic in 1715, 
                                                
1 Harvey Lewis Carter, The Life and Times of Little Turtle (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 11. 
2 Emily J. Blasingham, “The Depopulation of the Illino s Indians,” Ethnohistory Vol. 3, No. 4 (Autumn, 
1956): 363.  Estimates from Father Jacques Marquette, Louis Jolliet, and James Mooney placed the number 
of Illinois Indians between 9,000 – 10,000 during this period. 
3 Ibid., 372. 
4 Blasingham, “The Depopulation of the Illinois Indians,” 373. 
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although their population remained stable.5  The Miamis were able to fill the void left by 
the Illinois, eventually moving south and settling along the Wabash and Maumee Rivers 
where they slowly constructed a lucrative trade network.  Even though the Miami polity 
would never be as large as the Illinois, they did exert great power in the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley. 
Various Indian peoples settled in the region because of the valuable trading 
centers.  These communities prospered along the Miami, Maumee, and Wabash River 
and were inhabited by a mix of Indians and non-Indians.  These three essential waterways 
fed a diverse array of peoples.  The Wabash was quite large and ran southwesterly n arly 
500 miles from present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana past Vincennes to where it emptied into 
the Ohio River.6  Trade could easily travel southwest down the Ohio River to Vincennes, 
then north along the Wabash River to Kekionga, the major trading center of the Wabash-
Maumee Valley.  There, one could take an eight-mile portage east to reach the Maumee 
River which flowed into Lake Erie.  This network enabled Europeans to exchange cloth, 
guns, liquor, and pelts from Canada to Illinois.  Particularly at Kekionga, the trade 
network supported the development of a peaceful and diverse settlement.  Their control 
of the portage gave the Miami greater power in the region and made up for their smalle
population in comparison to other Indian groups.  Miamis protected their economic 
success with deft diplomacy, but as trade and territory became more contested during the 
early nineteenth century, so too did Miami hegemony. 
                                                
5 Blasingham, “The Depopulation of the Illinois Indians,”  14. 
6 “A Topographical description of the state of Ohio, Indiana territory, and Louisiana,” Boston: Published by 
Charles Williams.  J. Belcher, Printer. 1812. 
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Figure 1.1, Geographic Layout of Towns along the Wabash River 
Map created by Patrick Bottiger. 
 
Trade was an essential component to Indian society in the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley but also largely responsible for maintaining factionalism.  From their initial 
contact with the French to their relationships with the Americans, Wabash Indians valued 
trade above military alliances.7  These trading relationships were often very local in 
nature because Indian communities did not identify as tribes, and thus did not function 
like political entities where one decision applied to all involved.  It was common for 
Indian villages to shift allegiances and to move in order to access trade, even if their 
                                                
7 I use the term Wabash Indians to designate the trib s who settled in the Wabash-Maumee Valley – this 
was a contemporary term used by several settlers.  It also helps prevent repetition. 
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fellow Indians did otherwise.  Outsiders often interpreted this behavior in larger te ms, 
concluding that if one Miami polity favored the British then they all might soon do so.  
This sort of rationale continually upset regional stability because the Europeans often 
demanded and expected uniform allegiance, which led to punitive expeditions by the 
French or British against innocent Indian communities. 
For the most part, however, factionalism within the Miami polity was relativ ly 
peaceful.  Local Indians constructed relationships with outsiders like the British and 
French and traded regularly for goods, but never entered into an entirely dependent 
relationship or sacrificed their autonomy.  Miamis would first identify through their local 
kinship network and trade connections, and secondly with their shared ethnic history to 
other Miami-speaking Indians.  The permanence of Miamis in the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley was as much a product of their localized identities, which did not necessitate 
collective action, as was their ability to compromise with outsiders.  Relatively 
autonomous communities allowed the Miamis to incorporate and satisfy French and 
English demands without undermining their kinship networks, traditions, and rituals.  A 
person was not Miami because he traded with Indians and non-Indians alike. One was 
Miami because he used trade to protect their local interests. The Miamis did not act 
unilaterally, which allowed them to prosper rather than collapse due to internal divisions 
and violence.  As Stewart Raffert argues, the various Miami communities adapted to 
local conditions and realities rather than conform to one leader or community’s 
demands.8 
                                                
8 Stewart Raffert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent People, 1654-1994 (Indianapolis: Indiana 
Historical Society, 1996), 34. 
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Because of Kekionga’s location between the Maumee and Wabash it eventually 
became the  political center for the Miamis, administering trade between D troit and 
French settlements in Illinois country like Vincennes.  The Miamis at Kekionga lived in 
relative peace compared to settlements near Vincennes, Detroit, and in the Illi ois 
country.9  To this end, the Miamis raided more distant rivals like the Sioux, Pawnee, 
Chickasaw, and others for goods rather than attempt to assert their authority.10  This 
geographical diplomacy created buffer zones around the Miamis and let them live 
without fearing an attack from their neighbors.  This is not to say that their diplomatic 
methods prevented all kinds of danger.   
Even though the Miamis enjoyed stability in northwestern Indiana, a few Miami-
speaking communities broke off and migrated southwest along the Wabash.  These 
groups, the Wea and Piankashaws, left the Miami settlement at St. Joseph’s River.  
Although connected to the Miami cultural center at Kekionga, they would experience less 
stability because they settled in more contested areas.  Oral tradition staes that the Miami 
peoples at St. Joseph were so numerous (close to 3,000 people) that “migration of a part 
of the tribe [was] necessary.”11  One Miami man, Wuyoakeetonwau, settled 20 miles 
south of the Tippecanoe River, establishing the Wea village Ouiatenon near what is tod y 
Lafayette.12  When those Indians “increased considerably, one of them separated himself 
from them and went to the mouth of the Vermillion River, where he settled down & made 
a village.  This man had no holes or slits in his ears, as was customary at that day, and he 
                                                
9 Raffert, The Miami Indians of Indiana, 27-30. 
10 Harvey Lewis Carter, Little Turtle, 14. 
11 Vernon Kinietz, ed., “Meearmeear Traditions” by C.C. Trowbridge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1938), 4. 
12 Dorothy Libby, An Anthropological Report on the history of the Miam s, Weas, and Eel River Indians - 
Summary of Piankashaw locations (New York: Garland Pub. Inc., 1974), 58. 
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was on that account called Piankeshaw.”13  This settlement may have supported 600 
Indians.  The Sieur de Vincennes, who had forged relationships with the Piankashaw 
during his exploration of the Wabash Valley, founded a post at what is today Vincennes, 
Indiana, in 1732.  He convinced several Piankashaw Indians to live there with him, but 
most remained at their village at the mouth of the Vermilion River.  By 1736, three major 
Piankashaw villages existed along Wabash River - at Ouiatenon, Vermilion River, and 
Vincennes, supporting about 800-1000 Indians.14  The Miamis at Kekionga, the Wea at 
Ouiatenon, and the Piankashaws at Vincennes developed a vast trading network along the 
Wabash and Maumee rivers.  The British and French hoped to access the extensive and 
profitable trading system. 
These European-Indian trade alliances, although lucrative, fueled competition 
between European powers and factionalism among the Indian communities.  The British 
attempted to trade with various groups “by offering cheaper British goods at [a] secret 
rendezvous in the Illinois country,” which benefited both peoples greatly for the French 
had, at times, manipulated and abused the Indian trade.  There were instances where “‘a 
cask of brandy worth forty dollars fetched $3,000 worth of furs’.”15  French and British 
traders desperately wanted access to the Indian villages in the Wabash-Maumee Valley. 
However, the competition between France and Britain for alliances among the Miami-
speaking Indians fueled factional rivalries.  The French constructed a small fort they 
named Fort Ouiatenon, located on the western side of the Wabash River near present-day 
                                                
13 Vernon Kinietz, ed., “Meearmeear Traditions” by C.C. Trowbridge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1938), 4. 
14 Dorothy Libby, An Anthropological Report, 59-61. 
15 Arrell Gibson, The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1976), 21. 
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Lafayette, Indiana where a dozen traders and their families lived.16  The British settled at 
Pickawillany on the Great Miami River where they hoped to trade with the Piankashaw.  
Many of the Indians in the Wabash Valley had familial and diplomatic relations with the 
French.  However, these relationships became tenuous by 1750 because of the availability 
of cheaper British trade goods.17  In fact, because of these rapidly shifting alliances, the 
Miami leader at Vincennes, known as La Demoiselle, abandoned the pro-French Miami 
faction in the 1740s and attacked the head Miami town of Kekionga in 1747.18  He then 
established a pro-British Miami settlement at Pickawillany that numbered close to 2000 
people, challenging the pro-French Miami leader Piedfroid at Kekionga.  Trade with 
Europeans maintained factionalism among the Miami-speaking Indians.   
Like La Demoiselle’s Miamis, many Piankashaws had also forged ties with the 
British, settling near Pickawillany in early 1752.  Traditionally, they had migrated back 
and forth between Vincennes, the Vermilion River village, and Fort Ouiatenon.  
However, in 1752 many Piankashaw settled on the White River along with various Weas 
and Miamis in an effort to trade with the English.  The French attacked this settlemen  in 
June of 1752, killing several Miamis as punishment for associating with the British.  The 
French hoped to maintain their socio-economic relationship with the Miamis and the 
Piankashaws, who had signed a treaty of friendship with the British in 1750.  George 
Croghan, a British Indian agent, said that he “had been well acquainted with them sev ral 
years before [1765],” when he had visited Vincennes and forged diplomatic relations 
                                                
16 Thomas Hutchins, A Topographical Description of Virginia, Pennsylvani , Maryland, and North 
Carolina, Comprehending the Rivers Ohio, Kenhawa, Sioto, Cherokee, Wabash, Illinois, Missisippi 
(London: Burlington House, 1778), cited in Banta’s manuscript, “The Wea Country.” 
17 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 216. 
18 Ibid., 216.  La Demoiselle was actually Piankashaw. 
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with the Piankashaws, no doubt a reason they eventually settled near his fort at 
Pickawillany.19  The destruction of Pickawillany forced the formerly pro-British 
Piankashaws to quickly re-establish ties with the French by removing to Ouiatenon, while 
the displaced Miamis returned to Kekionga.20  The Piankashaws had little choice but to 
re-establish relations with the French after the pro-French Ottawas and Ojibwas ate their 
leader La Demoiselle in a ritual following his capture.21   The Piankashaw demonstrated 
their support for the French by sending two English scalps “to the governor of Canada s 
a token of their repentance.”22  Many Miami warriors then aided the French cause during 
the Seven Years War, participating in the victory over Edward Braddock at Fort 
Duquesne in 1755.  While the Miamis did aid the French during the Seven Years War, 
they did not play a substantive role against the British during Pontiac’s Rebellion.  The 
Miamis remained neutral during the majority of the rebellion except for an att ck on 
Kekionga in which they captured the British forces and their trading center.23  Regaining 
control over Kekionga was one part of a larger plan by the Miamis to reassert their pow r 
in the area.  They understood the necessity of controlling the regional trade route in rd r 
to prevent Britain from dictating terms.  Their attack on Fort Miami (Kekionga) was not 
necessarily a reflection of anti-British sentiment, but rather an attemp  to maintain control 
of some important waterways and portage areas.24  The Miamis wanted the British around 
in order to facilitate, but not dictate, trade.  
                                                
19 Written by Reverend Simon Brute de Remur in six installments in The Western Sun during 1839. 
20 Libby, An Anthropological Report, 60. 
21 Raffert, The Miami Indians, 32. 
22 Carter, Life and Times of Little Turtle, 35. 
23 Ibid., 41. 
24 Carter, Life and Times of Little Turtle, 68. 
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Although Kekionga’s economy was fundamentally oriented towards Detroit and 
the Great Lakes, Vincennes’s economy was in many ways directed toward Spanish 
Louisiana.  By the late 1760s, Vincennes was a heterogeneous village of close to 250 
French settlers, African and Indian slaves, several British traders, and Indians, mostly 
Piankashaws.  Although the fur trade dominated the local economy, French agricultural 
production boomed as well, contrary to British and American claims that the French were 
lazy and unproductive.  The French purposely produced an agricultural surplus - over 
10,000 bushels of corn and 36,000 pounds of tobacco in 1767 so that they could purchase 
rum, wine, and manufactured goods from New Orleans, which they in turn exchanged for 
furs from local and more distant Indian communities.25  Even though the economy was 
for all intents and purposes part of the Mississippi Valley and Louisiana hinterland, the 
Indians’ diplomatic and cultural connections were at places to the north like Ouiatenon, 
Kekionga, and even Detroit.  Once the French left North America as an imperial power 
after the Seven Years’ War, the British began a concerted effort to access the trading 
opportunities in the Great Lakes and further west.  British trade was fundamentally 
oriented towards Detroit and they succeeded in profiting from trade along the Wabash in 
part because of the connections among the Piankashaws at Vincennes, the Weas at 
Ouiatenon, and the Miamis at Kekionga.   
George Croghan, deputy chief for Indian affairs in the west, led Britain’s ttempts 
to secure trade in the region during the 1750s and 1760s.  His efforts culminated in an 
expedition into the region in 1765 and 1766.  He recognized the interests among the 
Wabash Indian communities, and hoped to establish trading connections with these 
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Indian groups and thus secure trade routes from Detroit down to Vincennes.  Some, like 
the Kickapoos, had experienced the destructive result of European competition for trade 
and wished to stop Croghan’s expedition into the region.  Kickapoo scouts located 
Croghan’s expedition in early June of 1765.26  They quickly notified their followers at 
Ouiatenon, who assembled and ambushed the British envoy the next morning, killing and 
wounding several British men and kidnapping Croghan.  The Piankashaws, who had 
refused to partake in the abduction of Croghan, feared retribution from pro-British 
Indians like the Shawnees and Delaware, who might defend their British allies.  As a 
result, the Piankashaws eventually allied themselves with the British to prevent attacks 
from the pro-British Shawnees.27  The Kickapoos, having captured Croghan, understood 
that the British were an important trading power in the region and thus used Croghan as 
leverage to develop more peaceful relations with them.   Croghan’s supporters called on 
Pontiac to facilitate a council between the two groups, which resulted in Croghan’s 
release after thirty-five days in captivity.  Croghan then led councils at Fort Chatres and 
Detroit in August where the Kickapoos joined in an alliance with the British that 
remained tenuous at best.28   
The Miami settlements at Kekionga, led by Pacanne and Le Gris, remained 
relatively undisturbed during this period because they had developed a unique 
relationship with both the French and British.  They enjoyed easy access to British trade 
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goods while also maintaining positive relationships with the French who lived nearby.29  
Kekionga, unlike Vincennes and Ouiatenon, was a settlement where trading relations did 
not create conflict because the Miamis dictated the terms of trade to which the European 
powers consented.  The Miamis did not need to make themselves subservient to the 
Europeans in order to prosper.  This cultural independence played an especially important 
role for Miami diplomatic decisions when refugee Indian communities entered the region 
during the late 18th century.   
Many refugees immigrated to the area as victims of Iroquoian efforts to 
consolidate power further east, which greatly changed the dynamics of Indian society in 
the valley.  The Potawatomies, Kickapoos, Shawnees, and Delawares lacked legitimat  
claims to the lands and sought other ways to defend their presence.  At first they were 
able to trade with the various European communities that resided in the region, but these 
options vanished once the Americans established themselves.  Thereafter, refuge Indian 
groups survived by forging relationships with the Miami-speaking Indians, trading what 
goods they still possessed, attaining annuity payments through treaty negotiations, or by 
fighting their traditional enemies and the Americans.   
Each group responded to their situation differently.  Having fled the Iroquois 
during the beaver wars in the mid-1600s, the Potawatomies settled in Detroit and Gree  
Bay, eventually migrating south into the Wabash-Maumee Valley in the late 1770s.  Here 
they were able to maintain some autonomy, but without legitimate claim to the land.  
Although they had fought against the British during Pontiac’s Rebellion, they, like the 
Piankashaws, forged an alliance with the British in the mid-1760s.  The Potawatomies 
abandoned that alliance when they moved into the Illinois country and Indiana territory to 
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access French and Spanish goods.  They were able to re-establish ties with French and 
Spanish traders who endeavored to exclude the British, and although this strategy 
worked, it left various Potawatomi bands spread out over a vast territory, factionalized 
over their loyalties to the Spanish, French, and British.     
The Kickapoos entered the Wabash-Maumee Valley for many of the same reasons 
as the Potawatomies.  Pushed into Green Bay by the Iroquois and French during the late 
1600s, the Kickapoos suffered from attacks through much of the eighteenth century, 
although a few Kickapoos had migrated south to Ouiatenon and Vincennes.  For a time, 
the Kickapoos ventured south only to attack French trade routes.  Animosities between 
the two groups stemmed from French attempts to stop the Kickapoos from allying with 
the Iroquois in 1715 and 1716, as such a relationship would have aided British traders 
while undercutting the French.30  The Kickapoos moved south in larger numbers during 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in order to avoid the Sioux and Iroquois 
but also to attack the Peorias, a remnant of the once great Illinois confederacy.  The 
Kickapoos settled in two main communities, one in present-day Illinois north of the 
Sangamon River north to Peoria, and the other near the Piankashaws on the Wabash and 
Vermillion rivers.31  From here they continued to war against the remaining Peorias who, 
according to the Kickapoos, had participated in the assassination of Pontiac at Cahokia in 
1769.   
The Shawnees and Delaware entered the Wabash-Maumee Valley as refugees, b t 
far later than the Kickapoos and Potawatomies.  Although William Johnson, British 
Indian agent for the northern colonies, hoped to secure peace with these Indian nations in 
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1768, his strategy effectively did the opposite.  The Treaty of Fort Stanwix marginalized 
the Delaware and Shawnees in two ways: by not including them in the final boundary 
negotiations, and by ceding their lands in Pennsylvania to the British.  This aided the 
Iroquois, who were able to protect their territory, as well as the British, who had curt iled 
the power of the Shawnee league; however, it placed the Delaware and Ohio Shawnees in 
a difficult position.  They would be forced to fight for their lands or remove west.  Both 
options would weaken them.  Ultimately, most of the Shawnees and Delaware migrated 
west, settling in the Wabash-Maumee Valley.   
The outside Indian groups recognized that they could continue to live in their 
traditional manner in the region even as guests of the Miamis.  It was not as th ugh the 
Miamis did not welcome them.  The Miamis increased their regional influence by 
incorporating groups like the Kickapoo, Shawnee, and Delaware into their socio-
economic networks.  The outside Indian groups were initially very small and posed little 
threat to the established Miamis.  Furthermore, the Miamis did not function as a tribe or a 
unified nation and could not expel the invaders without weakening themselves.  Had the 
Miami at Kekionga mobilized to expel the Delaware and Shawnee, the Piankashaw at 
Vincennes may have welcomed the Delawares and Shawnee into their villages as a way 
to usurp the influence of their northern brethren.   
Factionalism Persists 
 Despite such major changes in the Wabash-Maumee Valley, Indian communities 
continued to operate on local rather than national or racial terms.  Factionalism per isted 
in part because the recent Indian immigrants brought greater competition for the region’s 
resources, but also because their simply was no immediate reason for the Indians to unite.  
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By 1770, the Miami remained in control of Kekionga and the regional trading network.  
The British, although desirous to control the region for economic and military purposes, 
were unwilling to expend the economic capital necessary to supplant the Indians in the 
valley and could only hope to benefits as participants, rather than regulators, of the 
trading network.  Violence did erupt periodically, but the French residents and traders 
were often available to police and temper frontier animosities, which prevented large-
scale violence from developing.  Although there was greater stress on the resources in the 
region, most Indians maintained some control of their affairs.   
Ironically, in their effort to avoid violence, refugee Indians often prolonged it by 
creating factional strife within the communities into which they settled.  The quest for 
land and trade forced the Miamis, Delaware, Shawnees, Potawatomies, Kickapoos, and 
others to compete for resources at a time when access to resources was increasingly 
restricted due to the settlement of non-Indians.  European and American traders also 
amplified factionalism present within Indian communities into greater confli ts when 
they sought greater access to Indian trade goods.  Maintaining stability became more 
tenuous in the period during the American Revolution when war erupted between the 
Indians and Americans, forcing the Indians at Kekionga to use violence, rather than 
diplomacy, to defend their economic interests.   
The Americans first officially arrived in the area during the Revolutionary War 
when George Rogers Clark captured the trading posts at Cahokia, Kaskaskia, and 
Vincennes.  His forces consisted of frontiersmen rather than Regulars (representatives of 
a national government), something the various Indian communities failed to recognize.  
Most Indians at Vincennes remembered the violent and ruthless behavior of Clark’s
34 
Virginia and Kentucky militiamen for decades thereafter, hindering relationships between 
Indians and Americans who arrived in subsequent migrations.  Most historians have 
mythologized Clark, his men, and his victory at Vincennes (Fort Sackville).  However, it 
was, as Patrick Griffin argues, nothing more than a “costless victory.”32  Clark 
accomplished little besides replacing the British forces at Vincennes with oldiers who 
were there to claim the territory for Virginia.  The victory did nothing to strangle the 
British fort at Detroit as Clark argued it would.  Moreover, the victory did not displace or 
undermine French and Indian hegemony in the region.  The support given to Clark on 
behalf of the Indians was simply a diplomatic move to prevent violence, not recognition 
that Americans controlled the area or the trade.  The Indians outnumbered the Britis and 
the Americans collectively and could have destroyed Fort Sackville had they wanted.  
They refrained, for they prized long-term economic relationships over a short-sighted 
victory in battle.   
The Revolutionary War in the Wabash-Maumee Valley was relatively uneventful 
militarily; however, most Indian communities were well aware that Britain and the 
American colonies were at war, and many capitalized on the resulting opportunities.  The 
Wabash Indians wanted to maintain security in a vastly changing world.  Theiralliances 
with the British and the Americans were largely out of convenience because they 
recognized how destructive permanent treaties could be.  Thus, the pact Young Tobacco 
(a Piankashaw) fashioned with Clark makes sense after Clark’s victory at Vincennes.  
The British, although influential in the area, were no longer in control, which convinced 
Young Tobacco never to fight for the British again.  He told “all the Red people on the 
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Wabash to bloody the land no more for the English.” 33  This was quite possibly a 
diplomatic move designed to protect Piankashaw settlements at Vincennes as well as to 
foster new trade relationships, a common strategy for many regional Indi n communities.   
The Kickapoos behaved much like the Piankashaws.  They declared their support 
for the British at Detroit in June and July of 1778 after they met Henry Hamilton in 
conference.  A Kickapoo leader, Manihamba, promised the British that the Kickapoos 
had “no will but that of their British Father.”34  This was not entirely true, for the 
Kickapoos had also professed allegiance to the Americans when they marched with Clark 
to Kaskaskia that summer.  When Clark attacked Vincennes in February of 1779, the 
Kickapoos failed to aid the British even though they had “reconnoitered Fort Vincennes 
for Hamilton and formed a defensive cordon of one hundred warriors about the post.”35  
The Kickapoos and Piankashaw used a war between the British and American colonials 
to their benefit by playing the powers off of each other in order to profit from trade.   
Like the Kickapoos, Little Turtle, a Miami leader hoping to legitimize himself, 
benefited from the unstable atmosphere caused by the American Revolution.  In 1780, a 
French officer, Augustin Mottin de La Balme, gathered nearly eighty Indians and 
Frenchmen at Kaskaskia and Vincennes in order to destroy the British-Miami settlement 
at Kekionga and the British at Detroit.  Although his motives remain a mystery, La 
Balme likely felt that the instability provided an opportunity to punish his British 
enemies.  La Balme, like Clark, believed that Detroit was the “Achilles hel in British 
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Canadian defenses.”36  La Balme’s rhetoric found many supporters along the Wabash and 
in Illinois country who hated the British for disrupting trade.37  Upon his arrival, La 
Balme discovered Kekionga abandoned.  He then looted the Miami trading center, but 
was unaware that Little Turtle was organizing a counter-attack, which he launched on 
November 5, 1780.  Little Turtle assaulted La Balme’s force and killed him and thirty of 
his men which ended the French and Indian threat.38  Not technically a Miami Indian, 
Little Turtle used this victory to legitimize his influence within the Miami nation.  Not all 
Indians considered Little Turtle a Miami Indian because he was the son of a Mohican 
father and Iowan mother.39  He solidified his position as a Miami leader by welcoming 
the Shawnees and Delaware when they arrived in Miami country during the 1780s after 
fleeing vengeful American frontiersmen.  Although Little Turtle disliked the disturbances 
within the Wabash-Maumee Valley, he benefited from them nonetheless by esta lishing 
himself as a Miami leader at Kekionga.  
The Revolutionary War showed both the Americans and the British the 
importance of Kekionga.  It played an essential role in facilitating trade an  diplomacy in 
the region by distributing trade goods from Detroit to Indian allies.  Henry Hamilton 
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hoped to complement British troops with Indian allies and attack American frontier 
settlements and realized that he could do so my accessing the Wabash-Maumee tr de 
network.  The British could ship goods to Detroit and trade with Indians at Kekionga, 
increasing British chances at winning Indian allies.  The Americans, although more 
focused on the eastern theater of war, were furious at the British actions outside Detroit.  
Unable to access Kekionga during the war, the Americans knew that controlling it would 
be essential for their western territories.  Despite recognizing the importance of Kekionga 
and the diverse trading network that it facilitated, the war was uneventful militarily for 
the Wabash Indians as the region had little strategic importance for the rebels or loyalists.   
Indians like the Shawnees and Delaware also recognized the importance of 
Kekionga.  The Shawnees and Delaware fled to Miami country in part because they had 
lost claim to their homelands in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, but mostly becaus the 
frontier violence during and after the Revolutionary War had pushed them there.40  Lord 
Dunmore’s war in 1774 proved disastrous for the Shawnees.  Not only did some angry 
colonial militiamen murder Shawnee leader Cornstalk, but a flood of settlers and land 
speculators streamed into Kentucky and the Ohio Valley in order to seize Shawnee lnds.  
The Delaware advocated neutrality yet suffered nonetheless.  In 1782, the Kentucky 
militia stormed their village at Gnadenhutten in 1782 and murdered 100 people.  The 
violence forced the Delawares and Shawnees to move west and seek protection from 
more established Indian communities.  The Delawares constructed a town on the eas  
bank of the St. Joseph River in 1785 and added two more on the St. Mary’s River two 
years later.  The Shawnees settled further south along the Maumee River.  The Miamis 
typically would have objected to this, yet they used the displaced Indians to their ben fit.  
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It was quite obvious that they would need to unite against the violent and expansionistic 
Americans in order to protect their lands.  The Delaware and Shawnees proved to be 
convenient allies.  This level of cooperation, however, lasted only as long as the Miamis 
were able to control their traditional lands and perceived an American threat.  Still, 
common defense had surpassed trade as the defining characteristic at Kekionga.  
Indians near Vincennes did not unite collectively because such an alliance would 
have undermined the trade network.  The Piankashaw did not control trade at Vincennes 
like their brethren at Kekionga, nor did they necessarily need to do so.  Although 
Vincennes experienced a similar influx of Indians into the area during the 1780ssimilar 
to what happened at Kekionga and Ouiatenon, these migrations were more the result of
economic pan-Indianism than a reaction to either large-scale frontier disruptions or the 
American military forces.  Many Indians actually came to trade with each other at 
Vincennes and with the French settlers.  French diplomatic policing had protected the 
stability of Vincennes because of neutral “exchange zones.”41  The neutral exchange 
existed because the French and Indians had developed and solidified socio-economic 
relationships over the previous sixty years.  Denise Wilson states that the symbiotic 
relationship between the European Americans and Indians at Vincennes was born of out 
of familiarity and economic interdependence.42  Various Indian groups like the Weas, 
Kickapoos, Delawares, Miamis as well as the French and the British, maintained friendly 
relationships because their economic and social relationships depended upon it.   
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The delicate balance between Europeans and Indians present at Vincennes quickly 
disappeared after the Americans settled there. American attempts to take control and 
monopolize the trade produced violence.  Most American immigrants to the valley during 
the Revolutionary War felt that the Indians were duplicitous and deceitful when the 
Indians were in fact only trying to maintain pre-existing trade relationships, which were 
far more important to them than military alliances.  Yet, as the Americans took control of 
all facets of trade they also began to displace the French, a move that proved costly.  
Without consulting the French, the Americans often misinterpreted Indian actions which 
precipitated hostility, creating an increasingly unfriendly region around Vicennes.  Not 
only did the Indians use trade negotiations to assert their power, but balanced trade 
allowed communities to maintain a degree of autonomy.  This balance resulted from the 
Indians’ ability to play the French and British off each other.  Trade declined as the 
Americans gained influence and control of the valley, forcing various Indian 
communities to assert themselves in new ways.   
The events in Vincennes mirrored the experiences of Indians throughout the Ohio 
Valley.  While Indian communities experienced only minor disruptions during the war, 
they were increasingly aware that the Virginians and Pennsylvanians were making a 
concerted effort to stake their claims to the region.  Violence between Indians and the 
Revolutionaries at Blue Licks in Kentucky and Gnadenhutten in Pennsylvania reminded 
most of the Ohio Valley Indians that the ending of hostilities between the British and 
Revolutionaries did not translate to tranquility in the Ohio Valley.  The peaceful balance 
many of the Indians enjoyed throughout the western Ohio Valley disappeared within a 
few years after the British and Revolutionaries signed the Treaty of Paris in 1783.  
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American Intervention 
American Indians refused to recognize Britain’s cession of the Ohio Valley to the 
United States in the Treaty of Paris.  Nonetheless, the Americans marked the lands west 
of Pennsylvania and north of the Ohio for settlement, but watched in horror as Indians 
raided American settlements and murder hundreds of squatters and land speculators who 
had flooded the region.43  By 1790, the United States still had not established its 
sovereignty over the Ohio Valley.  Although the Indians benefitted from the continued 
presence of the British in the southern Great Lakes and the Spanish in the trans-
Misssissippi West, the Indians’ ability to stall the Americans was largely due to disparate 
Indian nations cooperating for a common defense.44  The United States government 
interpreted the growing resistance among the Ohio Valley Indians as the product of a 
growing Indian confederacy devoted to the destruction of the western American 
settlements.  However, few Ohio Valley Indian groups wanted to risk wide-spread 
warfare and hoped instead to use small frontier raids to stop the Americans f om settling 
north of the Ohio River.  Nonetheless, the federal government mobilized its army and 
confronted the Indians, the results of which only exacerbated the factionalism already 
present in the region. 
The failure on the part of the Americans to interpret Indian behavior was nowhere 
more apparent than in Vincennes in the mid-1780s, when some local farmers construed 
the actions of a few Indians as part of a larger conspiracy.  The Americans believed that 
the Indians at Kekionga planned to kill the Americans at Vincennes, and they interpreted 
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a June 20, 1786 Indian attack on two nearby farmers as signs of a larger strike.  Dani l 
Sullivan, a local firebrand, reacted with rage.  He killed the nearest Indian he could find 
and used his horse to drag the man around town.45  The French, the one community 
capable of stabilizing relationships between various groups, feared an all-out war and 
quickly met the Indian forces gathering at Petit Rocher (located three mil s from 
Vincennes) where they diffused the situation.  The French vented their frustration at he 
Americans who failed to distinguish between peaceful and militant Indian groups.  
Sullivan’s crime, coupled with other random outbursts of violence, had forced various 
Indian groups to set aside their differences in order to protect themselves.  To a certain 
extent, Indians stopped discriminating between the French, English, and Americans when 
they retaliated out of fear for their own lives.  Both the Americans and Indians began to 
distinguish each other more through singular identities like Indian and non-Indian in 
order to survive, but such behavior was fleeting.  In fact, the increased unity amongthe 
Indians was more apparent among the Miamis rather than the Indians overall.  The 
Miamis recognized the actions of the Americans and some of the outside Indian 
communities had led to increased attacks on trade routes, creating even greater violence 
in town.  While the Miami-speaking Indians united to a greater extent during this period, 
it was largely due to their cultural and historical connections and not race.46 
In an effort to maintain peace, General Clark decided to increase his force at 
Vincennes in November of 1786 while at the same time requesting that the Wabash 
Indians and Americans convene a council at Clarksville.  Clark’s desire to forge a treaty 
with the Indians showed the extent to which his Virginians understood their tenuous 
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position in the area.  The Miamis saw this as well.  They turned down Clark’s request to 
meet at Clarksville and suggested that they meet at Vincennes instead, knowing full well
that they were in a position to direct diplomacy.  An Indian leader reminded Clark that he 
“ought to know the place we have been accustomed to speak at.  It is Post Vincennes.  
There our chiefs are laid; there our ancestors [sic] bed is and that of our father, the French 
and not at Clarksville . . . We don’t know such a place.”47  There was a subtle but 
important message in that statement.  The Indians reminded Clark that the French 
remained influential and powerful in Vincennes - diplomacy would take place on India 
terms.  Their explicit demands reflected their understanding of frontier negotiations, as 
well as their ability to shape them.  
Most Americans interpreted Indian resistance as militancy and hoped to stop it 
before war broke out.  In 1789, Arthur St. Clair had instructed the federal commander at 
Vincennes, Major John F. Hamtramck, to determine the status of the Wabash Indians.  
Antoine Gamelin, a French trader who had married the daughter of the Indian leader at 
Ouiatenon and who could communicate with the various Indians of the Wabash Valley, 
took on this challenge.  His correspondence with the various Indian communities 
revealed their reluctance to commit to peace without having first communicated with the 
Miamis at Kekionga.  It was obvious that the various Indian communities were concerned 
about the American settlement of Ohio.  Indians questioned the Americans’ professions 
of peace.  In fact, the Indians were troubled by the Americans’ ambiguous motives, 
particularly because of the increased tenor of violence in the area.  Both Indians and  
French inquired about the reasons for yet another American force in the area. 
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Neither the U.S. army nor the French could control the increasingly hostile 
environment in the valley.  Although Major Hamtramck stationed American troops at 
Vincennes in 1787 as part of Josiah Harmar’s effort to conciliate the French and to 
“cultivate friendly relations with the Piankashaw, Wea, Kickapoo, and others,” violence 
continued to grow.48  Hamtramck hoped to promote peace but many American settlers 
continued to misinterpret the actions of the Indians.  Miami leader Pacanne and some 
followers moved close to Vincennes in 1785 because of the growing anti-American 
sentiment near Kekionga.  Pacanne physically separated himself and his followers fr m 
the more militant Miami at Kekionga.  In an attempt to protect Miami interes s, he 
assisted Harmar and the Americans as an intermediary, yet found himself their victim 
instead.  The French and Indians like Pacanne sought to stabilize the region around 
Vincennes, but were continually frustrated by Americans who thought the Indians were 
part of a larger conspiracy based at Kekionga.  Patrick Brown, a Kentuckian, attacked 
Pacanne’s settlements near Vincennes during the summer of 1789 in an effort to avenge 
recent Indian attacks.49  Rather than see Pacanne’s actions within the factional nature of 
the valley, Brown interpreted the Miami and the Indians as a unified entity preparing for 
war.  Brown grew more convinced of this when a large contingent of Kickapoos then 
attacked an American force near the mouth of the Wabash, forcing the French into a 
desperate policing action.   
Hamtramck believed that he needed to take a decisive step in order to stop the 
growing violence around Vincennes.  He hoped to undercut what he perceived as an 
increase in Indian militancy by marching against and destroying the Miami-Wea towns 
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near present-day Lafayette in late 1790.  Surprisingly, he found them abandoned.  The 
Frenchmen in Hamtramck’s forces had actually warned the Indians ahead of time in order 
to protect their friends and family.50  Frustrated by the French, he marched his men back 
to Vincennes without incident.  Although the Indians wanted to attack Hamtramck’s men, 
they likely refrained out of fear that they might hurt the French contingent within it.51  
Peace, however, remained elusive, and many of the Piankashaws moved west while 
several French families migrated south in an attempt to avoid the increasing violence.  
Fewer French residents along with the rise in Kickapoo militancy greatly disrupted trade 
at Vincennes and surrounding hinterland.  The Americans again interpreted th  
corresponding rise in violence as part of a larger Indian conspiracy at Kekionga.   
Policymakers had identified the conglomeration of Indians at Kekionga as part of 
the Miami Confederacy and expected that the American army would put an end to their 
militancy.  Diplomats hoped that military action would officially announce the arrival of 
the United States into the Ohio Valley and dissuade “all peoples of any notions they 
might have about resisting or ignoring the grand plans outlined in the legislation of he 
1780s.”52  Harmar represented more than new settlers or trading opportunities for Indians.  
Rather, as Andrew Cayton argues, he was there to prime the region for the arrival of the 
Americans who hoped to alter the region’s social and political institutions entirely.53  The 
national nature of Harmar and Hamtramck’s endeavors meant that the stability at 
Vincennes, and with that the Wabash Valley, might change drastically.   
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American military intervention had also transformed the Wabash-Maumee 
portage.  The portage area had become even more cosmopolitan during the 1780s as both 
English and French traders established themselves among a more diverse Indian 
population.  The hinterland of Kekionga supported various Indian villages – Delaware, 
Shawnees, Miamis, and Potawatomies.  Kekionga lacked the segregation apparent at 
Vincennes for the “French, English, and Miami lived together,” subordinating themselves 
to the will of the Miami leaders.54  It was not uncommon for influential Miami leaders 
such as Little Turtle or Le Gris to dine with various Europeans on a daily basis.  This is 
not to say that the portage Indians refused to deal with the Americans.55  Negotiations 
with the Americans had failed even when Henry Hay, a close friend of Le Gris’s 
daughter, visited the region in an attempt to forge stronger diplomatic ties between the 
two nations.  His failed mission, however, convinced the Americans that only force 
would give them power over the trading region long managed by the Miamis.  The 
Indians though had no plans to cede control of the Wabash-Maumee region.   
Displacing the Indians from Kekionga involved destroying a league of Indian 
nations the Americans believed to be based there.  What the Americans perceived to be a 
confederacy of Indians was in fact various Indian groups working together in a 
cooperative fashion to protect their villages.  George Washington and Henry Knox both 
hoped to destroy Kekionga, yet watched instead as the American army collapsed in 
defeat.  The Indian league nearly annihilated two American military expeditions into the 
territory during the early 1790s.  The first expedition, led by Josiah Harmar, succeeded in 
his initial attempt to destroy the villages at Kekionga in September and October of 1790, 
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but suffered a humiliating loss at the hands of Little Turtle when Harmar’s forces 
returned later that fall.  Arthur St. Clair attempted to finish Harmar’s job the following 
November, but suffered a similar rout.  The defeats of both Harmar and St. Clair left the 
American army in shambles and the American government unable to enforce its policies 
upon the Indian communities in the Ohio and Wabash valleys.  Harmar’s and St. Clair’s 
defeats placed the Indians of the Northwest in a unique position to influence (if not 
dictate) policy to the Americans in the late 1780s and early 1790s.  However, by 1795 
they had lost power thanks in large part to Anthony Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers in 
1794.  Harmar and St. Clair had both suffered major setbacks because of a united front - 
labeled the “Miami Confederacy” by many Americans - of Indians based largely in 
western Ohio and the Wabash Valley.   
The league as a unified political entity with Little Turtle at its head did not really 
exist and was more the product of American perceptions than reality.  Although Little 
Turtle and Shawnee leader Blue Jacket directed the actions of the league during battle, 
the two leaders did not function as the political head of a unified Indian confederacy.  
The interests of the Indians were simply too diverse to remain united for an extend d 
period.  Shawnee, Miami, Lenape, Haudenosaunee, Kickapoo, Wyandot, and a host of 
other Indians participated in the defeats of Harmar and St. Clair but they did so in order 
to protect their homelands and villages.  Their larger goal was local, rather than racial.  
Any allegiance to the league and to its leaders was temporary, which explains, in part, 
Little Turtle’s efforts to leave the league in 1793 and 1794.   
The Indian alliance had, in essence, thwarted federal Indian policy, yet this did 
not mean the league had not suffered.  In 1791, General Charles Scott destroyed acres of 
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cultivated Miami lands near Ouiatenon, which greatly undermined several Indian 
communities’ ability to subsist.  Under orders from Knox, Scott attacked the Wea towns
west of Kekionga, destroying Ouiatenon and various Kickapoo villages as well.  His 
subordinate, Colonel James Wilkinson also destroyed Kethtipecanunk [Tippecanoe], an 
important settlement north of Ouiatenon, but found it “completely rebuilt” by the 
Kickapoos upon his return two months later.56  Harmar’s expedition, although a failure, 
had devastated Miami agriculture, forcing the various Indian communities into a greater 
dependency upon British and American goods.  It also necessitated that some groups 
make practical alliances that transcended traditional identities.   
Such behavior cemented factionalism within the region.  Two Potawatomi 
settlements, one in the Illinois country and one north of Kekionga, differed mainly in 
geographical placement before the 1790s.  Their physical differences shapedt eir 
experiences with the Americans, which precipitated a more decisive break between the 
two communities.   The western faction of the Potawatomies on the Illinois River near 
Lake Peoria had enjoyed relative autonomy, much like the Miamis, before 1770.  Their 
leader, La Gesse, supported peace with the Americans and met them in council at 
Vincennes in the fall of 1792.  The Potawatomies under La Gesse, Gomo, and 
Waweachsetoh signed the Treaty of Vincennes, which the U.S. Senate failed to confirm.  
The Senate’s failure to confirm the treaty effectively turned it into a pact of friendship, 
which drew the ire of the eastern Potawatomies who settled along the St. Joseph River, 
fifty miles northwest of Kekionga.  The St. Joseph Potawatomies witnessed the American 
military’s attempts to destroy the Indians settlements in the Maumee Valley, including 
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their own.  Having watched their autonomy diminish during the late 1780s and early 
1790s, some Indian communities, like the St. Joseph Potawatomi, turned their support to 
the anti-American Indian Indian league.57  Their alliance with Little Turtle was essential 
for protecting their settlement along the St. Joseph River even though their fellow 
Potawatomies further west supported the Americans.     
The necessity to unite in common defense against the American army eclipsed, 
for a short time, the factionalism that was rife within the allied Indian communities.  The 
Indian league defeated two American armies, which forced the Americans to reconsider 
their strategy for the Wabash-Maumee Valley.  It took the Americans three years after St. 
Clair’s defeat before they could assemble an army capable of competing with the Indians, 
but by 1794 the dynamics had changed.  Little Turtle feared the new, efficient, and well-
supplied American army under Anthony Wayne, and suggested that the Indians negotiate 
a truce, while at the same time Little Turtle’s adopted son, William Wells, aided Wayne’s 
men.  Although the Miamis participated in the campaign against Wayne, they did so in a 
secondary position to Shawnee leader Blue Jacket who had taken command after Little 
Turtle resigned his post.  Although Little Turtle lead his contingent of Miamis into battle 
against Wayne’s men, he did not direct the forces as he had done in the confederacy’s 
victories over Harmar and St. Clair.  Changing physical and diplomatic circumstances, as 
well as Little Turtle’s reluctance to lead the Indians, contributed to Wayne’s victory over 
the Indians at Fallen Timbers in 1794.  Little Turtle was too concerned with his spec fic 
community of Miamis to support a long-term war against the Americans.  He recognized 
that some Indians might suffer if they lost to Wayne’s forces and he hoped that his 
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community of Miami would not be among them.  A strong storm before the battle not 
only dispersed a large contingent of the Indians, but had also made warriors’ movements 
virtually impossible because the wind blew down so many trees.  To make matters worse, 
the Indians could not repel Wayne’s force and attempted to retreat to Fort Miami near 
present-day Toledo, Ohio.  They hoped the British would protect them, yet the British 
refused them aid, a result of improved diplomatic relationship between Britain and the 
United States.  Without British aid, the Indians were forced to concede defeateventually 
signed the Treaty of Greenville nearly a year later.   
The Treaty of Greenville officially marked the end of what Americans called the 
“Miami confederacy.”  Only three Miami leaders signed the initial agreement at 
Greenville, reflecting the extent to which the Miamis were factionalized.  They 
abandoned their villages at Kekionga for other settlements along the Wabash and 
Mississinewa rivers, splitting into several disparate communities that could subsist more 
easily.  Thereafter, most Indian communities depended upon American goods at Fort 
Wayne; the forces under Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne had destroyed large stores and 
vast fields of Miami corn.  The post-war years forced the Miamis, both to consider their 
growing dependency on the Americans and to deal with growing internal faction lism.  
The post-treaty dynamics convinced many Indians to consider treaty negotiations, rather 
than trade relationships, as a means for survival.  European Americans were gaining
greater control over the regional trade by controlling places like Vincennes a d 
Kekionga, which compelled Indians to trade their one remaining commodity, land, in 
exchange for annuity payments. 
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The Treaty of Greenville also promoted greater dependency (an important factor 
in maintaining factionalism) by displacing the Indians from their traditional settlements.  
The Indians signed away a large piece of land which constituted present-day Ohio and 
sixteen much smaller cessions of land that were as important.  The Indians ceded the land 
where Kekionga and Ouiatenon existed, and reaffirmed the American’s control f “the 
post of St. Vincennes” which collectively moved the Miamis and various other Indian 
communities away from their traditional towns and trading centers.58  Although this sort 
of displacement was relatively new for the Miamis who had enjoyed relative stability, 
many Shawnees and Delaware communities saw it as yet another exampl of American 
aggression.  The Miamis hoped to use subsequent negotiations to maintain their 
autonomy, but a large contingent of Shawnees and Delaware had already learned their 
lesson and rejected this rationale.  Some Shawnees moved west to Missouri while others 
simply refused to sign the treaty.  The Miamis had not experienced the degree of 
displacement that the Shawnees, Potawatomies, Kickapoos, or Delawares had and chose 
a more pragmatic approach to dealing with the Americans.  They believed negotiation, 
rather than resistance, would bear fruit.   
The degree to which Indian communities had been dislocated from their 
homelands played a central role in determining how they reacted to the Americans in the 
Wabash-Maumee Valley.  Anthony Wayne’s destruction of the Miami cultural center of 
Kekionga, while important, did not result in the forced removal of the Miamis from the 
valley.  Rather, they simply abandoned the town and the area around it and settled in 
other villages to the west, which had not been destroyed.  Although Kekionga was 
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important, it was only one town, and not the entire Wabash-Maumee Valley.  The 
Shawnees, Kickapoos, Delaware, and Potawatomies had experienced whole-scale 
removal from their territories well before their arrival in the valley.  Many of the 
Potawatomies had fled from Michigan, while the Kickapoos moved north into Wisconsin 
from Illinois.  The Delaware and Shawnees moved west from places like New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Kentucky.  Losing Kekionga for the Miamis paled in comparison to 
the experiences of the Indians like the Shawnees who had lost large parts of Kentucky 
and Ohio.   
Kekionga as the seat of the Miami polity ceased to exist by the late 1790s.  
Wayne constructed a fort at Kekionga (Fort Wayne) and his forces constructed a road 
along the north edge of the Maumee River to its source at Kekionga so that the 
Americans could easily supply the fort and defend any Indian counter attack.59  Fort 
Wayne displaced the various Indian communities that had settled the area, forcing them 
to abandon over five hundred acres of cleared cropland.60  The loss of Kekionga at the 
hands of the Americans did not unify the Miamis.  Le Gris, Jean Baptiste Richardville, 
White Loon, and Little Turtle were the four Miami leaders who signed the Treaty of 
Greenville.  Metocina, Owl, and Pacanne did not.  The divisions apparent among the 
Miamis were also present among other Indian groups.  The Treaty of Greenvill had 
spurred great disagreement within many Indian communities.  In an ironic twist, the St. 
Joseph Potawatomies, who had objected so strenuously to their western brethren’s 
alliance with the Americans, signed the Treaty of Greenville, benefiting rom the annuity 
payments even though they did not have a rightful claim to the ceded territory.  In fact,
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over twenty-five percent of the treaty signers were Potawatomi, even though they lack d 
the historical legitimacy to sign a document ceding lands to which they had a nebulous 
claim.61  Indian groups used the Treaty of Greenville to protect their local interests, at the 
expense of their larger Indian community. 
While some groups utilized the violence to their benefit, others removed west in 
hopes that they could maintain their autonomy by avoiding the Americans who, in turn, 
continually interpreted such behavior as inherently militant.  The majority of the 
Kickapoos, unlike the Shawnees, Delaware, Miamis, and Potawatomies who remained in 
the region, removed further west and south.  A few lingered, joined by a larger contingent 
in the early 1800s, when some Kickapoos migrated back to the area to attack the 
remaining Illinois Indians and in response to Tenskwatawa’s nativist rhetoric.  Those 
Kickapoos who stayed in Missouri and further south fought alongside the Spanish against 
their traditional enemies, the Chickasaw and Osage, until the early 1800s.62  The 
Kickapoos who returned to the Wabash were technically under the jurisdiction of the 
Americans, not the Spanish.  They did not realize the extent to which the Americans, and 
other Indians, would try to regulate their behavior, a major reason the Kickapoos grew 
resistant toward interference from outsiders.  Their migrations to and from the area 
reflected traditional behavior rather than a movement towards militancy.  Some 
Kickapoos associated with the Prophet and other Indian communities hesitated to ally 
with the Americans in order to protect their local interests.   
Some Indian leaders accommodated the Americans after the Treaty of Greenville 
because they believed that the only means of survival was through negotiation.  The 
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Shawnees had a violent history with the Americans and understood better than most that 
resistance might prove disastrous.  Black Hoof’s Shawnees hoped to settle permanent 
agricultural villages near the Miami River by opening diplomatic relations with the 
Americans in Washington D.C.63  These negotiations fueled a growing division between 
Black Hoof’s Shawnees at Wapakoneta and those Shawnees in Missouri and the small 
group of Kispoktha, Thawegila, and Piqua Shawnees who had followed Tenskwatawa 
and his brother Tecumseh to western Ohio.64  Some like Cornstalk advocated 
accommodation and negotiation while others like Blue Jacket believed that militancy w s 
the Shawnee’s only option.  These same ideological camps remained within the Shawnee 
polity well into the nineteenth century. 
Black Beard, in support of Black Hoof, hoped that the Shawnees would unite as 
one nation and devote themselves to an American way of life centered on intensive 
farming and animal husbandry.  Tenskwatawa’s group also hoped for unity but in an 
effort to resist the Americanization of their culture.  The division between the two 
factions grew even more defined in the early 1800s when Tenskwatawa began 
persecuting those Indians involved with the Americans, especially those who “remained 
firmly opposed to his movement.”65  Main Poc, a Potawatomi leader from the Illinois 
country who Little Turtle considered “the greatest warrior in the west,” invited 
Tenskwatawa to settle near him by Ouiatenon.  Thus, Tenskwatawa moved his settlement 
from Ohio into Indiana territory in 1808.66  The two Shawnee factions moved in opposite 
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directions ideologically and, for the Prophet, literally.  There simply was not a practical 
reason for the two groups to unite because their ideological differences trumped the need 
for a common defense.   
Greater competition for resources and American expansion after 1795 only 
exacerbated the ideological divisions between groups.  Indian groups could no longer 
play European powers off each other, nor could they influence trade as they once had.  
Moreover, treaty negotiations filled the void of trade, providing Indians with new 
opportunities to access goods.  Since many had been displaced from their traditional 
homelands, they had little to lose.  The Miamis watched in disgust as the Potawatomies, 
Kickapoos, and others illegitimately signed away Miami lands.  By 1800, treaty
negotiations were the means through which many Indian communities found security. 
These negotiations usually occurred between William Henry Harrison, the 
governor of Indiana Territory, and various Indian communities within the Wabash-
Maumee Valley.  Harrison utilized the factional nature of Indian society to his benefit.  
Several different Indian communities resided in the territory and like the Potawat mies, 
numerous communities hoped to access trade goods and annuities from the Americans, 
but often did so by signing land cession treaties outside of their authority.  Harrison 
capitalized on this willingness and gained land transfer after land transfer.  Several Indian 
groups agreed to sell land, which legitimized a process the governor would use 
repeatedly.  Harrison allowed Indian communities to sign treaties even when he knew 
they had no claims to the area.  Their desire to gain annuity payments provided the 
governor with a convenient tool to force resistant Indians to the negotiating table.    
55 
Few Indians were as complicit in this process as the Potawatomies.  They had 
established power in the Wabash-Maumee Valley by manipulating treatyn gotiations in 
their favor.  They succeeded first during the Vincennes-tract conference in September 
1802, which they used to protect their northern settlements.  Henry Dearborn, the U.S. 
Secretary of War, had cautioned Harrison a year earlier to “sound the Piankiashaws [sic] 
and Kickapoos on the subject of their sale [of the Vincennes land] to the company 
[Illinois and Wabash Company] in the year 1795” in order to determine the validity of the 
sale.67  He did not direct Harrison to negotiate with the Potawatomies because their 
“claims to any of that region were nebulous.”68  The Potawatomies and Harrison 
disregarded Dearborn’s instructions.  Five Medals, aided by fellow pro-American leaders 
like Topinbee and Keesass, ceded “a tract of land stretching along both sides of the 
Wabash from Point Coupee, eighteen miles north of Vincennes, to the mouth of the 
White River,” about 1,600,000 acres.69  This treaty at Fort Wayne in June of 1803 upset 
other groups like the Miamis who felt that the Potawatomies lacked the right to 
participate in Wabash-Maumee politics.  The Potawatomies had filled the void left by the 
Piankashaw Indians who had departed from Vincennes in the mid-1780s to escape the 
violence that had become endemic to the town.70  The Potawatomies also played into 
Harrison’s hands when their threatening presence forced the Kaskaskians to sign a treaty 
ceding almost 8 million acres in present-day Illinois in order to gain the protection of the 
American government.71 
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Figure 1.2, Treaty Boundaries for Indiana Territory 




Rather than negotiate with the Americans, some Kickapoos simply removed west.  
They utilized Spanish assistance to fight against their traditional enemies the Osage and 
the few remaining Illinois Indians.  After the Spanish treated with the Osage, many 
eastern Kickapoos returned to the Wabash Valley in the early 1800s, where they hoped to 
destroy the remaining Kaskaskian and Peoria Indians because they blamed these group  
for the assassination of Pontiac at Cahokia in 1769.  This move angered Governor 
Harrison who was forced to protect the remaining Kaskaskians and Peorias as he did his 
“own citizens,” for the Kickapoo had almost exterminated the Illinois.72  Harrison hoped 
that the Kickapoos might emulate the Cherokee by adopting agricultural subsistence 
strategies and settling quietly while “employed in the cultivation of the earth.”73  But 
Pawatmo and Oulawau’s Kickapoos, like Main Poc’s Potawatomies, remained steadfa t 
in their refusal to make peace with their traditional enemies.  Harrison grew frustrated, 
questioning why he always addressed the Kickapoos “in the language of complaint.”74  A 
noted historian suggests that the Kickapoos were simply unwilling to give up their 
“intense personal and group pride,” which often necessitated revenge.75  Harrison 
summed up what many people thought about the Kickapoos.  They “had received so 
many injuries from the Americans that they were determined to perish to a man rather 
than not revenge them.”76  The Kickapoos refused to act in line with Harrison’s 
diplomatic policies because it appeared that Harrison could do little to enforce his 
policies.   
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To a certain extent, the Kickapoo helped Harrison.  Harrison defended the Illinois 
who, although weakened, still possessed occupancy rights to vast stretches of land that 
Harrison wanted.  They used these lands as collateral, ceding them to the Americans for 
annuities and promises of defense.  The willingness of the Kaskaskians to transfer lands 
to the Americans amplified and redirected Kickapoo fury towards Harrison.  Thus, some 
Kickapoos eventually settled at Prophetstown in reaction to Harrison’s policies.  Th  
governor’s motives for protecting marginalized Indians had indirectly added to the 
assemblage of Indians at Prophetstown.   
The Miamis also opposed many of the American policies but their opposition to 
the Americans did not push them into an alliance with the Prophet.  The Miamis were in a 
unique position as traditional inhabitants of the area.  Most Indians who settled at 
Prophetstown did so because they had experienced such a high degree of change and 
displacement from their traditional lands.  This had not been the case for the Miamis, 
who had experienced great change since 1785, but not large-scale displacement.  Many 
Miamis looked at Prophetstown much like Vincennes.  Both towns represented a foreign 
threat to Miami hegemony.  The rise of a militant nativist settlement in Miami territory 
only gave the Americans a more legitimate reason to attack the Indians, including the 
Miamis.  The Miamis wanted to protect their lands and to find security, which forced 
them to operate between American and nativist demands.  
The portrayal of the Miamis as collaborators is largely the result of histrians who 
misunderstood local factors and who focused only on the relationship between Little 
Turtle, William Wells, and Harrison.  Archaeological and ethnohistorical evidence 
concerning the different Miami bands forged during this period suggests that major 
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historical actors like Harrison “effectively excluded significant portions f each of those 
groups [the Miamis, Delawares, Weas, and Potawatomies of the Wabash] from 
contemporary and, subsequently, historical consideration.”77  One reason the Miamis 
remained divided over their loyalties to the Americans was because many of the goods 
available to the Indians during this time were British, not American, in origin.  Although 
the United States had reduced and then restricted its trade with Great Britain, the Indian 
communities continued to trade with and benefit from British traders in the area.  Th  
“conservative Miami” were attempting to reestablish “constructive kin relations with the 
British” in order to “reproduce their cultural identity.”78  Harrison’s belief that he could 
buy off the leaders, and thus conciliate the Miamis, displayed his ignorance of the issues 
underlying Miami politics.  John Johnston’s remarks from councils at Fort Wayne 
exemplify this trend.  At times he interpreted Miami “interests and destiny” as 
“inseparable from ours [the Americans],” but at other moments he stated that they were 
in league with the Prophet.79  Johnston and Harrison’s comments reflect their inability to 
see how the Miamis remained focused locally rather than nationally.  Americans 
interpreted Miami factionalism as a divide between Miamis who hoped to stop American 
settlement and those who did not.  Americans were unable to see Miami behavior as a 
reflection of the varied Miami experiences throughout the previous century.  The 
Miamis’s efforts to trade with the Americans or the British was not part of a larger 
conspiracy to play the powers against each other.  Rather, it was a reflection of how 
Miami villages continued to protect their local, rather than Indian, interests.  
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Factionalism among the Miami polity was evident especially after some of their 
leaders signed the Treaty of Greenville.  An Indian, likely a Miami, killed Little Turtle’s 
cow shortly after the treaty as “a symbolic act of resistance and opposition” to the 
leader’s relationship with the Americans.  The cow possibly “possessed potentially 
dangerous spiritual power” to Miami society, for they rejected the domestication of 
animals and the cow was thus not only a representation of accommodation but also a 
threat to Miami culture.80  The cow was only a small part of a much larger problem 
within Miami society centered around the Treaty of Greenville.  When LittleTurtle 
signed the treaty, he knowingly abandoned Kekionga, a sacred place marked by the 
Maumee-Wabash portage.  American forts, like American livestock, had polluted native 
culture.  It is no surprise that Miami leaders like Pacanne turned against their 
accomodationist brethren, forging new relationships with Indians outside their polity, and 
at times, treating with the British or supporting the Prophet.  The dynamic shifts in 
Wabash-Maumee associations reflect the extent to which the society had changed in 
relation to American settlement.  Many communities had grown frustrated as the 
Americans forced their way into the valley by taking control of Kekionga and Vi cennes 
and destroying croplands.  With the decline in game and an inability to dictate the terms 
of trade, many Indians were compelled to sign treaties in order to protect their rema ning 
settlements and to access goods necessary for survival.     
During the period 1779 to 1808, most of the Indian nations within the Wabash-
Maumee Valley continued to construct their societies around local relationships and 
regional histories.  There were two major dynamics in the Wabash-Maumee Vall y by 
1808: various local Indian communities that tried to protect the particular relationships 
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they had fostered throughout the 18th century, and two new communities (Vincennes and 
Prophetstown) centered around nationalistic goals and identities.  The Prophet’s town and 
Harrison’s community represented national goals that were in effect a foreign threat to 
the traditional inhabitants of the valley.  The Shawnee leaders Tenskwatawa and 
Tecumseh founded Prophetstown in reaction to decades of displacement and warfare, 
advocating a pan-Indian identity in an attempt to ward off further displacement.  
Vincennes was a physical representation of national expansion: the capital of Indiana 
Territory, which was to facilitate the western advancement of American society.  The 
American government had chosen Vincennes (an old French and British settlement) as 
the capitol of Indiana territory in 1800, and Tenskwatawa had established Prophetstown 
near Ouiatenon (an old Oui trading center) in 1808.  Both communities were thus 
relatively new to the territory but they represented echoes of much older settl ments, a 
point which both the Americans and nativist Indians failed to grasp.  The leaders of both 
towns did not understood the local dynamics and histories into which they settled which 
prevented them from unifying their communities.  Rather than unite racially, the two 
communities divided over conflicting interests tied to local disputes.  The two towns were 









Chapter Two: Evolving Relationships Between Vincennes and Prophetstown 
The early nineteenth century was a time of great flux for the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley.  Various Indian and non-Indian settlements tried to protect the local relationships 
they had fostered throughout the eighteenth century while two new towns (Vincennes and 
Prophetstown) vied for cultural hegemony in the region.  As Indian polities attempted to 
protect what Kathleen DuVal calls “their own sovereign identities,” Prophetstown and 
Vincennes ignored the diverse interests in the region.  Groups like the Miami and French
found themselves caught in the increasingly contentious relationship between Vincnes 
and Prophetstown.  Although the hostility between the two communities appeared to be 
racial, it was in fact far more complicated.1  The dispute between Prophetstown and 
Vincennes amplified pre-existing factionalism within Indian and non-Indian communities 
while also providing convenient opportunities for several communities to protect their 
cultural, rather than racial, interests.   
Prophetstown was a pluralistic and factionalized town.  It was a contested spac .  
Historians have often described it as a Shawnee town because Tenskwatawa and his 
brother Tecumseh used it as a base for their continued resistance to European American 
settlements.  While the Shawnee sentiment was strong in Prophetstown, Kickapoo, 
Potawatomi, and Miami Indians also settled there, each group bringing its own histories 
and interests.  The disagreements within Prophetstown were partially the creation of 
conflicting ideas of space that resulted from groups like the highly migratory Shawnees 
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challenging the relatively sedentary Miami, but they were also a product of their disputes 
over their relationships with the non-Indian communities at Vincennes.     
Like Prophetstown, Vincennes was a contested place.  European American ideas 
of place were as dynamic as those in Indian country, but constructing them came at the 
expense of dispossessing the nearby Indians.  When Harrison negotiated with the various 
Wabash Indians for land cessions, he also demarcated the western boundary of the United 
States of America and the confines of Vincennes.  He fueled a passionate disput  over the 
cultural identity of the town as to whether it would be American, French, or Indian.  
Throughout the eighteenth century, the French constructed what many American settlers 
identified as a distinctly European community.  Many British and Americans understood 
Vincennes to be French, but the French community in Vincennes was actually more a 
hybrid of ethnicities.  The French survived by trading regularly with the Wabash Indians 
while also farming communal lands.  They resisted adopting American values requiring 
the farming of private property and large-scale participation in the market economy 
because it would have placed undue pressure on themselves and their Indian neighbors.  
Most of the French chose to defend their autonomy and way of life in the face of greater 
political and economic marginalization by the Americans.  However, American efforts to 
displace the French did not necessarily mean that the Americans were united.  While they 
hoped to refashion Vincennes into an American town, the Americans divided over the 
identity that community should take - specifically the benefit slavery would bring to it.  
Much like Prophetstown, the inhabitants at Vincennes shared common space but fought 
to protect their cultural identities. 
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Both communities confronted the Miami Indians as they vied for control of the 
Wabash-Maumee Valley.  The Miami played an important part in the relationship 
between the two communities even though they did not have a substantial presence in 
either settlement.  Despite characterizations that they accommodated the Americans 
while opposing Prophetstown, Miami Indians used both communities to protect their 
interests.  Although the Miami allowed non-Miami Indians to live within their villages 
and partake in seasonal hunts, they restricted certain rights (such as farming) and 
excluded certain peoples from living or hunting in their homelands altogether.  The 
Miami’s hegemony in the region depended upon their ability to share certain resources 
while restricting others, which in turn created conflict between the Miami, other Indian 
groups, and European Americans.  For example, supporters of the Shawnee Prophet 
settled in the heart of Miami territory at Tippecanoe where they farmed and hunted as 
guests of the Potawatomi leader Main Poc, even though, from a Miami perspective, he 
lacked legitimacy to offer such an invitation.  The settlement at Tippecanoe angered the 
Miami, who saw it as a physical threat to their regional control because the nativists 
ignored Miami trading rights in the region.2   
European Americans also failed to recognize the delicate ways in which the 
Miami maintained regional hegemony.  Americans traditionally established dominion by 
forcing all foreign cultures out of the area in order to solidify their claims to the region, a 
philosophy in direct contradiction to that of the Miami. While Americans excluded 
foreign cultures to consolidate power, the Miami preferred to keep close tabs on outside 
Indian groups and allow them limited rights in Miami lands.  Rarely did European 
                                                
2 One of the Prophet’s stipulations required that India s cease trading with European Americans.  The 
Miamis relied on the Wabash-Maumee trade network to maintain kinship relations but to also assert their 
hegemony in the region.  The Prophet’s rhetoric served as a direct threat to Miami interests. 
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Americans recognize the intricate ways in which Indians protected their sov eignty by 
sharing their hunting or residential grounds.   In overlooking these efforts to protect their 
sovereignty, some historians have labeled the Shawnee as nativists and the Miami as 
accomodationists.  These interpretive constructs do not recognize the varying histories of 
the Wabash-Maumee Indian communities in relation to concepts of place.  Place mattered 
less to Shawnee identity, while it was fundamental to the Miami who had only recently 
experienced displacement.3  Some Miami willingly negotiated with the Americans 
because they had a history of accommodating outsiders in order to maintain their 
interests; their behavior during the first decade of the nineteenth century reflected that 
history.  The Shawnees at Prophetstown refused to bargain with the Americans due to 
their history of violence and continual displacement brought on by European Americans 
squatting on their lands.     
As the inhabitants of the Wabash-Maumee Valley constructed their communities, 
they became increasingly dependent upon outside groups to legitimize their place n the 
region.  Both the Indians at Prophetstown and the European Americans at Vincennes usd 
each other as a way to establish and protect their interests in the valley.  Inhabita ts at 
Prophetstown confronted the Americans at Vincennes for three reasons: to communicate 
their desire to resist European American cultural influences, to defend their physical 
space to do so, and to stop individual Indian communities from ceding land without the 
consent of all the Indian communities.  The Prophet found himself and his town 
                                                
3 Stephen Warren challenges the accepted belief that all American Indian cultural identities emanate from 
the land itself, stating that “the long Shawnee diaspora meant that infusing new landscapes with sacred 
meaning became a perilous luxury.  Movement became a colonial survival strategy” because the Shawnee 
did not have a homeland.  They had developed an itinerant identity.  Stephen Warren and Randolph Noe, 
“’The Greatest Travelers in America’: Shawnee Survival n the Shatter Zone” in Robbie Ethridge and Sheri 
Shuck-Hall eds., Mapping the Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in 
the American South (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, in press.), 326-330. 
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increasingly tied to the territorial government at Vincennes because it was there that 
Tenskwatawa could challenge Miami leader Little Turtle and his son-in-law William 
Wells.  The residents of Vincennes found themselves increasingly connected to 
Prophetstown because it became a means for local factions to convey their ideological 
positions regarding territorial development and expansion.  Maintaining territorial 
security in the region also demanded that policy makers in Vincennes determine if 
Prophetstown was a militant threat.  The factionalism within both communities continued 
to grow throughout the first decade of the nineteenth century, but this did not prevent the 
eruption of full-scale violence.  Divisions within each town prevented the inhabitants 
from unifying around the racial and often militant visions espoused by Harrison and the 
Prophet.4  Without the support of their followers, Harrison and the Prophet spent more 
time trying to unify the inhabitants of their towns rather than confronting their en mies.  
Rather, the rhetoric between the Prophet and Harrison polarized the communities to such 
an extent that it overshadowed the factionalism within the towns. 
This chapter examines the diverse nature of Prophetstown and Vincennes, 
exploring the various groups that inhabited the towns and the region, while also 
evaluating their interdependencies.  First, I analyze the factionalism between the French 
and American areas of Vincennes, but also describe the ways in which both groups used 
the other in order to protect their interests.  I then examine the ways in which the 
Americans divided over the issues of slavery and involuntary servitude in the territory in 
order to contextualize how they handled Indian affairs.  I contrast a brief description of 
                                                
4 The racial rhetoric espoused by the Prophet was certainly present in the valley during the early 1800s.  
Not only was it present at Prophetstown, but Tenskwata a sent runners throughout the region to gain 
converts to his cause.  American Indians certainly e countered racial ideas, but unifying racially simply 
was not practical if indeed Indian groups fully understood its implications. 
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the African-American experiences in Vincennes with the rhetoric of the slav ry debate in 
The Western Sun for two reasons: to show how the slavery debate had little to do with 
actual slave experiences in Vincennes and to identify a similar pattern also apparent in 
the debate over Prophetstown.  The residents of Vincennes had a tendency to remove the 
topic of conversation (slavery and the Prophet) from its context.  Furthermore, when 
discussing the Prophet and his town, the Americans rarely discussed the Indians i volved 
and tended to refashion representations of Prophetstown into a tool to attack their 
enemies.  The second part of the chapter frames the historical and cultural dynamics 
behind the establishment of Prophetstown, particularly the different ways in which the 
Miami and Shawnees constructed identity and place in the region.  This section also 
describes Tenskwatawa’s village at Greenville, Ohio and his subsequent town near the 
Tippecanoe River.  Understanding the differences between these two settlements allows 
for a more nuanced critique of the varying Indian interests at Prophetstown.  The internal 
factionalism of Indian and European American society redirected and undermi ed the 
American and Shawnees efforts to construct their ideal societies.  Frustrations on both 
sides moved the two communities towards conflict with each other. 
Vincennes 
Elihu Stout was exhausted from lugging printing equipment 190 perilous miles 
from Louisville to Vincennes.  He had traveled up swollen rivers raging with melted 
snow and through overgrown forests said to be hiding Indians hunting for European 
American scalps.  Nevertheless, he made it to the territorial capital of Indiana territory in 
1804, but his relief at arriving safely vanished quickly as he walked the streets of 
Vincennes. Stout discovered several intoxicated Indians lying in the mud next to a 
 
68 
number of their dead brethren and decomposing horse and pig carcasses.5  Stout looked 
wide-eyed at the hundreds of Indians who frequented Vincennes “almost naked, tanned 
by the sun and air, shining with grease and soot; head uncovered; hair course, black and 
straight; a face smeared with red, blue, and black paint, in patches of all forms and 
sizes.”6  Miami-speaking Indians visited Vincennes because they had a historical 
connection to the area and had family members in the French community, many of whom 
were traders.  Although both Indians and non-Indians needed to trade to survive, 
economic relationships often ignited violence in the streets when disagreements broke out 
over the sale and abuse of alcohol.  Violence was common and “it was rare for a day to 
pass without a deadly quarrel, by which ten men [lost] their lives yearly.”7  Though 
alcohol was a factor in the violence, it was not the underlying cause.  Problems developed 
due to the diverse interests coming into regular contact with each other, which forced the 
factional nature of the Wabash-Maumee Valley to overflow into the streets of Vincennes. 
Here, various peoples (Indian and non-Indian alike) contested their interests and defended 
their presence in the region. 
The French hoped to protect their community during this period of drastic change, 
but their efforts upset an American community that wanted to displace them.  The 
Americans in Vincennes viewed the French with distaste and contempt.  Although the 
arrival of the Americans in the late 1770s transformed relationships throughout the area, 
the French maintained their unique village identity that many saw as distinctly 
                                                
5The Western Sun (Vincennes, Indiana), September 3, 1808. 
6 Ibid.  C.-F Volney and Charles Brockden Brown, A View of the Soil and Climate of the United States of 
America: With Supplementary Remarks Upon Florida; on the French Colonies on the Mississippi and 
Ohio, and in Canada; and on the Aboriginal Tribes of America (Philadelphia: Pub. by J. Conrad & Co, 
1804), 22. 
7 Ibid., 23. 
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European.8  Vincennes was at once an American and French town.  Even the physical 
differences between French and American buildings reflected the dual identity of the 
town.  Most structures were French made and lacked what the Americans termed as th  
more “civilized” construction visible in American homes.  To the Americans, the French 
“did not . . . conceive the importance of timber” and covered their houses, stables, and 
barns like a European village “with bark, which destroys more timber than can well be 
calculated."9  The French were simply not as progressive as the newly independent 
American nation.  Most Americans referred to the French residents as “ignorant” because 
of their “uncouth combination of French and Indian manners.”10  The Americans thought 
that they, with their “greater understanding” and “more enlarged views,” worked 
industriously to develop the land while the French lived “in a great state of poverty, 
hauling their firewood from a distance of three or four miles, raising a little corn in the 
neighborhood,” having lost “their former opulence [through] the Indian trade by which 
they subsisted.”11  John Badollet complained that the French desire for wood had ruined 
several available plots of land in the area, inhibiting their sale.  One could stand in he 
commons of Vincennes, he said, and see “trees strewed over & covering the ground, just 
as if a west Indian hurricane had exerted its destructive fury on the land, & the whole 
appearing like a barren waste.”12  The Americans felt uncomfortable in such an un-
American town where the French language dominated and the only Christian presence 
was the Catholic Church.  Americans in Vincennes disliked relying on French 
                                                
8 Volney, A View of the Soil and Climate of the United States of America, 23. 
9 John Louis Badollet, Albert Gallatin, and Gayle Thornbrough, The Correspondence of John Badollet and 
Albert Gallatin, 1804-1836 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1963), . Badollet to Gallatin, June 27, 
1807. 
10 Badollet to Gallatin, Correspondence, January 1, 1806. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Badollet to Gallatin, Correspondence, June 27, 1807. 
 
70 
interpreters and the fact that the only school in the area was run by the French pri st 
Father Rivet.  The French character of Vincennes was starkly visible to the new 
American settlers. 
Physical descriptions of Vincennes reflected the distaste that Americans had for 
the French.  Jonathan Jennings described it as “highly picturesque, situated on the East 
side of the Wabash almost surrounded by a beautiful Prairie” nearly three square miles in 
size.  Bordering the prairie were three “curious mounds regularly formed” and “[were] 
from twenty to thirty feet about the level of the Prairie” where one could watch the last 
few buffalo in the area mingle with herds of cattle.  Upon reaching the top of what 
Jennings called the “Sugar loaves,” one could see dozens of Frenchmen plowing their 
field, a custom he saw as “very ridiculous and grating to the feelings of an American” 
because the land was held in common rather than divided into individual plots.13  
Lieutenant Larrabee was only moderately more kind in his comments toward the French.  
He enjoyed dancing with the “Fair Sect” at the French balls put on in town, but noted that 
the French had corrupted the character of Vincennes by trading with the Indians 
regularly.  He had met “a small and agreeable” group of Virginians and Kentuckians, yet 
Larrabee also longed to be back in “the Yankee States.”14  Although the French offered 
great hospitality, their “idleness and ignorance” in domestic affairs and market-oriented 
production exceeded even the Indians, who many Americans saw as lazy and 
                                                
13 Jennings to Mitchell in Dorothy Lois Riker, ed., Unedited Letters of Jonathan Jennings: With Notes by 
Dorothy Riker (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society Publicatons, 1932) , September 19, 1807. 
14 Larrabee to Adam Larrabee, Fort Knox Indiana Territory, February 7, 1812.  Charles Larrabee, 
"Lieutenant Charles Larrabee's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe, 1811," Florence G. Watts, ed. Indiana 
Magazine of History 57, no. 3 (September 1961): 225-247.  Charles Larrabee (1782-1862) was a member 
of the 4th Army Regiment who wrote five letters to his cousin Adam Larrabee (d. 1869), a Second Lt. 
Charles had been stationed in Pittsburgh when he was transferred to Indiana Territory and traveled to 
Prophetstown under Colonel Boyd. 
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unproductive.15  Jennings and Larrabee enjoyed the physical beauty of the town, its 
dances, and its history, but they did not identify Vincennes as an American town because 
of the obvious cultural presence of the French and Indians.  They recognized a dual town, 
one that echoed the French history of the area and another that reflected the lost potential 
for industry and development.   
Many Americans blamed the violent nature of Vincennes on the French, who had 
close relationships with the Wabash Indians.  Much of this violence took place in the 
central part of Vincennes near the trading houses and taverns operated by the Frenc . 
The chance to see French relatives and friends and trade for goods like alcohol attracted 
an assortment of Indians into the town.  Even though this was customary for the French, 
the Americans cried out against such behavior because the resulting drunkenness and 
violence threatened their livelihoods.  Harrison described the various Indian peoples who 
frequented the town, “intoxicated to the number of thirty or forty at once, when they 
commit the greatest disorders, drawing their knives, and stabbing every one they meet . . 
.breaking open the houses of citizens ; killing their cattle and hogs, and breaking down 
their fences.”16  The liquor trade was just one of the many reasons the Americans hoped 
to replace the French, who nevertheless remained entrenched in the central part of 
Vincennes.  Harrison reacted decisively after 1803 by enacting new laws regulating trade 
with, and preventing the sale of liquor, to the Indians.  As the violence declined, the 
Americans began to establish mercantile and hospitality businesses alongside their 
French counterparts. 
                                                
15 Volney and Brown, A View of the Soil and Climate of the United States of America, 20-25. 
16 James Hall, A Memoir of the Public Services of William Henry Harrison of Ohio (Philadelphia: Key & 
Biddle, 1836), 99. 
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William Henry Harrison’s dislike for the French and Indian inhabitants of the 
town reflected a desire to curtail their remaining political influence i the immediate area.  
Although the American commanders deftly appointed several Frenchmen to political 
positions in the town after 1789 to keep the peace with the Indians, many Frenchmen had 
died or been replaced by American immigrants by 1802.17  Several officials arrived on 
Harrison’s coattails in the five years after he began his term as Indiana’s territorial 
governor, so that, by 1805, the only roles the French had in the territorial government 
were as traders or interpreters during treaty negotiations with the Indians.18  Only two 
Frenchmen served outside this capacity.  Antoine Marechal and Pierra Gamelin wer  
judges in Knox County - but Gamelin, who died in 1804, did not survive long.19  Local 
bias against French participation in the territorial government, however, did not prevent 
them from playing a crucial role in Indian affairs.  Their presence as traders and 
interpreters made them an essential part of the economic and social culture in Vincennes 
after 1805.  Not only did they serve an important role in developing trade throughout the 
valley, the French could also use their familial and historical connections to maintain 
peace in the region.  Even though they did not hold influential posts in the territorial 
                                                
17 Francis Samuel Philbrick, ed.  Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801-1809 (Springfield, IL.: Illinois State 
Historical Library, 1930), ccxix-ccxx. 
18 There was some intermarriage among the upper class sections of Vincennes, but it was usually between 
American men and French women.  The wealthier French families had diverse economic connections and 
lived better than their lower-class Frenchmen.  It seemed that the Americans were more willing to dealwith 
the upper-class French women because they shared common economic interests. The gender dynamics 
suggest that the Americans were willing to marry French women because it would not threaten American 
property, but French men marrying American women would have allowed the French men to control 
American economic interests.   
19 “Journal of the Proceedings of the Executive Government of the Indiana territory,” in William Woollen 
et al, eds., Executive Journal of Indiana Territory, 1800-1816, (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 
1900), 91; Barnhart and Riker, Indiana, 317-18, 318n. Indiana Gazette, October 16, 1804. 
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government, they did determine in large measure the safety of the region and, with that, 
the success of the American settlement.20   
By participating in various treaty negotiations, the French meant to protect Indian 
and American interests so that they could remain in the area, which in turn allowed them 
to protect their own economic interests.  The French remembered the violence ushered in 
by Clark’s victory in February of 1779 and the war-like status created by Sullivan’s 
murderous rampage through the streets of Vincennes.  Trade declined drastically during 
the early American period, causing great suffering among the French residents who 
depended upon it for their livelihood.  The French also recalled when the Americans 
burned their trading houses at Kethtippecanunk (Tippecanoe) in 1791, when many 
American commanders believed that the French had protected the Indians and 
collaborated with the British.  According to the Americans, they destroyed the area to 
disperse the Indians, though it was clear that they had purposely fired the French trading 
houses as well.21  The Americans would simply not deal with the French who did not 
support their national vision.  For a community threatened from without by both 
disaffected Indians and ethnocentric Americans, the French had to use any means 
necessary to protect their interests. When Americans flooded the region, they simply 
bullied their way into the pre-existing economy and eventually displaced the French.  The 
French continued to use their connections with the Indians to forge some semblance of 
normalcy in a rapidly changing environment.  The French hoped to use the Americans 
                                                
20 Jay Gitlin, "Old Wine in New Bottles: French Merchants and the Emergency of the American Midwest, 
1795-1835," Proceedings of the 13th and 14th Meetings of the French Colonial Historical Society 13/ 14 
(1990), 42-43. 
21 American State Papers, Indian Affairs 1832-1834:1:96, Report of the 2006 Archaeological Investigations 
at Kethtippecanunk Tippecanoe County, Indiana, IPFW Archaeological Survey, 233. 
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and Indians to protect their network of trade routes, mercantile houses, taverns, and 
cleared agricultural lands. 
Negotiating land cessions for the territorial government allowed the French to 
maintain existing economic and social relationships with the Wabash Indians.  Their 
influence among the various Wabash Indian nations, not to mention the Indians camped 
in the immediate vicinity, made the French useful to the Americans.  By facilitating land 
cessions, the French controlled annuity payments and goods sent by the United States 
government to the Indians.  It was common for the French traders to siphon off goods to 
trade at a later time, to charge the federal government for items they never deli red to 
the Indians, and to preserve traditional social relationships through the distribution of 
gifts.22  Since they were essential to the diplomatic process, the French interpreters and 
merchants maintained a certain degree of autonomy in the region because the Indians 
simply refused to negotiate without the French.  The American officials did not 
understand the geographical layout of the lands nor did they recognize the important 
differences between the various Indian communities living along the Wabash.  American 
ignorance of Indian affairs in the Wabash region meant that the French would remain
important for territorial affairs.  Harrison knew that he could not protect Vincennes 
without relying on the French.  
Harrison sought the aid of French traders like Michelle Brouillet, Toussaint 
Dubois, and Joseph Barron from 1800 to 1803 in order to secure the lands surrounding 
Vincennes from the Indians.  The governor was only continuing federal policies designed 
to secure the west for the young republic.  The 1795 Treaty of Greenville ceded a tract of
                                                




land including Vincennes to the Americans, so Henry Dearborn instructed Harrison to 
ascertain and define the exact boundaries with the Wabash Indians.23  Dearborn worried 
that the Indians who appeared “uneasy” might react violently if the surveyors marked the 
wrong lands, but he also knew that the Treaty of Greenville had not forced the Indians to 
leave the ceded areas.  Despite Harrison’s belief in the indisputable nature of the treaty’s 
provisions, the governor also realized that “none of the Piankashaw chiefs (by which tribe 
all the former sales in this country were made) attended the Treaty of Greenville, and the 
Wea chiefs, who are said to have represented them, are all dead.”24  To a certain extent, 
Harrison recognized the fraudulent nature of the treaty.  Rather than confront it, he 
suggested not “taking the whole” of the tract guaranteed in the treaty and instead sought 
to negotiate with the Indians for the remainder.25  Harrison felt that continued diplomacy 
would result in the same land cessions stipulated in the treaty while also maintaining 
peace, but knew that this would not be possible without French support.  By late summer 
of 1802, it became obvious that another council was necessary to solidify the Vincennes 
tract boundaries. 
Harrison’s frustration in treaty councils that summer compelled him to seek extra 
legal means to delineating the boundaries of the recent land cession.  According to 
Harrison, the Wabash Indians originally gave the tract to the French who sold it to an 
American land company in Philadelphia shortly before the Revolutionary War.  Because 
of these transactions, Harrison argued that neither the French nor the Indians retained a 
legitimate claim to the area.  Thus, it became the rightful property of the Unitd States.  
                                                
23 Harrison, William Henry, Douglas E. Clanin, and Ruth Dorrel. The Papers of William Henry Harrison, 
1800-1815. Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1994.  Henry Dearborn to William Henry Harrison, 
WHH Papers, January 23, 1802, Reel 1, 247. 




Harrison’s actions disregarded a Congressional decision that had rejected speculative 
land sales before the Revolutionary War, and which therefore negated the French land 
sale to the Illinois and Wabash Company.  In spite of Congress’s decision, Harrison nd 
Dearborn argued that the sale was indeed legitimate and sent surveyors out to define its 
exact boundaries.26  The governor concluded that “all the Indians have understood that 
the claim to [the Vincennes tract] had been extinguished” but in council with the Wabash 
Indians he could “not obtain any satisfactory information as to the depth of the tract 
originally given to Monseiur [Francois-Marie Bissot, Sieur] De Vincennes.”27  A Wea 
Leader, Lapoussier, continued the objections by stating that his “forefathers lent the 
French, land. . . we gave them no land.”28  Securing Vincennes proved difficult for 
Harrison, but he eventually signed treaties in June and August of 1803 that guaranteed 
the area to the United States.29  Without legitimate right to the area, Harrison could not 
hope to secure Vincennes from Indians who objected to the American presence.  By 
using the French interpreters and traders, Harrison protected Americans intere ts through 
traditional diplomatic traditions. 
However, as Harrison used the old French claims to define the boundaries of 
Vincennes, the Americans sought to alter drastically the physical nature of Vincennes.  
The French were well aware of townspeople like Jennings who snubbed their noses at 
their communal farming, but few could ignore men like Harrison, Stout, and Badollet 
who suggested selling off the communal lands in order to expand the local school, 
                                                
26 Henry Dearborn to William Henry Harrison, WHH Papers, June 17, 1801, Reel 1, 320 
27 Negotiations at an Indian Council, WHH Papers, September 12, 1802, Reel 1, 373. 
28 Notes of Speeches at an Indian Council, WHH Papers, September 15, 1802, Rell 1, 380 
29 Charles Joseph Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (Washington D.C., Government Printing 
Office, 1904), 66, 74. 
 
77 
Jefferson Academy.30  Distaste for French cultural traditions was one thing but such a 
major alteration to the French character of the town was intolerable.  Many Fre ch 
residents felt that the territorial government wanted to eradicate any semblance of their 
society, and they grew increasingly resistant to the Americans.   
Resisting the American policies was a challenge for the French once the 
Americans raised taxes.  The increased tax burden forced several French families to move 
out of the area; others feared ruin if the Americans seized their lands when they defaulte  
on their tax payments.  Unhappy with the burdensome taxes and the public officials who 
were unresponsive to their community in Vincennes, the French demanded that Elihu 
Stout print resolutions in his paper The Western Sun.  They expressed their “deep regret 
and chagrin” toward the elected officials for whom they had voted and trusted, men who 
had failed “to realize the promises and assurances which [the French] too credulously 
relied upon.”31  If the taxes and unsympathetic representatives were not enough, the 
Americans began auctioning off French property when the Frenchmen failed to pay their 
taxes.  Confusing tax laws were amplified by a language barrier that prevented most 
French residents from understanding the laws in the first place.  Land seizure co pled 
with the cultural differences added to the increasingly bitter feelings most French 
residents had toward the Americans, guaranteeing that the pluralistic community of 
Vincennes remained segregated. 32   To make matters worse, most Frenchmen blamed 
American intervention for the Indian violence.  In fact, most French routinely socialized 
                                                
30 “French Resolutions,” The Western Sun, August 22, 1807.  Initially a small one room school use where 
the local Catholic priest taught Latin, mathematics, and history, it eventually became Vincennes University 
(exists to this day) and was the only four-year institution in Indiana until the founding of Indiana 
University. 
31 “French Resolutions,” The Western Sun, August 22, 1807. 
32 Stout prints a list of the people who defaulted on their taxes in the January 27, 1808 issue of The Western 
Sun.  The article also stated that all defaulted accounts would have their land sold that March.   
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with their Indian friends and family members, which the Americans abhorred.  Few 
French could find a silver lining in the American policies that forced them to either 
abandon their homes or their traditions in order to survive in Indiana Territory.  Their 
choices were much like those of the nearby Indians - adapt or move. 
 
Figure 2.1, Treaty Boundaries for Indiana Territory 




By 1807, it was increasingly apparent that the French had not fully assimilated 
into American society.  This bothered the governor, who privately questioned French 
loyalty to American interests.  In 1807, when disputes over maritime rights increased 
hostilities between the Americans and the British, Harrison asked the French community 
to consider British abuse of American rights “and adopt some mode of expressing 
[French] sentiments.”33 Vincennes, Harrison thought, might suffer from British or Indian 
depredations if war broke out and, therefore, it was necessary to determine French 
sentiment so that the Americans would know if they would help prevent the Indians from 
siding with any British incursions into the area.  Although the French expressed their 
loyalty to the Americans, they also articulated their frustration that such a loyalty oath 
was necessary.  Their resolutions, framed around Harrison’s allegations, reflected deep-
seated anger over years of displacement.  
Resolved unanimously that we perceive with great Surprise and indignation that 
there appears to exist in the mind of the Governor Suspicions of our patriotism 
and Fidelity to the United States.  That under such circumstances a recurrence to 
the evidence of facts in the past conduct of the French inhabitants of Vincennes 
will furnish the strongest arguments and proofs in our power to adduce to remove 
such injurious suspicions if they really exist.34 
 
Rather than simply accede to Harrison’s demands, the French used the situation to 
question the governor’s suspicions and to state bluntly that their “conduct” in Vincennes 
had always been peaceful.   
William McIntosh, an Irishman who had formed an affinity for the French, seized 
upon this opportunity and wrote a letter of complaint to President Thomas Jefferson in 
order to undermine the governor’s character.  Harrison rejected McIntosh’s claim  that he 
                                                
33 To Thomas Jefferson from the French Inhabitants of Vincennes, “Resolutions adopted at a meeting of the 




doubted the French settlers’ loyalty to the U.S., and told Jefferson that he wanted to use 
the French to gauge the intentions of the British and the Indians.35  The French sided with 
and defended him, while Harrison accused the Irishman of being an “inveterate tory.”36  
Jefferson wrote to the French community in Vincennes and assured them that the United 
States and its officers welcomed and appreciated their support and had never questioned 
their loyalty.37  Harrison, McIntosh, and Jefferson unwittingly declared that the French 
were an important corporate entity within Vincennes even though the French felt 
increasingly marginalized and ignored.  Without French aid, Harrison would have had 
fewer Indian traders serving as sources among the Indians and a more violent territory
because the French would not have served as go-betweens for the two groups.  Even 
though the French assisted the Americanization of the town by aiding in the legitimizing 
of American claims through diplomatic negotiations with the Wabash Indians, they 
remained dedicated to protecting French identity. 
The French residents in Vincennes had a history of playing political forces against 
each other to their benefit.  Hyacinthe Lasselle, one of the most respected French traders, 
was actually born at Kekionga but used his familial connections to profit greatly by 
playing American and Indian interests against each other.  Americans misi terpreted 
Lasselle’s economic ventures as loyalty to the United States when in fact he was simply 
protecting his own interests.  Most Americans believed that the French traders wer  pro-
American because they negotiated for the United States in important treaty councils.  
However, some of these traders, like Lasselle’s family, had a history of switching sides.  
                                                
35 To Thomas Jefferson from the French Inhabitants of Vincennes, “Resolutions adopted at a meeting of the 
French Inhabitants of Vincennes,” WHH Papers, October 10, 1807; Reel 3, 9.  William McIntosh to 
Jefferson, December 15, 1807 in Carter, (ed.), Territorial Papers, 7:503. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Thomas Jefferson to the French Inhabitants of Vincen es, WHH Papers, January 30, 1808; Reel 3, 105. 
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His Uncle Antoine was almost shot in 1794 as a British spy and his brother Francois was 
accused of war crimes during the War of 1812.38  One historian concluded that “it is hard 
not to notice a certain self-serving persistence in French attitudes” in Vincennes.39  
Longtime resident of Vincennes, Michelle Brouillet, held commissions as both a British 
and American officer; playing both sides would serve in the best interest of the French 
community.40  Even Harrison recognized the ulterior motives of the French interpreters 
when he wrote William Eustis that “nine tenths of them prefer the interests of the Indians 
to that of their employers.”41  Harrison failed to recognize fully how the French used both 
the Americans and Indians to maintain some degree of independence.   
He also did not comprehend the extent to which the American settlers disagreed 
with his politics. Harrison’s success in buying the lands around Vincennes allowed 
American settlers to discuss the ideological boundaries of their town and territory.  Two 
American factions began debating the development of the territory in relation to the use 
of unfree labor and slaves.  By 1805, slavery had become the most divisive issue in 
Vincennes.  Several influential men objected strenuously to the legalization of slavery 
and sought to replace Harrison in order to protect their European American community 
from its polluting effects.  Men who initially supported Harrison found themselve  
disgusted by governor’s sponsorship of unfree labor.  John Badollet, for example, rankled
at Harrison’s attempts to legalize slavery in the region.  Born in Geneva, Switzerland in 
1758, Badollet immigrated to Georges Creek by the fall of 1786 to join his close friend 
Albert Gallatin.  Badollet eventually moved to Vincennes with his wife Hannah 
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Nicholson in 1804.42  Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury for Thomas Jefferson, had 
appointed Badollet as registrar for the land office in Vincennes.  Within a year of his 
arrival in Vincennes, Badollet voiced his displeasure with Harrison’s attemp s to negate 
the sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance; Badollet wrote that “[t]he introduction of 
Slavery into this territory continues to be the Hobby horse of the influential men here.”43  
He continued, “The members of the legislature [men appointed by Harrison] have signed
a petition to Congress praying for some reasonable modifications to the ordinance, but 
this favorite topic of slavery, will I trust meet with a general disapprobatin in Congress.”  
Badollet saw these Harrisonian legislators as “shallow” men who were “willing to entail 
on their Country a permanent evil.”44  For Badollet and men like him, national policies 
mattered as much as local security, which is why they became obsessed with the issue of 
slavery even as they lived in such volatile community.   
Badollet and other residents soon coalesced into two large factions defined by 
their stance on slavery.  The factions consisted of well-educated men from around the 
United States and Europe who had a firm understanding of republican ideology and the 
political atmosphere in Washington D.C.  Benjamin Parke, Thomas Randolph, Elihu 
Stout and William Henry Harrison were pro-slavery and hoped to overturn Article Six of 
the Northwest Ordinance or at least pass a law restricting its application in the territory.  
Parke served as the attorney general to the territory from 1804 to 1808, a position held 
thereafter by Thomas Randolph, a first cousin to Thomas Jefferson.  Stout, originally 
from New Jersey, had immigrated to the territory from Kentucky to serve as the territorial 
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printer.  These men represented Harrison’s core group of supporters and defended the 
governor’s stance on slavery as well as his policies towards the Wabash Indians.  They 
hoped to force the Indians out of the territory by purchasing their lands and then open up 
the area to slaveholders in order to spur settlement. 
Other residents of Vincennes opposed many of the Harrisonian’s policies, 
especially slavery.  They believed that slavery would undermine European American 
labor and prevent the settlement of the territory, and they disagreed with Harrison’s 
Indian policy because it seemed to punish the Indians for defending their property.  
Besides Badollet, the most influential of these anti-Harrisonians were Nathaniel Ewing, 
Dr. Elias McNamee, Judge John Johnson, William McIntosh and Jonathan Jennings.  All 
of these men met each other while working for the territorial government.  Ewing was the 
receiver of public monies, McNamee a doctor in town, Johnson a territorial judge, and 
Jennings worked with Stout before he became the territorial representative in Congress.  
McIntosh had moved to the territory after fighting with the British during the 
Revolutionary War, serving as the territorial treasurer until 1804.  These men, though 
from divergent backgrounds, were unified in their opposition to Harrison’s pro-slavery 
policies.  They welcomed an opportunity to discuss slavery when the factions began 
mobilizing for the territorial elections in 1809.   
A contentious debate over slavery’s influence on Indiana territorial affairs broke 
out in The Western Sun i  early 1809.  The Harrisonians and anti-Harrisonian’s published 
lengthy articles about the American Revolution and the ways in which their politics 
embodied the ideals of the newly independent republic.  The parties oriented their articl s
around the views of President Jefferson in order to connect themselves to a republican 
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tradition they believed should be guiding territorial politics.  When discussing Jefferson, 
the factions usually evaluated his relationship to slavery.  The Harrisonians argued that 
Jefferson’s support for slavery justified its use in Indiana Territory, while te anti-
Harrisonians believed that Jefferson’s residence in Virginia had forced him to accept the 
institution.  The men used Jefferson as a way to rationalize their stance on slavery to 
voters.  Most of the men involved in the dispute wanted to win the lone seat to Congress 
as territorial representative and hoped that their articles in Stout’s papers would tip the 
balance.        
Stout, the printer of Indiana Territory’s only newspaper, found himself the 
facilitator of the dispute.  Ewing and Badollet attributed Stout’s behavior to the 
governor’s machinations, claiming that Harrison manipulated the printer in order to 
spread propaganda.  Although Stout had benefited from Harrison’s generosity when he 
first moved to the territory, he did not allow his newspaper to become Harrison’s 
mouthpiece.  Not only did Stout print material objectionable to Harrison, but he 
maintained an independent press in order to protect his sources of information.45  I  was 
at Stout’s office where people reported local news or addressed their grievances about the 
territory, grievances many feared vocalizing to a governor they disliked.  The last thing 
Harrison wanted to do was to undermine Stout’s press to the extent that no one trusted 
him, which is why he stayed out of the dispute that raged in the pages of The Western 
Sun.  Both factions refashioned President Jefferson’s relationship with slavery and the 
meaning of republicanism, but never discussed the actual slave presence in Vincennes.   
It is possible that the differing perspectives regarding slavery reflectd the 
developing economic structure in the territory.  Most of the Americans owned individual 
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farms outside of Vincennes while the French continued to farm their communal holdings 
in town.  Small manufacturers also popped up throughout the southern half of the 
territory so that by 1810, 33 grist-mills, 14 saw-mills, 28 distilleries, 1256 looms, 1850 
spinning-wheels, and 18 tanneries produced nearly $160,000 worth of manufactured 
goods.46  In other words, small-scale manufacturing and farming dominated the economic 
landscape in the region.  Most American residents opposed the legalization of slavery in 
the territory because it would provide incentive for individuals to buy vast tracts of land 
while also undercutting the need for hired help, thereby replacing free labor with slaves.  
Labor was a precious commodity during this period.  Those who supported slavery 
tended to own a great deal of land and likely wished to work it with unfree labor.  They 
hoped that slaves and large-scale agriculture would increase their profits. 
Vincennes was a society with slaves that lacked the restrictive codes pres nt in 
the southern states, and, while the legal record reflects this, the public rhetoric rega ding 
slavery does not.  European Americans circumvented the sixth article of the Nort west 
Ordinance that banned slavery north of the Ohio River by freeing their slaves and then 
forcing them to agree to ninety-nine year indentures.  Some residents found slavery in 
any form to be directly against the soul of the American Revolution.  The town’s factions 
argued about republican ideals and the founding fathers’ relationships with slaves, but 
without mentioning the actual slave community in Vincennes.  The judicial record of 
Vincennes reflects an African-American community that enjoyed relativ  social and legal 
freedoms in Vincennes when compared to the more restrictive lives of slaves in the 
southern states.  When some slaves in Vincennes lodged complaints against European 
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American residents for “ill usage & cruel treatment,” the court responded in their favor.47  
Slaves and free African Americans gathered freely with each other and walked 
throughout the town without passes or supervision; even when imprisoned, slaves could 
count on the European American community to protect their rights.48  Yet despite 
African-American mobility, the anti-slavery men in Vincennes continued to emphasize 
slaveholding practices in the Carolinas and Georgia as representative for Indiana 
Territory.  Slave experiences in Vincennes did not reflect the anti-slavery rh toric printed 
in The Western Sun.  The disconnect between the reality and rhetoric reflected the extent 
to which the parties would ratchet up their language in order to marginalize their political 
enemies. The factions might have found common ground had they actually discussed the 
practical application of slavery in their community.  Instead, the groups sought t  
influence Congress through petitions and by electing a territorial representativ  
responsive to their desires.  Congress ignored their petitions, which left the factions to 
settle the issue themselves.  However, the factions continued to bicker over slavery and 
congressional representation even though Indian affairs threatened to undermine the 
safety of their town. 
Despite the Americans’ success in securing the political boundaries of Vincennes 
and gaining new lands from the Indians, their community remained factionalized nd at 
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risk.  Central to the threat was the growing rift between Wabash Valley Indian 
communities caused by both the American efforts to negotiate land cessions and the 
foreign Indians who had moved into the region.  Little Turtle, speaking for many of the
Miami, rejected the Piankashaw and the Delaware treaties that had been nec ssary to 
secure Vincennes.  Indians resided on these lands without, according to the Miami, 
historical connections to them, but still ceded the lands as if they were their own.  In fact, 
many of the Delaware initially lived near Kekionga under the auspices of the Miami and 
had since moved south to the White River.  Miami identity grew out of local hegemonic 
relationships whereby the Miami incorporated outsiders like the French, British, or 
Indians into their communities while maintaining their sovereignty over established 
trading networks and sacred places like Kekionga.  The Piankashaw, a Miami-speking 
group with cultural ties to the area, lacked the right to cede land “without the consent of 
the Miamis, or so Little Turtle argued.”49  From the Miami perspective, they maintained 
sovereignty over the land even though they had welcomed various groups like the 
Potawatomi and Delaware into the area.50  In response to Little Turtle’s objections, 
Harrison belittled Little Turtle’s authority among the Miami, stating that “nine tenths of 
that tribe who acknowledge Richardville & Peccan for their Chiefs . . . utterly abhor . . . 
the Turtle.”51  In deflating Little Turtle’s importance, Harrison acknowledged the 
factionalism among the Miami.  He also weighed the relationships between the various 
Indian groups and concluded that, 
neither the Miamis nor the Putawatamies have any just claim either in common or 
otherwise to any part of the tract ceded by the Delawares & Piankeshaws. . . The 
Delaware claim to that particular tract was derived from present occupancy and 
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from a grant said to have been made to them upwards of thirty years ago by the 
Piankeshaws. . .That the Piankeshaws are a tribe of the large confederacy which 
obtained the appilation of Miamis from the superior size of the particular tribe to 
which that name more properly belongs is not denied—the tie however which 
united them with their brethren has become so feeble that for many years past the 
connection has been scarcely acknowledged.52 
 
Harrison defended the rights of the Piankashaw in order to secure more lands for the 
territory.   
Harrison’s desire to negotiate, rather than to recognize the intricate rel tionships 
unique to the Wabash Indian community, clouded his understanding.  Arguing that the 
Piankashaws had made their own peace with the United States three years before the 
Miami surrendered at Fallen Timbers, Harrison believed that since “the Piankesh ws 
were competent” to make “peace and war without the consent of the Miamis—they must 
be equally so to sell lands which is acknowledgedly theirs & which is no longer useful to 
them.”53  Harrison contended that the Piankashaw had acted without the consent of the 
Miami before the Treaty of Greenville and should be allowed to act independently in the 
period after it.  This logic ignored the fact that Miami-speaking peoples had alw ys been 
able to negotiate their own alliances without undermining the interests of the larger 
Miami nation.  There was a difference, though, between making peace and ceding lan .  
Peace negotiations did not always involve land.  Harrison’s approach ignored the 
historical circumstances underlying Piankashaw behavior.  Their diplomatic relationship 
with the Americans before the Battle of Fallen Timbers was a product of the increasing 
violence in the southern region of the Wabash River where the Piankashaw lived.  They 
sought peace to protect their community but not because they considered themselves 
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independent from the Miami nation.  Realities of war convinced them to make peace or to 
suffer instead.  Harrison interpreted Piankashaw behavior as a reflection of Piankashaw 
independence when in fact it only displayed traditional Miami behavior in the valley. 
Understanding the ways in which the Miami Indians managed place would have 
helped Harrison in his negotiations.  He grew frustrated and angry with the Miamis when 
he met them in council at Fort Wayne in 1805 because they remained adamantly opposed 
to the land cessions around Vincennes and the White River.  They “strenuously 
contended” that the declaration which they made at Fort Wayne in 1803 regarding the 
right for the Delaware to inhabit the White River area “meant nothing more than an 
assurance to the Delawares that they should occupy the country as long as they 
pleased.”54   The Miamis never wanted “to convey an exclusive right” to the lands.55  In 
attaining Harrison’s recognition of Miami sovereignty in the region, they initiated another 
cession of lands amounting to almost two million acres that embraced “some of the finest 
land in the Western Country.”56  Although the Miami did indeed cede land, they did so on 
their terms and with “persevering obstinacy,” which compelled Harrison to recognize the 
lands on the Wabash River as the common property of the “three tribes who call 
themselves Miami.”57  Harrison dismissed Little Turtle’s “violent opposition. . . to the 
Delaware and Piankashaw Treaties” as a product of his “consciousness of the superiority 
of his talents over the rest of his race and colour.”  Little Turtle lacked the “opportunities 
for exhibiting his eloquence” among his own race and therefore used the stage provided 
                                                






by the treaty negotiations to “satisfy his vanity.”58  Unable to dissect cultural differences 
between the Indian groups, Harrison concluded that their anger and frustration was 
simply a product of their vying for attention.  To Harrison, the Indians recognized their 
own inability to stem the tide of American settlement and wanted his favor in order to 
attain more annuity goods.  What Harrison did not see was how the Wabash Indians used 
him to maintain their traditional interests in the territory.  The Wabash Indians realized 
that the power dynamics were shifting throughout the region, but they also believed that 
any change should be subject to the established cultural dynamics of the area.  Littl  
Turtle, like many of the Indian leaders, was not seeking Harrison’s attention; Little Turtle 
was trying to force the governor to recognize Miami connections to place.   
Even though the Americans had settled at Vincennes, the Miami still laid claim to 
it. In securing Vincennes and the surrounding area from the Piankashaw and the 
Delaware, Harrison initiated a much larger debate over sovereignty by including several 
outside Indian groups in the discussion and by treating the Piankashaw Indians as a group 
separate from the Miami.  Whether he intended to do so, Harrison opened the discussion 
over the ownership and control of land to many of the Indians groups in the territory.  
Soon, other Miami leaders began signing land cessions as a way of asserting thei  righ ful 
authority in the region.  Such behavior had become more commonplace after the 
Revolutionary War as American Indians tried to rebuild their decimated communities. 
Pressure to defend their rightful place in the Wabash-Maumee Valley forced the 
Miami to confront a Shawnee prophet who had reportedly been chastising Indians for 
selling their lands.  William Wells, Little Turtle’s adopted son, desperately wanted to 
control the Prophet, whom he viewed as a threat to Miami hegemony.  In June of 1807, 
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Wells issued a warning to Vincennes that the Shawnee Prophet intended to “destroy 
every white man in America.”59  Wells abhorred the Prophet’s “insolence” largely 
because Tenskwatawa’s rhetoric challenged Little Turtle’s leadership in the valley.  By 
claiming that no single Indian polity had the right to sell lands without the consent of all 
Indian nations, the Prophet defied the authority of Indian communities like the Miami.  
The Prophet argued that the Wabash-Maumee Valley was the property of all Indians; the 
Miami disagreed.  The Miamis believed that the Treaty of Greenville was essentially an 
agreement between the Miamis and the Americans, even though other Indian groups had 
signed it. 
However, Tenskwatawa rejected the Treaty of Greenville which some of the 
Miami Indians had signed.  He also ignored the treaties that Harrison had used to secure 
Vincennes because only a minority of Indian leaders had signed them.  As a result, 
Harrison and his Indian agents worried about the Prophet and his potential destabilizing 
influence in the Ohio Valley.60  Indian agents at Fort Wayne and Detroit reported to the 
governor that various Indian communities had traveled great distances to hear the Prop t 
speak about Indian unity.  Harrison feared that the large migrations of Indians would 
create trepidation among European American frontier communities and increase the 
likelihood of violence.  Harrison feared that the growing number of Indians at 
Prophetstown would undermine his efforts to secure more land cessions.  Well awar that 
many Indians retained their attachment to the French, Harrison hoped to use the French to 
undermine Prophetstown and make the Indians dependent upon the Americans.  He 
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believed that Indians would “look upon the United States in the same light that they had 
formerly done their fathers the French.”61  However, Harrison’s efforts to orient the 
Indians towards Vincennes proved difficult because much of the information the French 
provided shaped Harrison’s Indian policies, which were increasingly confrontational.    
By 1808, fears that the people of Prophetstown were preparing to attack 
destabilized society in Vincennes.  Not only did many residents dread the growing 
number of Indians to the north, but internal divisions over the threat posed by 
Prophetstown fueled violence in the streets of Vincennes.  Some Americans believed that 
their neighbors were conspiring to help the Prophet.  These divisions increased in 
intensity as the Prophet moved into Indiana territory and especially as he became more 
militant.  Rather than unite, the Americans, French, and Miami secretly worked to protect 
their own interests at the expense of the other. All saw their identity and interests 
increasingly connected to the Prophet and his settlement on the Tippecanoe.  Few 
Americans realized that the Prophet was dealing with similar divisions in hiown town.   
Greenville 
Tenskwatawa’s mission to reform Indian society began in the spring of 1805 
when he experienced a vision so profound that he gave up alcohol and decided to help his 
fellow Shawnees separate from the destructive forces of European American culture.62  
Within a year, he established a settlement for this purpose at Greenville, Ohio, three 
miles from Anthony Wayne’s Fort Greenville.  The Shawnees constructed nearly 60 
lodges surrounding a long and imposing council house that sat atop a hill.  From the hill, 
visitors could watch throngs of Indians set up their portable dwellings around the lodges 
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while many others gathered in anticipation of hearing Tenskwatawa’s teachings.  Dawn 
and dusk were met with equal drama as “the faithful offered prayers to the Great Spirit . . 
. in a ceremony described by white visitors as both solemn and dramatic.”63  
Tenskwatawa hoped that their settlement at Greenville would become a cultural center 
where all Shawnees from North America would gather in unity.64  Greenville’s reach 
extended to Indians from various communities including the Potawatomis, Delaware, 
Ottawas, Ojibwa, Sacs, Wyandots, and Shawnees.  To a certain extent Greenville only 
continued a tradition of diverse Indian gatherings in the region, embodied best by the  
diverse groupings of Indians who gathered at the Glaize in 1792 and 1793.65       
Like the meetings at the Glaize, Indian factionalism prevented Tenskwatawa from 
establishing a unified Indian community.  The diverse nature of Indian society at 
Greenville lead to disputes over the advantage of continuing to oppose European 
American intervention in Indian affairs and prevented Tenskwatawa from unifying his 
followers.  This was especially true for the Shawnee people.  While the Prophet h ed to 
construct a permanent physical and cultural barrier between the Shawnees and European 
Americans, he watched as Black Hoof’s Shawnees rejected his message.  Bl ck Hoof, 
like Little Turtle, feared continued militancy against the Americans after Wayne’s victory 
at Fallen Timbers.  In turn, he advocated adapting to American social mores in order to 
prevent full-scale annihilation of the Shawnees.  Desperate to protect Shawnee culture,
Black Hoof believed that associating with the Prophet would spell disaster because it 
would invite further American excursions into the area.  As a highly influential leader, 
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Black Hoof’s resistance was especially difficult for Tenskwatawa, Tecumseh, and Blue 
Jacket to bear.  Without Shawnee support from Black Hoof, Greenville became more of a 
symbolic settlement for displaced and frustrated Indian communities throughout the Ohio 
Valley than a cultural capital for the Shawnee people.  Tenskwatawa probably hoped tat 
his fellow Shawnees would see the remarkable influence he had upon other Indian 
communities and eventually join him in Ohio.  This did not happen, however, and 
Greenville remained a heterogenous Indian settlement rather than a Shawnee center. 
Despite Tenskwatawa’s failure to unite Shawnee peoples at Greenville, other 
Indians remained convinced that the Prophet exercised too much influence.  Little 
Turtle’s son-in-law William Wells continued to pressure the Prophet to leave as did other 
non-Indian residents who feared an imminent attack by him.  However, Wells and the 
European Americans had little power to force Tenskwatawa’s removal frm Ohio.  Wells 
hoped to protect the Miami Indians; they had grown increasingly wary of the Prophet’s 
confrontational statements and feared he might start a war.  Taken captive by the Miami 
at age twelve, Wells forged strong relationships with the Miami Indians and eventually 
married Little Turtle’s daughter while re-establishing connections with his European 
American family in Kentucky.  Little Turtle knew Wells’s value as a go-between.  
Harrison recognized this too, for he made Wells the Indian agent at Fort Wayne.  
Devoted to Little Turtle and fearful that the Prophet might overshadow his father-in-law, 
Wells manipulated information and material goods to protect the interests of Li tle Turtle 
and the Miami.  He purposely overspent his allowance as factor of the Fort Wayne Indian 
agency in order to distribute goods and garner support for Little Turtle.  Wellswanted 
Tenskwatawa and his brother to leave the area; he grew even more resentful when they 
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migrated west to the heart of Miami country near the Tippecanoe River.  Some historians 
have framed Wells’s actions in relation to his desire to protect “American expansionism,” 
but this neglects the cultural and familial ties he had to the Miami.66  At that moment, his 
efforts to force the Prophet out of Miami affairs appeared to backfire.  In fact, an Indian 
agent at Fort Wayne questioned Wells’s contribution to the government’s assimilationist 
plans and suggested to Henry Dearborn that they transfer him to Vincennes because he 
had failed to “answer the purposes of the government” at Fort Wayne.67  Wells could not 
separate himself from his Miami roots when dealing with the Prophet and the Indians in 
the Wabash-Maumee Valley.  His advice to William Henry Harrison and otherIndian 
agents was deeply biased, and as the Prophet tried to unite his followers, he also had to 
contend with Wells’s influence on both Indians and European Americans.  Wells’s 
rhetoric about the Prophet convinced many Indians and European Americans in the area
that Tenskwatawa meant them harm.  However, the Prophet benefited from nearby 
missionaries who countered these accusations.   
European Americans, Indians, and missionaries lived throughout the region 
surrounding Greenville and most interacted with each other on a regular basis.  The 
presence of missionaries near Greenville tempered relationships between Indians and 
European Americans in western Ohio by defending the Indians’ efforts to convert to 
Christianity.  The support of the missionaries mattered a great deal to Indians like the 
Prophet who continually dealt with men like Wells who remained adamantly opposed to 
the Shawnee leader’s presence in the region. Western Ohio served in many ways as the 
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vanguard of American westward settlement, and the diversity of peoples and interests 
proved challenging to the Prophet’s mission.  Although the Prophet benefited from 
Quaker and Catholic missionaries who helped his community, European Americans 
fearful of an Indian attack and oppositional Shawnees spoke out against the Shawnee 
leader.  A group of Shakers that lived near Greenville witnessed the Indians’ devotion 
and spirituality, which one historian claimed could “shame the Christian world.”68  Many 
of the missionaries believed in the Prophet’s pacifist rhetoric, which challenged Wells’s 
professions that the Prophet served the British and hoped to destroy the Americans.  
Weary at the hostility from his fellow Shawnees and from European Americans, the 
Prophet decided to move west where there were far fewer non-Indians and a greater 
opportunity to influence Indian nations not yet surrounded by European Americans.      
In early 1808, the Prophet, his brother Tecumseh, and a host of followers trudged 
west through the woods bordering the Miami and Maumee rivers.  They were on their 
way to Main Poc’s Potawatomi settlement near the confluence of the Wabash and 
Tippecanoe rivers.  The Prophet’s migration west represented more than a piece of the 
Shawnee diaspora; it was also a shift in Wabash-Maumee Valley politics that would 
influence the structure of the Prophet’s town.  The new settlement along the Tippecanoe 
resembled what he and his followers constructed at Greenville, but with some noticeable 
differences.  Among these was Main Poc’s militant resistance to the Americans that also 
complimented Tenskwatawa’s struggle against European American culture.   
Main Poc visited the Prophet at Greenville during the summer of 1807 where he 
heard Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh discuss how interracial marriages, liquor, witchcraft, 
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and American goods had polluted Indian culture.  The three men forged a close 
friendship through their shared rejection of American hegemony and the Indian 
communities that collaborated with the United States. 69  Main Poc exercised great 
influence among Potawatomi Indians communities as a spiritual leader.   The Potawatomi 
relied on his spiritual powers to heal sickness, locate animals for the hunt, and to see the 
future, but many also sought his support because he rejected the growing American 
intervention in the region after 1795.  Main Poc hoped to protect Potawatomi interests by 
forcing the Americans out of their new settlements at Vincennes and St. Louis and by 
continuing to war against his traditional enemies, the Osage.  This angered the Americans 
and Miami Indians, who feared Main Poc’s growing influence among the Kickapoo and 
Sacs and Foxes because it primed the area for open war.   
Main Poc was a relative outsider to the valley and inviting the Prophet to 
Tippecanoe insulted the Miami and traditional inhabitants of the valley.  The Prophet’s 
presence at Tippecanoe placed him in an important position to influence Indians deep  in 
the interior of Miami territory.  Not only had Wells tried to banish the Prophet from the 
region, but he also hoped that Main Poc, “the pivot on which the minds of all the western 
Indians turned,” would aid him in that endeavor.70  He hoped to rein in Main Poc when 
the Potawatomi visited Fort Wayne in 1808 by bribing him with over $800 worth of food 
and other supplies.  Wells’s expense produced nothing.  Main Poc bested Wells, enjoying 
free food and provisions while organizing an attack on the Osage, in direct opposition to 
Harrison’s desires.  Main Poc remained independent from American and Miami control, 
which represented another threat to Little Turtle and the Miami polity.   
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Tenskwatawa and Main Poc settled right in the heart of Miami country without 
fully considering the extent to which their communities’ politics might upset the 
established economic, political, and social relationships between the Indians, Fre ch, and 
Americans.  The Miami could no longer associate with the Americans without first 
proving their loyalty.  The French watched trade decline throughout the area around 
Ouiatenon and Prophetstown due to the Prophet’s demands that his followers abstain 
from the destructive nature of non-Indian goods.  More importantly, previous Potawat mi 
attacks on various groups of Piankashaw and Wea Indians a decade earlier convinced 
many that the attacks would resume once Main Poc and the Prophet settled in Wea 
country.71  But the local geopolitics of the Wabash-Maumee Valley mattered little to 
Tenskwatawa or Main Poc, two men who valued Tippecanoe for its location between 
large settlements of Indians along the Great Lakes and the Mississippi and Ohio valleys.  
It was an important thoroughfare for trade and Indian migrations.  In addition, any 
settlement at Tippecanoe was just two days’ canoe trip from Vincennes and less than four 
days from Fort Malden, which facilitated communication and trade with the British and 
other Indians.  Communication was swift via river travel and these same rivers enabled 
warriors from various Ohio Valley communities to gather there whenever necessary.  
Harrison recognized the tactical advantage of the settlement and its location in the center 
of the “tribes which [Tenskwatawa] wishes to connect . . . he has immediately in his rear 
a country that has been but little explored, consisting principally of barren thickets, 
interspersed with swamps and lakes, into which cavalry could not penetrate, and our 
infantry only by slow laborious efforts.”72  Its location proved to have a tactical 
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advantage, but was also problematic considering that the Miami no longer controlled a 
place equivalent to Tippecanoe that would attract large numbers of Indians. 
Prophetstown, for all intents and purposes, replaced the once vibrant Indian center 
at Kekionga.  The multi-ethnic trading center that defined Kekionga vanished after 
Wayne constructed a fort there and when the Prophet’s settlement attracted Indians to the 
Tippecanoe rather than the Wabash-Maumee portage.  By 1808, the Kickapoo, 
Shawnees, and Potawatomi had displaced the traditional Miami-speaking residents of 
Tippecanoe.  The Prophet’s settlement at Greenville proved more attractive for th Miami 
because they could associate with it while not necessarily undermining Miami interests.  
Doing so at Prophetstown would indirectly acknowledge the Prophet’s influence in the 
heart of Miami territory.  The geographical differences between the Prophet’s two 
communities were quite important.  While Miami Indians visited Tenskwatawa’s 
settlement at Greenville, they refrained from doing so when the Shawnee leader moved to 
the Tippecanoe.73  The likelihood of the Miami ever recognizing Tenskwatawa’s and 
Tecumseh’s pan-Indian confederacy diminished greatly when the outsiders constru ted 
their capital in the heart of the remaining Miami territory.74   
Prophetstown 
Despite moving to a much more isolated area with fewer European Americans 
present, the Prophet encountered resistance from the Indians who already lived there.  
Having left Indiana Territory years before to establish a community at Greenville, Ohio, 
the Prophet recognized that Main Poc’s invitation for him to return to Indiana was not 
without controversy. Tenskwatawa was well acquainted with the politics of the Wabash-
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Maumee Valley and understood that his movement into the area challenged Miami 
hegemony.  It was one thing to have lived at Greenville near many of his fellow 
Shawnees, even if some of them objected to his call to resist the Americans, but it was an 
entirely different matter to move west and settle in the heart of Miami country.   
The Miamis feared that Tenskwatawa’s militant politics would upset the region 
and displace the Miamis further.  After the Miami lost Kekionga following the Battle of 
Fallen Timbers, they found themselves threatened by various Indian communities s ng 
treaty negotiations to access trade goods and annuity payments.  Also, by 1808, the 
Kickapoo and Americans had displaced the Miami from their settlements along the 
Vermillion River and at Vincennes.  The Miami feared that the Prophet would soon do 
the same.  The Miami despised the Prophet’s intrusion into the complex political affairs 
of the region because it polarized relationships between Indians and non-Indians, which 
challenged traditional Miami diplomacy.  The Miami used the British, the French, a d 
Indians to construct their hegemony in the valley during the previous decades; they 
feared that the Prophet’s rhetoric would undermine their customs when dealing with the 
Americans. 
The Prophet knew that his settlement, located among the beech-maple forests and 
wetlands along the Wabash River, upset Americans and Indians alike.  In the post-1795 
era in the Wabash-Maumee Valley, the area around Ouiatenon, like Vincennes, took on 
greater meaning because it remained one of the last vestiges of Miami territory.  French 
traders recognized the area as Miami lands as early as 1717.  Thomas Hutchins descr bed 
the fort as small and stockade “in which about a dozen (white, of course) families 
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reside.”75  Various Indians lived in the area, including some Kickapoo, Piankashaws, 
“and a principal part of the Ouiatenons.  The whole of these tribes consists, it is 
supposed, of about one thousand warriors.”76  Even though the region around Ouiatenon 
lacked the political importance of Kekionga, it nonetheless facilitated trade f om areas 
further north along the Tippecanoe to the settlements around Kekionga.   
C.C. Trowbridge confirmed the value the Miami placed on the region around 
Tippecanoe when he interviewed the Miami in the 1820s.  The Miami’s story reflected 
the cultural importance of areas like Kekionga, Ouiatenon, and Vincennes, and why they 
objected to the Prophet’s settlement near Ouiatenon.  Their migration story focused on 
Quyoukeetonwee, the first emigrant to Ouiatenon, who “traveled to the south, and having 
selected a prairie on the Wabash, about twenty miles below the mouth of the Tippecanoe 
River.”77  The Wea Indians were initially called the Wuyoakeentonwau, eventually 
shortened to Wuyautonoa and then to Weeau.  After the Weeaus increased in number, 
some moved “west to the mouth of the Vermillion River and were known as 
[Piankashaw] because they lacked “holes or slits in [their] ears.”78  Ultimately, one of the 
Piankashaws “descended the Wabash, and settled at a place called Tshipkohkrroanyee, 
(literally at the root)” which is now known as Vincennes.79  In talking to Trowbridge, the 
Miami emphasized geographic markers, specifically their historical connections to 
Ouiatenon, the Vermillion River, and Vincennes.  However, groups like the Potawatomi 
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and Kickapoo settled in the area and upset the regional social and trading networks 
established by the Miami-speaking Indians.  Kickapoo and Potawatomi conception of 
place was in many ways portable, while the Miamis rarely if ever considered 
outmigration as an option to protect their interests.  More importantly, the Miamis feared 
that the Kickapoos and Potawatomies would be more resistant to European Americans 
and upset regional trade.     
European Americans also noticed differences between the Miami and the Indians 
that had recently migrated to the valley.  John Wade, an officer in General Anthony 
Wayne’s force, commented on the changing dynamics near the Tippecanoe River.  
Having traveled far in Miami territory, Wade recognized the Miami’s “civility and 
attention” which convinced him “of the difference between the Wabash and Potawatomi 
Indians.”80  Wade understood that the Wabash Indians were capable of negotiating and 
maintaining peaceful trading relationships, while the Potawatomi could not be trusted.   
The [Potawatomi] I found to be much under the influence of the British, insolent 
– haughty – and domineering – holding forth the power and consequence of the 
British, declaring their determination to exact from every Boat which ascended 
such proportion of presents as they deemed proper and boasting of the quantity 
they received from Great Britain.81 
 
Unwilling to abandon their remaining lands, the Miami Indians were forced to contend 
with a growing presence of outsider Indians who disregarded Miami hegemony.  The 
Miami wanted to protect their traditional places in order to defend their identity, while 
the Kickapoo, Shawnees, and Potawatomi were more willing to establish new settl men s 
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in foreign areas.  While their lands had diminished, the Miami still maintained a large 
swath of their historical homeland.   
Unlike the Miami, Shawnee creation stories reflected a malleable sense of place 
due to their constant displacement and migration. Stephen Warren says that they learned 
to maintain their “distinctiveness through beliefs and practices that were not linked to 
place and that could be sustained in a wide variety of geographic contexts.”82  Like the 
Miami, Tenskwatawa also shared his beliefs with Trowbridge in 1824, a point Stephen 
Warren highlights by connecting Shawnee stories of migration and identity.83  The 
Shawnees had a diasporic history and moved frequently in order to access trade and to 
solidify diplomatic relationships.  The Shawnee were willing to migrate in order to access 
trade, unlike the Miami who believed that controlling trade in the valley was essential to 
their sovereignty.84  The Miami, by consensus, had protected their settlements and 
interests by controlling an important trade portage between the Wabash and Maumee 
rivers and by accommodating outsiders in order to access their trade goods.  The Miamis 
perfected a system that compelled outsiders to adjust their interests and migrate to Miami 
country, which enabled the Miamis to remain relatively sedentary.  
Prophetstown’s exact location remains vague in the historical record.  John 
Tipton, one of Harrison’s subordinates at the Battle of Tippecanoe, placed it “near the 
Tippecanoe on the Wabash” while Harrison judged that it was “about two miles” east of 
Burnett’s Creek.85  Veteran Indian fighters Adam Walker and Peter Funk situated the 
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town three quarters to one mile southeast of the battlefield.  Upon visiting the area, 
Tipton gave the most precise location of the settlement, locating the town  
on the NW side of the [Wabash River] from north to south 2 mile[s] below the 
mouth of the Tippecanoe River on a second bank or high ground between the 
eminence on which the town stood an[d] the river is a bottom of 50 yds bredth the 
site high & beautiful[.]  Extending back half [a] mile near one mile NW of this is 
the Battleground in a small grove of timber surround[ed] by a narrow prairie 
through which on the N runs a small creek called Little Tippecanoe.86 
 
Traveling down the Wabash, one would have seen an expansive and impressive Indian 
settlement stretching for a mile and just 200 yards from the Wabash River.  
Complimenting the settlement was a large cornfield that fed between “one and two 
hundred huts or cabins.”87  The Indians constructed a large storehouse where they could 
place corn, beans, and other goods to feed the Prophet’s followers, after the battle at 
Tippecanoe, an American militiaman ventured into the storehouse and discovered “3,000 
bushels of corn and beans.”88  Decades later, David Turpie described the layout of 
Prophetstown from information given to him by a “French half-breed who had visited the 
Prophet’s town during the time of peace.”89 
The dwellings were built in rows, with lanes or streets between them; there were 
wigwams (or huts) built of poles and bark, furnished inside with robes and skins, 
the spoil of the chase.  There was a large wigwam called the house of the stranger, 
where a traveler might find meals and lodging after the Indian fashion. . . part of 
the town stood in the prairie above the valley, and in this quarter, not far from 
each other, were two public buildings – the Council House and the Medicine 
Lodge-Long, low structure of some size, somewhat like a log cabin, but of 
slighter structure.90 
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Later and less reliable accounts describe a racetrack “for pony races and foot races, and 
an athletic field where Indian games were played.”91  Reflecting their long-standing 
interests in the area, French traders from Vincennes maintained a trading post ear the 
town, but it was nothing in comparison to the numbers of traders and missionaries who 
had lived near Greenville. 
The lack of contact with European American people compounded negative 
perceptions of Prophetstown in Vincennes because so few non-Indians knew what was 
happening at Prophetstown.  A small number of European Americans interacted with 
Prophetstown except for the French traders who visited the town to trade and spy, but 
Americans, including Harrison, questioned many of their reports because he did not trust 
the French.  The lack of missionaries near Prophetstown allowed Wells to influence 
European Americans’ perceptions of the Shawnee brothers and their followers.  
Missionaries functioned similarly to Indian go-betweens in that they often facilitated 
communication between European Americans and Indians.  Harrison and the U.S. 
government understood the importance the French priests played in the territory and their 
ability to use long-standing ties with the Indians to protect territorial stability, which is 
why the federal government appropriated funds to pay for a resident priest in Vincennes.   
Father Jean Francis Rivet, a French priest who arrived in Vincennes in 1794, 
considered moving north to a Potawatomi settlement along the St. Joseph in the early 
1800s where eventually he could have aided Harrison’s mediations with Prophetstown.  
Rivet had earned “the trust and affection of the Indians,” who found in the Black Robe a 
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man on whom they could rely to arbitrate their quarrels.92  As a result of his death in 
1804, there was no resident priest in Vincennes for 14 years to act as an intermediary 
between European Americans and Indians especially when it came to issues surrounding 
Tippecanoe.  Had Rivet moved to the Potawatomi settlement north of Prophetstown, he 
would have dealt with the disagreements arising over the Prophet’s rhetoric and might 
have played an important role in maintaining peace between the Indians and the 
European Americans.  Without a substantial European American presence near 
Prophetstown, the Prophet and Wells’s statements upset Indian/European American 
relationships in the Wabash Valley to a far greater extent than they did at Greenville.  
Wells influenced Harrison to such an extent that the governor accused the Prophet of 
being “a fool that speaks not the words of the Great Spirit, but the words of the devil.”93  
Tenskwatawa responded sharply and asked Harrison not to “listen any more to the voice 
of bad birds” like Wells.94 
The polarizing rhetoric was also the product of Indians seeking refuge from 
American settlers and policies that the Indians felt were destroying their way of life.  
Prophetstown provided various Indian communities with an opportunity for security and 
a place to voice their disgust with American policies and the Indians who supported the 
United States.  Prophetstown was not a static community – it was highly fluid with 
permeable boundaries.  Rather than monitor the diverse groups of Indians that rarely 
remained for an extended period of time, non-Indians began to focus on Tenskwatawa 
and Tecumseh who were two of the few permanent residents in the town.  Other 
Shawnees joined Prophetstown largely in support of Tenskwatawa’s nativist rhetoric, but 
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some of the Kickapoo, Potawatomies, and Miami settled there because it provided a 
convenient opportunity for them to access trade routes and find stability.  At the same 
time, the Kickapoo voiced their anger toward Harrison and his policies designed to stop 
their attacks on the remaining Illinois Indians.  For their part, some Potawatmies saw 
Prophetstown as a platform to voice their displeasure at the decline in annuity payments, 
and some Miami visited Prophetstown in order to marginalize rogue leaders like Little 
Turtle.  Indians associated with Prophetstown for practical reasons outside of 
Tenskwatawa’s ideology.  It provided convenient opportunities for Indians to reinforce 
their ethnic interests. 
Shawnee Indians could travel to Prophetstown and find a settlement that 
incorporated Shawnee beliefs and ideals while also adhering by the Prophet’s nativist 
teachings.  Many of the Shawnees who had lived at Greenville in support of 
Tenskwatawa’s mission followed him west to Prophetstown.  The Shawnees could 
participate in the Prophet’s renewal while also finding it acceptable to maintain kinship 
ties with their fellow Shawnees; they could act both racially and culturally without 
necessarily undermining the Prophet’s message.  The Prophet’s vision allowed Shawnee 
Indians to practice a dual identity as both racially Indian and specifically Shawnee.  They 
were not in a position where living at Prophetstown separated the Shawnee from family 
or clan members, but this was not the case for the other Indian groups in town.  The 
Shawnees accepted Tenskwatawa’s rules because they required less of a sacrifice on their 
part.  
Weighing the different identities of his followers with his racial message of 
unification was a constant process for the Prophet.  Tenskwatawa challenged his 
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townsmen who placed their traditions above the interests of their fellow Indians, but at 
the same time he understood that he could not be too heavy handed and risk angering 
them into leaving his settlement.  Living at Prophetstown was a unique experience and 
quite challenging for the Shawnee leader.  Tenskwatawa had to provide for the many 
different migrations of Indians into his town, offer instruction so that they could purify 
themselves from the polluting influences of European American culture, and manage 
outside perceptions of his community.      
Tenskwatawa also had to confront European American perceptions of him.  
Initially, residents of Vincennes viewed Tenskwatawa as simply a religious prophet.  It 
was after he settled along the Tippecanoe that most residents began to consider him as a
potential threat because of the large migrations of Indians to the town.  In the spring of 
1808, the Prophet sent a speech to Harrison guaranteeing his intent to “live in peace and 
friendship” with the Americans.95  Harrison echoed these sentiments when he responded 
that the Prophet’s “religious opinions [will] never be the cause of dissention and 
difference between us.”96  Tenskwatawa tempered his religious statements to Harrison in 
order to avoid conflict, but in private he called for the segregation of Indians from the 
Americans.  It is ironic that in doing so, he and his followers became increasingly 
connected to the events and peoples at Vincennes; by trying to stop Indians like Little 
Turtle from siding with the Americans, he increased his own connection with the 
territorial government.  He could not escape the inter-tribal politics of the valley.   
The American residents at Vincennes and Shawnee Indians as Prophetstown 
hoped to construct communities based on singular ideological visions, but were unable to 
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do so because of internal factionalism and a growing dependency on outsiders to aid their
cause.  Constructing place proved to be remarkably difficult for these two influential and 
powerful communities.  The Americans needed the French in order to protect their 
economic and political interests, while the Shawnees depended upon the Americans and 
other Indian communities to reject Miami regional hegemony.  Furthermore, disputes 
among the European American in Vincennes and the Indians associated with 
Prophetstown redirected their larger ideological goals. Although Prophetstown and 
Vincennes became increasingly adversarial, the animosity was as much a product of 
internal factionalism as it was a result of racial relationships.    
Both Prophetstown and Vincennes were foreign political entities in the Wabash-
Maumee Valley.  They were, in effect, transplants from geographical are s farther east.  
The Shawnee leaders Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh founded Prophetstown in reaction to 
decades of displacement and warfare, advocating a national Indian identity in an attempt 
to unite Indians against further displacement.  Vincennes was a physical representation of 
national goals.  As capital of Indiana Territory, it was supposed to facilitate the western 
expansion.  Both “new” settlements were hosts to nascent national and racial ideologies 
that redirected the chorus of local disputes, dividing communities further.  Even though 
both settlements flourished in the area, they were fundamentally opposed to each other.  
The Indian-dominated Prophetstown contested the expansive American nationalism of 
Vincennes.  It was the arrival of the Americans that threw the region into upheaval, but it 
was largely the relationship between Vincennes and Prophetstown that created war.
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Chapter Three – A Town Divided: Vincennes Fights the Prophet 
Vincennes in 1800 was a contested space.  Various Indian communities had 
inhabited the area for centuries and played an important role in the imperial contests 
between French, British and Americans.  During the eighteenth century, Vincennes grew 
from a small trading post into an important trading hub.  It lay along the Wabash River, 
strategically placed between the Illinois country and Ohio River.  Even though the 
Americans had political control of the town by 1800, Vincennes remained a pluralistic 
society – a hybrid of Indian, French, and Anglo cultures.  Americans hoped to displace 
the French and Indian residents in order to control their lands and trade, yet the 
Americans also depended upon diplomatic connections with Indians in order to maintain 
stability in a contested region.  Forced to accept the heterogeneous community for 
practical purposes, the Americans found themselves trapped by their desire to fashion a 
political system that could not be imposed upon the French and Indian population. 
Constructing a uniform political system in such a cosmopolitan settlement was 
nearly impossible, and most people either ignored laws they disliked or they divided into 
factions over the laws.  Some, like the French, used opportunities within the oppressive 
American political structure to protect their community by serving as diplomats and 
interpreters for the territorial government.  Increasingly marginalized from mainstream 
political and economic life in Vincennes, these Frenchmen manipulated treaty 
negotiations and reconnaissance missions as a way to reaffirm both their trading interests 
and familial connections with the Miamis.  Largely dependent upon the French to 
facilitate the negotiations that led to land cessions, the Americans had little choice but to 
trust the French community they so desperately wanted out of Vincennes.  Unity among
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the American communities in Vincennes was equally elusive.  Although the Americans 
united around their distaste for the French, the Americans could not compromise on the 
issue of slavery.  The Northwest Ordinance banned slavery north of the Ohio River, but 
the French and Indian inhabitants of the Wabash Valley, to whom the Ordinance did not 
apply, continued to own slaves.  Some American residents of Vincennes, however, 
rejected the institution because it undermined the republican ideals of the American 
Revolution.  Their opponents, meanwhile, felt that legalizing slave labor was essential to 
spur the settlement of the territory by attracting wealthy landowners.  Like the French 
who were largely free of federal interference, many Americans retained slaves as well.  
The issue was so divisive that it radically transformed territorial reltionships.  It 
reshaped how residents viewed their Indian neighbors, particularly the heterogeneous 
Indian settlement at Prophetstown.   
From 1807 to 1812, the French and American residents found themselves 
increasingly tied to Prophetstown, but for entirely different reasons.  Well aware that 
Prophetstown represented a direct threat to Miami hegemony, the French traders 
manipulated intelligence in order to construct a false and more militantly disposed 
characterization of the Prophet and to protect the relationships they had constructed with 
the Miami over the previous century.  Their hope was that the Americans would move 
against Prophetstown.  This would allow the French to continue trading with the various 
Indian communities throughout the region.  The Americans, however, found themselves 
increasingly concerned with Prophetstown for reasons well outside of Indian affairs, 
which they used as a convenient tool through which they could debate territorial policies 
like slavery.  The heated disputes over Indian affairs masked the central underlying issue 
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of the prospect of slavery in the territory.  Public officials in Vincennes argued about
slavery and Indian affairs, and their failure to come to terms led to a fierce taking of 
sides.  The debate within Vincennes dictated the course of events within Indiana as a 
whole, for the influence of a small number of public officials and French traders would 
resonate with their connections in Washington D.C. and determine territorial politics.  
This chapter examines Vincennes and the growing factional rifts between the 
French and American settlers but also within the American community.  American 
policies increasingly isolated the French settlers in Vincennes, which led to greater 
poverty among them and further marginalization from the American community.  
However, several key French traders were able to function within the American system 
and profit from it.  These traders used the opportunities provided by the Americans to 
protect themselves rather than to assimilate into Anglo culture.  This in turn presented 
more problems for the Americans, who came to rely on the “interested” French taders to 
facilitate diplomatic negotiations with the nearby Indian communities, especially 
Prophetstown.  At the same time, they never fully realized the extent to which the French 
manipulated the intelligence to suit their own ends.  The second part of the chapter delves 
into the political dispute between two groups of Americans who disagreed over the issue 
of slavery.  It analyzes how these factions used and even manipulated Indian affairs, 
particularly issues surrounding Prophetstown, to attack their enemies in the slavery
debate.  This chapter ends with the consideration of the printer of Vincennes’ newspap r, 
The Western Sun, as a way to show how the information provided by the French traders 
and the debate over slavery influenced one Vincennes man’s life.  Taken together, th s  
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three sections examine the ways in which factionalism within Vincennes pushed the town 
towards conflict with Prophetstown.  
The Americans Replace the French 
During the first five years of William Henry Harrison’s tenure as governor which 
began in 1800, the French watched in horror as Americans snatched up the lands 
surrounding the French sector of town.  The lucrative fur trade and fertile agricultural 
lands tempted many Americans into settling the region, but they grew frustrated hat the 
French community remained entrenched in the center of town.  The French did not farm 
extensively but rather owned merchant houses, groceries, and taverns in town where they 
could profit from the Indian trade.  Few Frenchmen could compete with the Americans 
who earned large profits from land speculation, nor were the French willing to sellheir 
commonfield in town.  Some French protected their economic interests by establishing 
partnerships, loaning money to new settlers, or by speculating in land, but few had the
means to do so.  Antoine Marechal made a profit by loaning money out to the Americans, 
while Claude Coupin, Pierre Menard, Louis Fortin eventually collaborated with Toussaint 
Dubois, a successful and literate trader.1  Others served as go-betweens for the territorial 
government, but most French settlers suffered from increasing poverty brought on by 
higher taxes and land foreclosures.2   
The divisions present between the two groups were not simply the product of 
ethnocentric policies.  Their cultural background also hurt the French.  Most lacked a 
formal education and could not read or write, nor could many speak English.  Unable to 
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communicate with the Americans and incapable of reading their newspapers, postings, 
and books, the French lacked the tools to survive within the much more competitive 
American community.3  The one school (Jefferson Academy) in town lost its teacher 
when Father Jean Francis Rivet died in 1804; thus, Vincennes went without a resident 
Catholic priest for almost another ten years.  The lack of formal instruction forced the 
French to forgo education but more affluent Americans continued private tutoring.  Many 
Americans recognized the inability on the part of the French to operate within the 
community, and most were happy with that.     
Getting rid of the French seemed to be the logical step in making Vincennes a 
truly American town.  It was to be an American town before it was a “white” town. 
Watching the French race horses and hold dances after mass on Sundays bothered 
Americans who saw such behavior as uncouth and backwards.  One American stated that 
the “customs of [Vincennes] are hardly compatible with my ‘Steady habits,’ one of which 
is the practice of dancing on Sunday.” 4  The Americans also blamed the French for the 
Indian presence in turn, because the two groups traded and cavorted on a regular basis.  
The French had little chance at surviving in a town where they could not communicate 
effectively, function within a vastly different economic system, or live in their traditional 
manner.  One Frenchmen feared the Americans who brought “with them, in a free and 
peaceful country, the discord and disunion of families through lawsuits and taxation.  
Lawyers, sheriffs, and constables will [come] crowding in here “dressed  in “motheaten 
                                                
3 Denise Wilson, “Vincennes: From French Colonial Vil age to American Frontier Town, 1750-1820,” 
(PhD Dissertation, West Virginia University, 1997). 
4 Jared Mansfield, Esq., to Edward Hempstead, Vincenes, I.T., July 30, 1804.   
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blacksuits.”5  For their part, the Americans scoffed at the notion that the “lazy” French 
merchants and farmers would control and profit from local trade when they had done so 
little to facilitate it.  Unwilling to submit themselves to the French, the Americans slowly 
whittled away at the French community by marginalizing the French from the political 
system, raising taxes, and foreclosing on their small plots of land.  For the most part, 
cultural boundaries were impermeable, except for a few men who possessed the linguistic 
skills to operate within the American system.    
Some Frenchmen managed to prosper during this period because they possessed 
the tools that so many of their neighbors lacked - wealth and literacy.  Harrison elied on 
these men when negotiating with the Indians.  Without their support, diplomacy with the 
Indians would have proven far more difficult.  Michel Brouillet, Toussaint Dubois, 
Hyacinthe Laselle, and Jean Baptiste LaPlante played a vital role in Harrison’s 
diplomatic missions among the Indians because they could understand and translate 
several Indian languages.  Despite their shared racial heritage, it rankled the Americans in 
Vincennes to watch Harrison collaborate with the French traders – the same men who 
owned the taverns, groceries, and trading posts in town that the Americans desperately 
wanted.   
Born at Kekionga in 1777, Laselle entered into the fur trade at an early age, which 
enabled him to forge lasting relationships with the various Indian communities in the 
region.6  He had watched his brothers Coco and Francois and his mother collapse into 
debt during the Revolutionary War.  Well aware that the majority of the French enjoyed 
                                                
5 Hyacinth Lasselle and Liliane Krasean. Lasselle collection transcripts and translations. 1713; Louis 
Fortin to Antoine Marechal, , July 25, 1803. 
6 Jacob Piatt Dunn and General William Harrison Kenper, Indiana and Indianans: A History of Aborginal 
and Territorial Indiana and the Century of Statehood (The American Historical Society, 1919), 346. 
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little economic prosperity during the American period, Lasselle appeased local elites and 
entertained many residents and honored guests at the Lasselle Ball Room in the French 
district of Vincennes.  He used the profits to run a very successful tavern in Vincennes, 
where people could get a cheap meal, play billiards, and dance, but the majority of his 
income came from two trading posts to the northwest, near the Kickapoo settlements.7  
Lasselle served Harrison in diplomatic negotiations with the Indians, which earned him 
the right to trade with the Kickapoo and allowed his tavern to thrive while fellow 
Frenchmen Frederick and Christian Graeter struggled to keep theirs afloat.8  Lasselle 
even served as the lead negotiator during the 1809 supplementary treaty with the 
Kickapoo, which Harrison used to legitimize the Fort Wayne Treaty of 1809. 
Michel Brouillet’s connections to the Lasselle family helped him get a license to 
trade with the Indians.  Brouillet clerked for Lasselle’s uncle Antoine, a trader at 
Kekionga, and eventually served as the agent in charge of Lasselle’s tradingposts near 
present-day Terre Haute.9  Literate and knowledgeable about Indian affairs, Brouillet 
served Harrison’s diplomatic missions as an Indian interpreter.  Harrison eventually 
awarded Brouillet a license to trade with the Miami in 1801 and with the Kickapoo in 
1804, but this was probably at Lasselle’s behest.  Trusting the Lasselle family could not 
have been the easiest thing for Harrison.  He knew that Anthony Wayne had almost 
hanged Antoine Lasselle for helping the Indians during the Battle of Fallen Timbers, and 
                                                
7 Hyacinthe Lasselle was a multilingual trader who could speak French, English, and some Indian 
languages.  Michael McCafferty, Native American Place Names of Indiana (Champaign: University of 
Illinois Press, 2008), 58. 
8 The daybooks show that the Graeter brothers charged hi her prices than most other taverns likely because 
they had more debts and little available capital after migration from the Alsac-Lorraine region of France.  
Malcolm Maurice Hodges, A Social History of Vincennes and Knox County, India a, from the Beginning to 
1860. Thesis (D. Ed.)--Ball State University, 1968. 
9 Richard White, The Middle Ground:Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650 – 
1815 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 452.  Nancy Niblack Baxter, The Movers: A Saga of the Scotch-
Irish (Emmis Books, 1987), 370. 
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was also well aware that the family had strong connections in the Miami community.10  
Nonetheless, Harrison needed Brouillet, who lived in town just a few blocks from 
Harrison’s mansion, Grouseland.  Brouillet owned a modest cottage where he socialized 
and traded goods with his Indian friends and rested after journeying out to meet with 
various Miami and Kickapoo communities.  Like the Lasselle family, Brouillet a so had 
connections to the Miami.  Brouillet’s first wife was a Miami woman and their son, Jea  
Baptiste Brouillet, became a Miami leader.11  Although Brouillet eventually married a 
French woman, with whom he had several children, he likely maintained connections 
with his metis son and affirmed these relations in order to maintain his trading 
connections.     
Like Brouillet, other Frenchmen used American policies to their advantage.  
Toussaint DuBois, Peter Lafontaine, and Jean Baptiste La Plant and his son Pierre all 
served Harrison and the territorial government in some capacity.  Lafontaine had lived in 
the area for many years and had even helped Little Turtle defeat La Balme’s men when 
the French leader tried to destroy Kekionga.12  Lafontaine eventually married a Miami 
woman and their children became influential in the Miami community.13  DuBois and La 
                                                
10 Henry Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio: Containing a Collection of the Most Interesting Facts, 
Traditions, Biographical Sketches, Anecdotes, Etc. Relating to Its General and Local history: with 
Descriptions of its Counties, Principal Towns and Villages (Henry Howe, at E. Morgan & Co., 1851), 327.   
11 Walter J. Saucier, "Brouillette to Louisiana and Much Before," Raleigh, NC: 1995, 87; Bob Page, 
"Brouillet: Jacques Brouillet Descendency Narrative," Sept. 2, 1999, 3.; Mary Taugher compil. Old 
Cathedral Records, "St. Francis Xavier Parish Records."; Walter J. Saucier, "Brouillette to Louisiana and 
Much Before," Raleigh, NC: 1995, 41, Poste Vincennes R censement, or Verification of Titles.; Indiana 
Historical Society Publications, Journal of Thomas Dean, (Vol. 6, 1919.).; Mary Taugher compil. Old 
Cathedral Records, "St. Francis Xavier Parish Records." 
12  Bert Anson, The Miami Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 91. 
13 Logan Esarey, Governors Messages and Letters, 337.  Peter Lafontaine came from Detroit to Fort 
Wayne about 1776 and established a trade among the Miami.  
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Plante served as spies for Harrison throughout the period, and the La Plantes establish d 
Indian connections among the Potawatomi Indians who lived along the Tippecanoe.14   
These Frenchmen served Harrison and the Americans during this period, but their 
experiences in Vincennes altered the extent to which they were willing to help the 
Americans.  The Americans were unwilling to accept the French because they differed 
culturally.  Watching their fellow Frenchmen fall into poverty because of oppressive 
American laws placed the traders in a difficult position.  Many of these men contiued to 
live and work within the deteriorating French sector of Vincennes, which obliged them to 
deal with their fellow Frenchmen on a daily basis.  One could walk through the heart of 
Vincennes and see Brouillet’s comfortable house, Lasselle’s tavern, and the Dubois 
trading shop surrounded by small, dilapidated homes where the majority of the French
struggled to make a living.15  To a certain extent these class distinctions also marked the 
American settler houses and establishments, but not to the degree that they did t 
French.  The Americans enjoyed greater opportunities for upward mobility because the 
territorial system favored their language and economic interests.  The system worked 
directly against the French for those same reasons.  Trapped by an American government 
that sought to displace them, men like Brouillet and Lasselle used Indian affairs s  way 
to protect their interests rather than simply as an avenue for profit.   
The literate French with strong connections to the Indian communities had a far 
greater chance to succeed economically and socially, but few if any had much of a 
political voice.  Lasselle, Brouillet, La Plante, and Dubois took on even greater 
                                                
14 Logan Esarey, A History of Indiana (W.K. Stewart co., 1915), 183-185.  Pierre La Plante was the son of 
Jean Baptiste La Plante.  Indiana Historical Collections (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1942), 
262. 
15 Population of Vincennes during this period grew from 800 in 1800 to nearly 5,000 in 1810.  The French 
numbered around 900 in 1788 but that numbered dropped to less than 500 in the early 1800s. 
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responsibility in territorial affairs in the period after 1808.  As the Americans recognized 
the increasingly militant nature of the Prophet, they relied on the French traders nd 
interpreters to legitimize land cessions and to spy on Prophetstown.  While the Americans 
and French shared a common purpose in undermining the Prophet’s influence, they 
differed in their long-term goals.  The French hoped to protect trade and the hegemony of 
the Miami Indians with whom several of the French had intimate connections, while the 
Americans wanted to get rid of Prophetstown in order to establish their dominance in the 
territory.  Most Americans hoped to marginalize and then displace the French and Indian 
communities that remained in the territory.  In attempting to do so, they put the French 
traders in a position to influence the decisions of the Americans. 
The French traders amplified the threat posed by the Prophet in order to force the 
Americans to move against the nativists.  In the spring of 1809, two subordinate Indian 
traders, residing at the Potawatomi villages south of Prophetstown, reported that the 
various Indian communities associated with the Prophet, except the Kickapoo, had turned 
against Tenskwatawa in 1809.  The French traders fashioned a story about how the 
Prophet “had always declared that the least violence which would be offered to him, or 
his followers, would be punished by the immediate interposition of the Great Spirit who 
would not fail instantly to destroy the Perpetrators of so great a Sin.”16  A few Ottawas 
and Ojibwas planned to test the Prophet’s powers by killing an Indian woman within 
Tenskwatawa’s village.  The Prophet’s doubters killed a woman just outside of his hut; 
traders reported that the rebellious Ottawas and Ojibwes fled unharmed, convinced that 
the Shawnee leader was a fraud.  Upon hearing this story, Harrison considered rev sing 
an earlier decision to call out two companies of the militia, but he “thought it best not to 
                                                
16 WHH to Eustis, WHH Papers, April 26, 1809; Reel 3, 399. 
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disband them until [he] heard something decisive from Governor [Meriwether] Lewis.”17  
Dubois used the story from the subordinate traders to influence Harrison.  Dubois told 
Harrison that the murdered Indian woman had been killed by “by Some of the Prophets 
Party to carry on the deception and to prevent us from taking the alarm at the force he is 
collecting and which he pretends is to protect him against the Chippiwas [sic] and 
Ottawas.”18 Dubois reassured Harrison that there was no truth to the rumor that the 
Ottawa and Ojibwe Indians had defected from Prophetstown.  Peter Lafontaine supported 
Dubois and told Harrison that the Prophet “and his followers had determined to 
commence hostilities as soon as they could be prepared & to ‘sweep all the white people 
from the Wabash and white River” after which they intended to attack the Miamis.”19  In 
response, Harrison readied the militia.  The physical act of marching men through the 
streets of Vincennes made the Indian threat very real to the local residents because such 
preparations spoke of the likelihood of an Indian attack.  By mid-May, Harrison received 
information that the Ottawas and Ojibwes had indeed left Prophetstown, entirely 
dispelling “all apprehension of Indian hostilities.”20 Although the intelligence concerning 
the Prophet remained contradictory, the defensive preparations convinced many non-
Indians that the Prophet was indeed a threat.  Neutral Indians found themselves 
compelled to ally with the Americans or the Prophet, which only inflamed relationships 
further by convincing Harrison that a larger threat existed.   
The French traders influenced Harrison’s policies towards Prophetstown far more 
than historians have previously considered.  The fact that DuBois and LaFontaine, two 
                                                
17 WHH to Eustis, WHH Papers, April 26, 1809; Reel 3, 400. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, 409. 
20 WHH to Eustis, WHH Papers, May 3, 1809; Reel 3, 409, WHH to John Johnston, May 4-12, 1809; Reel 
3, 411.   
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men with connections to the Miami Indians, challenged what turned out to be credible 
information regarding the Ottawas and Ojibwas at Prophetstown may have been a 
product of their personal relationships with the Miami Indians.  The French had long-
standing relationships with the Miami Indians and likely shared their vision of 
Prophetstown even if it was not entirely objective.  Michel Brouillet estimated 
Prophetstown’s population to be near 3,000 people, an estimate Harrison relied on to 
characterize the Prophet’s power.  Brouillet eventually admitted his error and suggested 
that there were only 650 warriors at Prophetstown, which meant the population of the 
town was likely less than two thousand, if that.21  The information he provided was 
inaccurate and unreliable and that forced Harrison to question the competency of these
traders at times.   
Harrison openly challenged Brouillet’s value as a spy and replaced him with Jean 
Baptiste LaPlante in the summer of 1810.  The governor sacked Brouillet because he 
wanted “to Procure correct intelegence [sic]” and replaced Brouillet with LaPlante who 
had lived among the Potawatomies near Prophetstown.22  LaPlante did not speak English 
and had always been engaged in the Indian trade, which made him an excellent choice to 
spy on the Indians at Prophetstown.  Harrison felt that the Indians would not consider him 
“much attached to the American Government.”  Not only did the Indians know that 
Harrison employed Brouillet, but the governor was “not satisfied with Some part of his 
conduct.”23  Although Harrison questioned Brouillet’s intelligence regarding 
Prophetstown, he did not alter his policies.   
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Harrison and the Americans simply had no other option but to ask the French 
traders to spy on the Prophet.  There were very few Americans who were as capable as 
the French go-betweens.  Although frustrated by their reliance on the French, Harrison 
believed that the French, like the Indians, would eventually disappear from the valley.  
The French, however, saw the Prophetstown affair as an opportunity to maintain their 
influence in the region.  By characterizing Prophetstown as a threat to the Americans, the 
French hoped that Harrison would chase Tenskwatawa out of the territory.  Without the 
Prophet chastising Indians for associating with European Americans, the French would 
once again profit from the Indian trade.  Harrison believed that the influence the French 
had on his policies was negligible.  Allowing the French to play a role in Indian aff irs 
would, in the end, aid the Americanization of the territory.  Despite their fears of the
Indians nearby, the Americans refused to unite with the French and instead sought to 
reshape the cultural, rather than racial, identity of Vincennes. 
Slavery and Indians 
The Americans had spent much of 1807, 1808, and 1809 arguing about slavery by 
petitioning Congress and members of the executive branch, and by attacking each other 
in The Western Sun.  The debate became for more contentious as the election for 
territorial representative to Congress approached in late 1809.   The debate began with 
tepid articles stating various cases for slavery, but increased in intensity as the factions 
argued about the foundations of American nationhood, particularly the method and 
ideological justifications for territorial expansion.  Each side constructed a version of 
Jeffersonian-Republicanism to defend their stance on slavery, focusing on issues like 
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religious rationale for slavery, the ways in which slavery would affect European 
American labor, and the implications of these issues for Revolutionary republicanism.   
Badollet spoke of maintaining “free and independent men” in the territory, a point 
defended by his fellow anti-Harrisonians.  One anti-Harrisonian argued that the “stocking 
of [the territory] with herds of negroes the now poor would become indigent, because in 
proportion as the negroes increase in our territory, the price of labor will assuredly 
decrease,” causing the “hard working poor white man” who earned 50 cents per day for 
his family to be displaced by the slave earning no more than 25 cents.24  Slavery would 
“tarnish the fame of our growing country, hitherto held up as the asylum of freedom!!” 25  
A loyal Harrisonian, Benjamin Parke claimed that slavery was necessary in the territory 
because a class of laboring poor did not exist in the area.  Residents were “too proud and 
independent to be day labourers.”26  Slaves were like spinning machines and printing 
presses – they were tools necessary for the advancement of industry and the creation of a 
competitive and open market.  If one restricted invention and progress, one courted 
aristocratic autocracy.  Legalizing slavery allowed Americans to shape their own futures 
by creating the tools through which they could succeed.  Parke argued that God had 
ordained slavery by favoring slave owners Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and vowed to 
“unmask [the] gentlemen” so that the public could “behold [them] in all [their] naked 
deformity.”27  According to Badollet, Parke laid the groundwork for a factionalized 
Vincennes. 
Alarmed at the approaching destruction of all his [Harrison’s] hopes[,] . . . he 
[Harrison] formed with Judge Park & Randolph a Caucus wherein were written & 
                                                
24 “For the Western Sun,” The Western Sun, February 7, 1808. 
25 Ibid., February 7, 1808. 
26 Ibid. 
27 “For the Western Sun,” The Western Sun, February 7, 1808. 
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whence flew in every direction the most abusive and artful pieces.  Parke whose 
republicanism had been neutralized in the Governor’s atmosphere, did not disdain 
at the nod of his master to descend from his elevated station, to enlist in the ranks, 
nay to place himself at the head of a faction.28 
 
The factions refused to compromise on the issue and hoped that the election would settle 
the debate. 
The factions viewed the upcoming election for territorial representative to 
Congress as a referendum on the slavery issue.  As the territorial election neared, the anti-
Harrisonians focused on differentiating the pro-Harrison candidate Thomas Randolph, 
from his first cousin, President Thomas Jefferson.  Associating with Jefferson played well 
among the voters of the territory, who were increasingly fearful of the aristocratic 
tendencies of the Federalists.  The anti-Harrisonians saw Randolph’s political prin iples 
as “diametrically opposed to those of Jefferson.”29  Dr. Elias McNamee even labeled 
Harrison a Federalist, recalling his role as a delegate to Congress from the Northwest 
Territory when, according to McNamee, Harrison advocated Federalist principles like the 
need for a standing army.  To McNamee, such a position reflected “the extravagant 
measures of John Adams’s administration.”  McNamee also reminded people that former 
President John Adams “made [Harrison] governor of Indiana.”30  By characterizing 
Harrison as a Federalist and then associating Randolph with him, the anti-Harrisoni ns 
hoped to undermine Randolph’s Jeffersonian connections and convince people to not 
vote for him.  The election was extremely close – Jonathan Jennings, an anti-slavery 
advocate and friend to Badollet received 428 votes to Randolph’s 402.  Jennings had 
                                                
28 Badollet to Gallatin, November 13, 1809. 
29 The Western Sun, May 13, 1809. 
30 The Western Sun, May 13, 1809. 
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refrained from the newspaper debate, largely because he was busy campaigning 
throughout the territory. 
French settlers flooded Vincennes on voting day because territorial laws allo ed 
them to cast their vote outside their township.31  They used the occasion to reconcile old 
disputes and to join in a raucous celebration that proved increasingly important to the 
French community.  The French men would settle their disagreements through feats of
strength that ended when a man cried “Hold, enough!”32  Hundreds assembled in the 
French sector of town near the intersection of Third and Main Streets to witness nearly a 
dozen fights and to join in the merriment of election day.  The French who voted no 
doubt played an important part in Jennings’s election.  Not only had the Harrisonians lost 
the electoral battle over slavery, but the French reminded the Americans that they had not 
pushed the French out of the area either.    
The Harrisonians’ defensive nature furthered the factionalism in Vincennes after 
Thomas Randolph lost the election.33  The Harrisonians became obsessed with Randolph 
because of their distaste for the anti-Harrisonians.  Randolph served as the symbol of the 
Harrisonian policies and his defeat forced the Harrisonians to find new avenues to shape 
territorial politics.  They feared what might happen to their influence in the territory now 
that they had lost the election, especially once Jennings began campaigning against 
Harrison in the halls of Congress.  Jennings called for a six-part investigation of he 
governor in an attempt to negate the governor’s reappointment.  At the same time, John 
Johnson authored an article in The Western Sun claiming that Harrison dissolved the 
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32 Ibid. 
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territorial assembly, a right given him in the Ordinance of 1787, when it failed to meet his 
expectations.  Johnson’s article echoed similar accusations offered by McNamee in a 
letter to the President of the Senate.  The anti-Harrisonians recognized the governor’s 
right to dissolve the assembly, but felt that he had abused his power.  In desperation, the 
Harrisonians sent Johnson’s article throughout the territory in order to garner support 
against their “malicious” and “vapid” enemies, but it had little effect.34  The letter only 
further angered the Harrisonians who were distraught over their loss in the territorial 
election.  The reassigning of the western counties to Illinois Territory in February of 
1809, as well as the more democratic political atmosphere, isolated and marginalized 
Harrison thereafter.35  While the Harrisonians once sought to construct a society around 
slavery, they were now fighting to maintain any sort of political power.   
Following the election, Harrison approached Badollet after discovering that he 
had circulated an anti-slavery petition throughout the territorial counties.  Theirheated 
discussion dampened what had been a friendly relationship.  Harrison took personal 
offense to the petition and remonstrated against Badollet in a letter to Albert Gallatin.  “I 
demanded of him only as the price upon which my confidence and friendship would be 
restored an avowal that it was not his intention to condemn the Motives under which I had 
acted in signing the law – This avowal was however not given & a distant & cold 
politeness succeeded to our former intimacy.”36  The governor attributed much of 
Badollet’s behavior to his association with McIntosh, who, according to Thomas 
                                                
34 Harrison to Thomas Randolph, WHH Papers, Reel 3 645.  Thornbrough and Riker, eds., Journal of the 
General Assembly of Indiana Territory, 268, 314.   
35 Andrew R. L. Cayton in Frontier Indiana states that, “Congress declared that the territorial delegate and 
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Jefferson, was the leader of the French faction in Vincennes.  Many Harrisonian  
believed that McIntosh had swung the election for Indiana territory’s congressional 
representative to Jennings.37  Harrison believed that McIntosh manipulated Badollet 
because “there was not a man on earth more easily duped.”38  Claiming to protect 
Badollet, Harrison said that he had “prevented a petition being sent from this county
signed as I am sure it would be by at least four fifths of the citizens for the removal both 
of the Register [Badollet] & Receiver [Ewing].”39  Harrison’s post-script comment to 
Gallatin shows just how angry he was at the possible ramifications of Badollet’s 
behavior, reminding Gallatin that there were people in Vincennes intimately connected to 
Jefferson, specifically Thomas Randolph.  He wanted Gallatin to know that he had 
connections in D.C. as well and claimed “Ewing’s disposition for tatling & scandal will . 
. . be the cause of” Thomas Randolph’s cousin John Randolph “calling upon you for an 
explanation.”  John Randolph was an influential Virginian Congressmen who supported 
slavery.  Harrison also hoped to turn Gallatin against another anti-Harrisonian, Nathaniel 
Ewing, claiming that,  E [Ewing] said some time since at a tavern that you had informed 
him that Mr. J. Randolph [second cousin to Jefferson] was known to be entirely under 
British influence--& may probably have communicated it to his relation—altho’ he 
declared his disbelief of the story at the time.40  Gallatin defended Badollet and said that 
he had never made any comment about John Randolph.  In his anger, Gallatin failed to 
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sign the terse letter.  To Harrison, Badollet was now an enemy.  To Badollet, Harrison 
was a “moral cameleon” who had “greatly impeded” the settlement of the territory and 
“filled it [with] intrigue and discord.”41 
Before the election, the anti-slavery men had allied with the pro-slavery Illinois 
factions in favor of territorial division.  The residents of Illinois would win division from 
Indiana Territory and construct a government more responsive to their needs, while also 
legalizing a defacto form of slavery.42  The anti-Harrisonians benefited because Harrison 
lost a large group of pro-slavery supporters, leaving the Harrisonians “on the 
defensive.”43  It was in this context that Badollet and Ewing circulated their anti-slavery 
petition, which placed greater pressure on the Harrisonians to defend their political 
legitimacy.  Badollet said Harrison “became enraged against Ewing & [himself], 
accustomed to a blind devotion to his mandates; he could not conceive such 
independence, such rebellious boldness.”44  Harrison’s anger was understandable, 
considering that he had experienced a drastic decline in his ability to govern the territory 
on his terms.     
Harrison’s desperation during this period may have influenced his handling of 
Indian affairs, something Badollet noticed during the previous months.  Harrison’s desire 
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to see the residents of Indiana territory elect Randolph to Congress rather th n Jennings 
had so absorbed the governor that he did not mobilize the militia effectively in the face of 
a possible Indian war.  Both Meriwether Lewis and William Wells had warned Harrison 
of a possible Indian war, but rather than sending emissaries throughout the region, 
Harrison “posted two companies . . . four miles from Vincennes, where they spent the 
working season in sloth and idle mockery of military manoeuvres.”45  The anti-
Harrisonians were especially angry at this because the militiamen wer not prepared in 
the event of an attack.  While Badollet may have overreacted to Harrison’s handling of 
the situation, Benjamin Parke, a close confidant of Harrison’s, expressed his fear in early 
May that the Indians on the Wabash were indeed a threat.46  Whether Badollet’s behavior 
reflected his personal animosity towards Harrison or a fair evaluation of the situation, he 
nonetheless began to understand Harrison’s political behavior in relation to Indian affa rs.  
Harrison used the threat of an Indian war to challenge those residents of 
Vincennes who had undermined his authority.  Some people felt that he used fear to 
propagate a conspiracy in an effort to discredit and marginalize his adversries.  Blaming 
his enemies for Indian depredations was an easy way for the governor to undermine their 
support.  After several Wabash Indian communities declined to meet the governor duri g 
the fall of 1809, Harrison addressed the General Assembly at Vincennes, spreading “the 
impression and even [hinting] to the Legislature that [he] had met with difficulties in his 
[negotiation] from the machinations of certain enemies of their country residing at 
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Vincennes.”47  Harrison suggested that his political enemies had failed to stop his policies 
in the assembly and had then convinced the Indians to reject his attempts to negotiate 
treaties.  Harrison wanted others to think that the anti-Harrisonians had excited the 
Wabash Indians against Vincennes in order to destabilize the governor’s leaderhip.48  
As the factional strife became associated with local issues surrounding Ian
policy, the participants became more desperate, sometimes turning to physical violence.  
Discovering that McNamee had questioned Harrisonian policies in the newspaper, 
Randolph challenged McNamee to a duel.49  McNamee, a Quaker, refused the duel and 
had Randolph arrested.  He swore to Judge Henry Vanderburgh “that Thomas Randolph 
of the county of Knox Esquire hath challenged him to fight a duel, and that he hath good 
reason to believe and doth verily believe that the said Thomas Randolph will take his lif 
and do him some bodily harm.”50  Randolph remained on the hunt, finding and attacking 
William McIntosh in the streets of Vincennes.51  McInstosh suffered superficial cuts to 
his face, but Randolph was not so fortunate.  McIntosh stabbed him in the back, leaving 
him close to death for several days.  The vulgar rhetoric that had characterized the 
newspaper debate spilled out into the streets, reflecting the extent to which violence had 
replaced a balanced discussion of the issues.     
The physical confrontation between the factions coincided with more rumors that 
the anti-Harrisonians had attempted to undermine treaty negotiations with the Wabash 
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Indians.  Colonel John Small reported that “some abandoned profligate, in the garb of an 
American, attempted to frustrate entirely the treaty.”52  This report not only reinforced the 
fear propagated by Harrison in his speech to the territorial assembly, but it may have been 
a ploy to discredit the governor’s political enemies.  An American had supposedly 
informed the discontented Indians that the President of the United States did not agree to 
the 1809 treaty and that Harrison had negotiated it only to “retrieve his declining 
popularity.”53  Rather than protect his racial interests, the American had worked with the 
Indians to undermine Harrison.  What happened next is essential to understanding the 
misuse of Indian affairs.  When questioned about his sources, Small named Elias 
McNamee. When confronted, “McNamee denied ever having told Small.”  The 
Harrisonians attributed McNamee’s denial to yet another anti-Harrisonian trick. 
Stout printed this story while also requesting that residents return petitions to his 
office in favor of the governor’s re-appointment in an attempt to make the governor look 
well-liked.  He owed his job to the governor and shared Harrison’s political ideals.  The 
printer feared that the “envious ambition” of the anti-Harrisonians might show“its 
demoniack crest, and malignant falsehoods . . . in Washington city,” much like they had 
“in the Borough of Vincennes.”54  Like his fellow Harrisonians, Stout was well aware 
that the governor had grown extremely unpopular in the territory, but the editor described 
Harrison’s declining popularity as a myth, claiming that those who supported the 
governor constitute[d] a majority of nine tenths of the Territory.”55  People throughout 
                                                
52 The treaty of which Small speaks is an addendum to the Fort Wayne treaty of 1805. By a Treaty at Ft. 
Wayne, Governor William Henry Harrison acquires 2,900,000 acres of land in the Wabash and White 
River valleys.  The Western Sun, November 18, 1809. 
53 Ibid. 




the Ohio Valley and eastern seaboard might read reprinted articles from The Western Sun 
and Stout hoped that his characterization of Vincennes would reflect well on the 
governor. 
Stout’s claim ignored the fact that most residents of the territory sought to expel 
Harrison from power.  Hundreds of settlers from Knox, Clark, Randolph, St. Clair, and 
Harrison counties petitioned congress for the removal of Harrison in favor of a governor 
who was “in principal opposed to slavery.”56  The division of the Illinois country from 
the territory left Vincennes as the last vestige of Harrisonian policies.57  Harrison still 
exercised a great deal of influence in the territory, specifically in Indian affairs, and the 
anti-Harrisonians believed that replacing Harrison with an anti-slavery advocate would 
likely stop the political intrigue and violence.  
To that end, the anti-Harrisonians may have delayed the governor’s 
reappointment, something the governor recognized.  McNamee wrote the vice-president 
and listed Harrison’s offenses, including the governor’s attempt to help his friends by 
aiding their efforts to profit from land speculation, slavery, and  by cheating the local 
Indians.  Apparently, Harrison had ignored the law restricting Indian agents and 
superintendents of Indians affairs from engaging in trade related activities with the 
Indians.  He “engaged in a mercantile partnership with the contractors for furnishing 
Indian provisions” and profited from it by switching similar local goods for the higher-
quality goods supplied by the government.58   McNamee did his best to characterize 
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Harrison as motivated by profit, not by a desire to protect the citizens of the territory.  
Although the anti-Harrisonians lacked proof to substantiate their claims, they continued 
to characterize Harrison’s Indian policy as corrupt.   Harrison contacted Gallatin bout 
McNamee’s attempts to undermine himself and his supporters.  The letter, however, 
departed from Harrison’s typical professional and diplomatic tone. He attacked Badollet, 
Ewing, McIntosh, and others in an effort to determine the extent of their influence on 
Gallatin and other Washington politicians.  Harrison knew that the letters and complaints 
had helped delay his reappointment that was several months late by November 1809.59  
Amidst the calls for Harrison’s replacement, Randolph traveled to Washington 
D.C. to protest the election results.60  The territorial election committee had declared 
unanimously that Governor Harrison lacked the authority to hold the territorial election 
from which Jennings had emerged victorious.61  After making his case, Randolph left the 
federal capitol confident that Congress would overturn the election and give him the 
advantage over Jennings for the next election; however, the House of Representatives 
refused to do so.62  Jennings was astonished by the efforts of his “great enemy the 
Governor” to overturn the election, but doing so made some sense considering the 
changing political atmosphere ushered in by the election of 1809.63   
Andrew Cayton refers to these democratic openings as the “revolution of 1808 – 
1810,” which culminated in Harrison’s war-time resignation in 1812.  The political 
changes greatly curtailed the powers of the governor while extending the franchise to 
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more white men.  By 1812, “a centralized, vertical system of politics” transformed “into a 
decentralized, local system.”64  Control of the territory rested more with its inhabitants 
than with the governor and the officials back in Washington.  Although federal policy 
makers may have wanted to replace Harrison for his politics, they could not ignore his 
success in actively aiding territorial expansion.  James Madison reappointed Harrison 
despite the changing political climate that greatly undermined Harrison’s ability to 
govern in the manner he saw fit.  Furthermore, the governor still had many influential 
supporters in the region, including several French traders who helped him maintain his 
influence with the various Wabash Indian communities.  
By 1810, Vincennes had so divided over the issue of slavery and the Indian threat 
that it seemed as though there were two entirely separate Vincennes – one in favor of
slavery and against the Indians and the other rejecting slavery and urging common sense 
with the Indians.  The election for the territorial delegate to Congress, as well as 
accusations of treasonous activities, polarized the town.  Jennings, once employed by 
Stout during the slavery debate, had left the town he described as full of rascals.  
However, that did not mean that he abandoned his efforts to undermine the Harrisonians.  
He tried to ruin Stout’s newspaper, which Jennings believed to be Harrison’s puppet.  
Rather than protect his fellow European Americans, Jennings worked hard to ruin them 
because they mistreated African Americans and American Indians.  Jenings requested 
that his friend David Mitchell “encourage Mr. Cooper to commence Editor at Vincennes” 
and thus displace Stout.65  Jennings’s idea to ruin Stout failed and The Western Sun 
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continued playing a key role in the factionalism dividing Vincennes largely becaus  both 
factions relied on the newspaper to fight their battles.66  
While necessary for the anti-Harrisonians to express their political views, the 
newspaper and its editor were essential for the Harrisonians to attack their enemies.  
Some Harrisonians called out John Johnson in The Western Sun for apparently trimming 
on the issue of slavery.  Information surfaced that Ewing and Badollet had promised to 
vote for Johnson if he opposed slavery in the last election.  Samuel Caruthers testified 
before Stout that “sometime after the election in April 1809, he had a conversation with 
Mr. Albert Badollet, son of John Badollet, relative to his father’s voting for John Johnson 
. . . [who] was under promise to Ewing and his party to oppose slavery.”67  Johnson had 
earned the enmity of the Harrisonians by challenging Alpheus’s pieces in the paper after 
discovering that Thomas Randolph was the author.  Johnson condemned the Attorney 
General for descending “from the dignity of his office.”68  The two men nearly came to 
blows, Johnson carrying “a large hickory stick for some days” in anticipation of a fight 
with Randolph.  Randolph armed himself as well, but soon the men re-established a civil 
relationship, “treat[ing] each other politely in court, and touch[ing] hats as [they] pass[ed] 
on the streets.”69  Nonetheless, Judge Johnson’s dispute with Randolph placed the judge 
firmly in the “little Vincennes faction,” Randolph’s term for the anti-Harrisonians.70  
Several residents believed that the real threat to Vincennes was the Harrisoni ns’ 
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attempts to construct a society with slaves in the territory.  Badollet felt that “as long as 
our Governor is really or is thought friendly to the admission of Slavery, this Territory 
will know no peace . . . Our next executive ought surely to come from the State of New 
York or Pennsylvania, no more Virginians.”71  As long as Harrison remained in charge, 
his sycophants would continue to challenge, if not attack, the governor’s enemies. 
In the spring of 1810, fears surrounding the events at Prophetstown began to 
trump debates in The Western Sun.  That spring, tales of western tribes like the Sacs, 
Foxes, and Kickapoos visiting Prophetstown spread throughout the countryside, alarming 
countless settlers.72  Harrison called Badollet to a meeting and told him that the Prophet 
intended to attack Vincennes and kill the governor.  The Prophet would then attack the 
other residents.  The governor “painted his fears in lively colours and said that f it was 
not for fear of spreading too great an alarm, he would immediately send his family to 
Kentucky and convert his house unto a fort.”73  Although Badollet respected the 
intelligence concerning the Indians, he noticed that most of the men present at the 
meeting were Harrison’s sycophants.  Badollet suspected a trap.74  It appeared to Badollet 
that Harrison had manipulated his followers into asking the governor to order out the 
militia so that his actions would not appear heavy-handed.  Other residents also wanted to 
send a diplomatic mission to Prophetstown.     
Harrison used his authority to attack the anti-Harrisonians who questioned his 
policies towards the mobilization of Indians at Prophetstown.  After hearing about the 
Indians at Prophetstown, Toussaint Dubois, one of the French traders trusted by both 
                                                
71 Badollet, Correspondence, 114.  Badollet to Gallatin, November 13, 1809. 
72 R. David Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 83. 




Harrison and Badollet, suggested that he visit Prophetstown and inquire about the 
Tenskwatawa’s intentions.  Several public officials supported this measure; howver, 
Harrison did not.  Badollet discussed the situation with Ewing and Judge Johnson, but 
they made sure to respect Harrison’s authority on the issue, even though they wanted 
Dubois to visit the Prophet.  Harrison decided to send a speech to the Prophet rather than 
Dubois.  Nonetheless, all present at the impromptu meeting believed “that the alarm w s 
unfounded” as the governor’s previous warnings.75  DuBois said that he would go only 
“if the Governor would send him,” well aware that it was the governor’s decision.76  
Badollet accepted Dubois’s answer and then visited Ewing’s house only to discover that 
the governor had ordered “Judge Johnson to be brought before him in the Secretary’s 
office, where he [Harrison] had summoned a number of witnesses, and then and there in 
an angry magisterial and insulting manner called him to account for his having bee  with 
us.”77  He accused the men of treason and demanded that they abide by his decisions.  
Ewing said Harrison “exults in the idea that he will make us smart severely fo  our daring 
perseverance in opposing his darling and never abandoned plan of Slavery.”78  The 
governor’s anger towards the anti-Harrisonians was as much a product of their oppositi n 
to slavery as it was the anti-Harrisonians questioning his policies.  He used his aut ority 
in Indian affairs to marginalize his political enemies.  
Harrison and his supporters constructed a false sense of support for the governor’s 
policies by speaking for their enemies but also by portraying Prophetstown as milit nt.  
Elihu Stout aided Harrison’s efforts to isolate his enemies by printing that Harrison had 
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unanimous support for his policies towards the Prophet.  Stout even stated that Badollet 
and other anti-Harrisonians supported the governor.  Harrison did his part and wrote a 
letter to Secretary of War William Eustis claiming that he had unanimous consent for his 
Indian policies even though Badollet and others disagreed with the governor privately.  
Stout’s editorials in The Western Sun described an increase of Indian militancy in the 
area.  An interpreter among the Delaware reported that the Prophet was hostile and hat 
many Indians had  arrived at Prophetstown in support of his measures.79 R ports from 
nearby forts raised alarms at the large-scale movements of Indians towards Prophetstown.  
Stout claimed that the Wyandots had joined the Prophet and that the conglomeration of 
Indians at Prophetstown hoped to stop the settlement of European American people in the 
territory.80  Not only had the anti-Harrisonians remained silent in the face of the 
governor’s accusations, but they also had no way of contradicting the information 
reported by Stout.  If the majority of people believed that the Prophet was militant, then 
the Harrisonians could legally condemn those who opposed the governor’s protectionist 
policies.     
The anti-Harrisonians grew fearful at the news and lashed out at men who 
opposed the governor’s policies.  Nathaniel Ewing found himself increasingly fearful of 
the Harrisonians after witnessing the governor’s tirade about the treasonous activities in 
Vincennes.  Ewing wrote Gallatin for “protection against the persecutions of Governor 
Harrison.”81  He apologized for using such words, but asserted that he had been punished 
repeatedly by the Harrisonians’ threats for simply doing his “duty as an officer of the 
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United States.”82  Ewing also complained about Harrison’s use of the militia.  The 
Shawnee Prophet had warned Vincennes that the governor’s “’people should not come 
any nearer to him . . . he smelt them too strong already’” 83 According to Ewing, Harrison 
then “raised a dreadful alarm of Indians [and] drafted two companies of militia . . . and 
stationed them at the upper end of the Town of Vincennes near his house.  This shows 
that he does not believe there is danger or that it is only his own safety he seeks & not the 
protection of the country.” 84  Ewing wondered if Harrison’s real intent was to protect 
Grouseland.  There was reason for Ewing to be suspicious of Harrison’s policies twards 
Tenskwatawa because the Prophet and his people appeared “peaceable” and treated non-
natives “well.”85  Ewing respected the Prophet’s effort to cultivate corn, raise cattle, fenc 
in boundaries, and share his religious visions, concluding that the disturbances, if any, 
were in conflicting religious ideology.  The Prophet did not have any “intention to 
meddle with the whites” and that many of the Indians believed that Harrison intended “to 
make war on them.”86  Ewing hoped to convince Gallatin of Harrison’s guilt with 
evidence that Ewing had collected regarding the governor’s behavior, and enclosed a 
letter from Harrison and Judge Johnson in his correspondence to Gallatin.  It was one 
thing to question the governor’s policies, but something entirely new to gather 
information that accused the governor of wrongdoing.   
The certificate from Judge Johnson supports Badollet’s statements about the 
meeting with DuBois and Harrison’s subsequent tirade about treasonous American 
activities.  On the night when Badollet spoke with DuBois, Ewing and Judge Johnson 
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were on their way to complete some business at Colonel Francis Vigo’s residence when 
they stopped at Badollet’s office for no more than fifteen minutes.  The judge noticd Mr. 
McIntosh, A. Marshal, P. Rieue, J. Caldwell, E. McNamee, John Johnson (the judge’s 
son), and a few others, all of whom had opposed slavery or the governor’s policies.  
Judge Johnson stated that “[t]he conversation turned on the common report of the Indians 
being hostile it appeared to be the general opinion of those present that there was no truth 
in the report which coincided with my own.”87  He heard the discussion over Dubois and 
suggested that, “it would be well in doing this not to infringe on the prerogative of the 
Governor as he had the exclusive superintendence of Indian affairs.  McIntosh and some 
other present said [they] did not intend to interfere with the proceedings of the Governor 
in any respect whatsoever.”88  According to Johnson, there was no ulterior motive behind 
the meeting and all of the men present recognized and respected Harrison’s authority in 
the matter.  True or not, the information given to Gallatin by Badollet, Ewing, and 
Johnson demonstrates that several influential residents of Vincennes questioned 
Harrison’s policies towards the Indians at Prophetstown.  Conspicuously absent from this 
“treasonous” group was General Washington Johnston, who had opposed slavery in the 
newspaper debate, but then regained the governor’s favor and protection by submitting a 
resolution to the assembly early that year in favor of the governor’s reappointment.89  It 
was becoming increasingly obvious that Harrison’s personal relationships influenced his 
handling of public affairs. 
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While some residents tried to confront the Indian problem, most feared that doing 
so would only earn them Harrison’s retribution.  Early that summer, John Johnson 
organized a meeting of Vincennes citizens after two Frenchmen arrived from Fort Wayne 
bearing a message from a French spy who had been living in Prophetstown. 90  Though 
everything appeared to be quiet at Prophetstown, Michael Brouillet had learned that a 
grand council was to take place between the Prophet and the four hundred warriors in 
residence.91  Stout printed Brouillet’s story along with estimates of Prophetstown’s 
military capability. He also printed Johnson’s request that all citizens of Kn x County 
attend a meeting “at the court house in Vincennes . . . to consult upon the best plan of 
avoiding the threatened war with the Indians, & of securing their several families.”92  
Johnson suggested forming a committee of men who would sound alarm if an attack did 
take place.  The citizens ignored Johnson’s suggestions until General Washington 
Johnston suggested that the governor attend the meeting.  Most citizens refused to risk 
discussing Indian affairs without Harrison present - they had read about his tirade against 
Badollet’s faction.93 
The tenor of the meeting changed entirely once Harrison arrived.  Several of his 
supporters, including John Gibson and William Prince, took charge and reiterated 
Johnson’s suggestions, which the committee “unanimously adopted.”  Harrison and his 
supporters then passed a resolution concerning their political enemies.  They concluded 
that “certain individuals in calling public and private meetings for the purpose of 
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adopting measures relating to the present crisis, have been dictated rather by personal 
enmity to the Governor, than motives of public benefit, and that they deserve public 
execration.”94  The Harrisonians’ suggestion that Johnson’s meeting was politically 
motivated lacked merit because he had invited all to attend.  There was no ulterior
motive; on the contrary his suggestions made practical sense.  It was the Harrisoni ns 
who used the opportunity to marginalize their political enemies by suggesting that 
Johnson wanted to cause trouble.  In fact, General Washington Johnston used the 
gathering as a way to reaffirm his relationship with the governor, which Johnston strained 
during the newspaper debate.  Rather than use the gathering to outline a plan of defense 
for Vincennes, Harrison and his men manipulated the meeting as a way to defend their 
interests and attack their enemies.     
The following week, Stout reported that the Prophet “denied most positively any 
hostile intention against the United States,” even though he had recently refused an 
annuity payment of salt.95  The Indian agents at Fort Wayne claimed that Tenskwatawa 
was planning for war.96  To learn the intentions of the Indians outside of Prophetstown, 
Harrison sent Colonel Francis Vigo, a longtime resident of Vincennes, to question the 
Miami.  Upon Vigo’s return, Stout was disappointed in the officer’s findings because 
Vigo warned him that the British were more involved in local Indian affairs than the 
Americans had previously considered.  Even though the Potawatomie had refrained from 
an alliance with the Prophet because they feared the destructive outcome of a war, Vigo 
had learned that a British agent, Matthew Elliot, had established a relationship with the 
Miami.  After delivering goods to Miami settlements, Elliot told them, “my tomahawk is 
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now raised – keep your eyes fixed on me – but do not strike, until I give you the 
signal.”97  Stout had long been suspicious of the British and this story convinced him that 
the “formidable banditti,” as he sometimes called the Prophet’s settlement on the 
Wabash, were under British influence.  This information heightened the threat 
represented by Prophetstown because it suggested that the British were goading the 
Indians into war that would affect the entire territory.  Prophetstown had become 
something much larger to Stout.  It was now the leading edge in a British plot to destroy 
American independence.98 
Harrison, however, continued to focus on the threats to his governorship, 
specifically those residents who were supposedly involved with the Prophet.  Harrison’s 
letter to Eustis in August 1810 reflected Harrison’s suspicions regarding local enemies.  
Apparently, “[Tecumseh] told Mr. [Joseph] Barron, that it was probable he had been 
deceived by white people, that he had been informed that the citizens here were equally 
divided, one half on [Harrison’s] side, and the other on his.”99  Half supported Harrison’s 
land policies and half did not, because, according to Tecumseh, Harrison had “purchased 
the [Indian] lands against the consent of the Government.”100  Stout’s personal record of 
the visit was much the same, concluding that European Americans had told the Indians
not to “receive their annuities” so that the “Governor would be displaced, and a good man 
appointed in his room.”101  It appeared that some Americans had once again placed their 
interests and those of the Indians above the needs of the “white” community in 
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Vincennes. Harrison used this information against his enemies.  He accused William 
McIntosh of adopting “any measure that would likely do [Harrison] injury,” but then 
went on to insult the “ignorant french” who supported McIntosh, and named William 
Wells as the white man to whom Barron referred.102  Although Harrison accused 
McIntosh, it appears that he actually thought the white traitor had been Wells.  Harrison 
did not comprehend why some Americans were helping the Indians, a people he felt were 
inherently predisposed to war.  “The mind of a Savage,” Harrison argued, “is so 
constructed that he cannot be at rest,--he cannot be happy unless it is acted upon by some 
strong stimulus . . . if he hunts in the winter he must go to war in the summer.”103  He 
believed that his enemies would have no success because the Indians were unable and 
unwilling to make peace. 
Harrison’s attacks appear misguided, for it was unlikely that the McIntosh had 
any influence among the various Indian communities.  His authority rested mor with the 
French, but the governor seemingly connected McIntosh’s power over the French with 
the Indians.  The governor attacked McIntosh because he was an influential leader among 
the anti-Harrisonian faction.  Harrison attacked Wells because he had continually used 
the opportunities provided by his role as Indian agent to benefit Little Turtle.  William 
Wells’s self-serving attitude had always bothered the governor, and it is possble that 
Wells had tried to undermine Harrison’s influence in order to strengthen Little Turtle’s, 
but at the same time Wells needed Harrison to undercut the Prophet whom he perceived 
as a major threat to Miami hegemony.  Even Stout felt that there were more peopl
involved than simply McIntosh and Wells; he suspected a “deep laid scheme of villainy” 
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connected to the British rather than simply two rogue Americans trying to hur  the 
governor.104  Most likely, Harrison did not know who was responsible.  A week after the 
negotiations, Harrison informed William Eustis that Wells probably had a “close 
correspondence with the faction here” and that the Weas had named “four persons here, 
who have advised them to unite with the Prophet and insist upon the late Cession of land 
being relinquished to them.”105  Harrison never provided the names of these men nor did 
he use the information against those responsible for deceiving Tecumseh.  The evidence 
likely did not exist. 
The anti-Harrisonians believed that Prophetstown was peaceful and that the 
Indians were not a threat to Vincennes.  The anti-Harrisonians challenged people to be 
more discerning in their understanding of the Prophet’s intentions because he had 
“conjured at once a most inveterate habit among his followers, and a no less inveterate 
prejudice, and had effected more towards civilizing them & thereby seconding the 
benevolent and philanthropic views of the General Government [U.S. government].”106  
A comparison of Stout’s and Badollet’s thoughts reveal that while the former saw the 
Prophet as a threat to the United States, the latter saw him as fulfilling the civilizing 
policies instituted by the American government.107  The ideological differences between 
the two were practically insurmountable, and while both sides believed that their acions 
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were in the best interests of the United States, the Harrisonians accused Badollet’s group 
of treason when they met with Dubois earlier that summer.   Badollet remembered that 
the meeting ended with everyone agreeing that DuBois should visit Prophetstown if the 
governor deemed it necessary.  However, the Harrisonians labeled the meeting as a 
treasonous affair, “the object of which was to bring the Indians on us.”108  The 
Harrisonians quickly condemned the conspirators and then spread rumors that “numbers 
of us [those at the meeting] had a close correspondence with the Prophet and had agreed 
with him upon signals designating those who were to be sacrificed & those who were to 
be spared.”109    In order to spread these rumors and to marginalize those leaders who 
opposed slavery, Harrison convened a grand jury of twelve men to consider the secret 
meeting the Harrisonians had labeled as treasonous.  Three of the “conspirators,” 
including Dubois (a man Harrison referred to as “one of the most respectable Indian 
traders in this country”) were grilled about the meeting and the intentions of the an i-
Harrisonians who questioned the Prophet’s motives.110  The jury did not agree on an 
indictment, and thus Harrison’s “diabolical” plan, at least in Badollet’s eye , was “at last 
disappointed.”111     
By the fall of 1810, reports of Harrison’s efforts to silence his political enemies 
had made their way outside of Badollet and Gallatin’s personal communication.  Gallatin 
forwarded Badollet’s correspondence to someone in the federal government, likely 
Secretary of War Eustis.  Gallatin also wrote a short letter to accompany Badollet’s, 
acknowledging the differences Harrison and Badollet shared over slavery while 
                                                
108 Badollet, Correspondence, 166.  Badollet to Gallatin, September 25, 1810. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid.,  Quote from William Henry Harrison to Secretary of War Eustis, WHH Papers, April 18, 1809; 




suggesting that a post desired by Harrison not be built until the Indians “be listened to & 
fully understood.”112  Gallatin, like Badollet, emphasized the importance of paying 
attention to the Indians, even when Harrison thought otherwise.  Gallatin remained 
steadfast that the federal government prevent the building of a fort north of Vincennes.  
He did not make his suggestions on a whim.  Gallatin’s fear in offering advice to a fell w 
member of the government was quite apparent when he stated that the letter was “from a 
friend to his friend, without expectation of its being communicated.”113  Gallatin worried 
what Harrison and his supporters might do if they discovered that Gallatin had frustrated 
Harrison’s Indian policy.  Gallatin recognized that the governor could easily turn his 
anger towards the anti-Harrisonians in Vincennes.     
Harrison often viewed the implementation of his policies as a personal 
referendum.  He interpreted opposition as a threat to his governorship, rather than simply 
a reflection of the democratic political process.  When confronted, Harrison usually tried 
to isolate his enemies rather than to negotiate with them.  The territorial assembly 
repealed an 1805 act that allowed slaves to be indentured when brought into the territory 
and Harrison went on the attack.114  It was “with a heartfelt pleasure” that Badollet wrote 
Jennings that “the law about slavery has at length been repealed.”  However, this victory 
for Badollet produced a concomitant reaction from Harrison.   In a speech to the 
assembly, Harrison suggested punishing “those who, by improper interferences, and by 
circulating falsehoods amongst the Indians, counteract the intentions of the government 
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and lay the foundation for distrust and enmities which may produce the most serious 
consequences.”115  John Caldwell challenged the governor, asking him to “lay before the 
house such documents as were in his possession, proving the existence of a treasonable 
correspondence between persons of this place and the Indians, & to name such 
persons.”116  Harrison responded first with confusion, then retraction, and finally by 
restating his previous conclusions.  He offered no proof and actually “gave in writing an 
errata or correction of his message,” which retracted his statement that residents from 
Vincennes had associated with the Prophet.117  However, he remained on the offensive 
and used a less direct method to remind his fellow Americans that they better not 
challenge his policies.  Harrison suggested that the legislature pass a law against such 
traitorous activity even though there had not been any proof of such behavior.  Harrison 
stated that he was “convinced that much mischief has been done by others, who, actuated 
by no views that were inimical to their country, have suffered their passions, prejudices, 
and personal animosities to lead them astray, and to do that which their cooler judgments 
must condemn.  Whilst a penal law would perhaps deter the former, it would be the 
means as an expression of the public sentiment, of reclaiming the latter to theidu y.”118  
He hoped, in short, to use the passage of a law to silence those whom he suspected of 
undermining his authority.119 
More rumors of treasonous activity arrived a week later on Christmas Day, 
although they did not corroborate Harrison’s accusations.  Daniel Graham had moved to 
the territory from Virginia the previous spring and knew only Thomas Randolph in 
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Vincennes.  However, Graham received a letter in the mail “soliciting [him] to join a 
caucus of traitors . . . to injure the reputation and fame of [the] Chief Magistrate 
[Harrison].”120  Graham opened the letter addressed to “Graham Esqr. Atto at law” 
because John Johnson had forgotten to include the person’s first name.  Another letter 
arrived for Harrison just four days later, this time from the infamous Daniel Sullivan.  He 
too warned Harrison of the political intrigue within Vincennes, stating that the gov rnor’s 
enemies were using “every means, however diabolical to affect your removal from office, 
you may think me your enemy, but find it otherwise.”121  Both Sullivan and Graham 
recognized the factional strife within Vincennes even though neither had a stke in it.    
The political climate in Vincennes forced the Harrisonians to challenge their 
critics in order to maintain power.  Harrison remained a formidable opponent even 
though his enemies had gained control of the assembly and negated his pro-slavery 
policies by skillfully using his authority in Indian affairs to exercise nfluence within the 
territory.  In March of 1811, Harrison withdrew his recommendation of John Caldwell as 
a Deputy Surveyor after Caldwell’s actions at December’s General Assembly meeting.122  
Although Caldwell had done nothing wrong by requesting proof that residents of 
Vincennes had collaborated with the Indians, Harrison sought to punish him for such 
behavior.  Harrison was aware that intelligence concerning Indian affairs w s not subject 
to debate in the assembly.  His political independence in Indian affairs provided a 
convenient means to punish those men who had undermined his role in civil affairs. 
Harrison’s absolute authority in Indian affairs worried several residents.  Badollet 
remained suspicious that Harrison’s rhetoric about Prophetstown was hiding underhanded 
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intentions.  The rumors of war and the “parades of the militia” were designed to “pave 
the way to the treaty, the second to stifle the discontents of the Indians . . . this present
panic . . . to induce a belief at Washington that the Prophet . . . is a very designing and 
dangerous man.” 123  William McIntosh accused Harrison of “defrauding the Indians in 
the Treaties” that he made with them, “making chiefs to answer [his] own particul r 
purposes” by excluding those Indian leaders who might oppose him.124  Badollet viewed 
the Prophet as a peaceful man who had settled along the Wabash in an effort to aid his 
people.  They had “cleared, fenced in and planted in corn,” constructed homes, refrained 
from alcohol, “[went] regularly to work every morning,” and most importantly, they 
“appear[ed] to be governed by regular kind of institutions, & rise, go to their meals, and 
to their rest at stated hours with as much regularity as monks, they seem[ed] to taste he 
comforts of civilized life.” For Badollet, Prophetstown resembled the civilizing ideal 
behind Jeffersonian philanthropy.  He spoke of a “perfect peace” in the area and of 
people passing Prophetstown daily, “not only undisturbed but well treated.”125   
Harrison used racial politics within Vincennes to silence his enemies and prevent 
debates over Prophetstown.  Harrison used Tecumseh’s visit as an opportunity to draw a 
strict racial line between European Americans and the Indians.  Harrison portrayed the 
Indians as bloodthirsty savages who were searching for a reason to murder the residents 
of Vincennes.  When Tecumseh visited Vincennes during the summer of 1811, Harrison, 
“clad in a hunting shirt, and addressing [his supporters] by the familiar name of fellow
soldiers, drew an animated picture of the meditated bloodshed with such success, that it 
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was with difficulty, that [his supporters] could be refrained from running to Tecumseh’s 
camp” and slaughtering the inhabitants.  Harrison ordered the townsmen to wear hunting
shirts during Tecumseh’s visit to Vincennes because he believed that the only way to 
control the “Savage” was by “placing danger before his eyes.”126  Men, dressed in 
hunting shirts, lined the street with their weapons, an imposing sight for Tecumseh as h  
walked towards Grouseland to negotiate with Harrison.  The governor then reminded the 
militia that there were people in Vincennes who were ‘friends” to Tecumseh, but these 
comments were nothing new to the anti-Harrisonians.  The governor had “conceived an 
unextinguishable hatred against [Ewing and Badollet], because [they had] assisted in 
defeating his favorite scheme of introducing slavery.”127  Harrison could not understand 
why Americans would be supporting the Indians.  While Harrison believed that it was 
“only by placing the danger before his eyes, that a Savage it to be control’d,”  he also did 
his best to direct European American fears of an Indian attack to the Americans who 
were supposedly aiding the Indians in that endeavor.128     
Harrison’s actions reflected his fears that the anti-Harrisonians might succeed in 
replacing him as governor.  He wrote to Eustis and asked him not to believe that his 
actions towards the Prophet had been “premature and unfounded.”129  Harrison reminded 
Eustis that the President was “too just to censure an officer for an unintentional err r or to 
                                                
126 WHH to Eustis, WHH Papers, August 13, 1811; Reel 4, 713.  Harrison writes in his letter, “Heedless of 
futurity, it is only by placing the danger before his eyes, that a Savage it to be control’d.  Even th gallant 
Tecumseh is not insensible to an argument of this kind.  No courtier could be more complaisant, than he 
was upon his late visit.  To have heard him one would have supposed, that he came here for the purpose of 
complimenting me.  This wonderful Metamorphosis in manner, was entirely produced by the gleaming & 
clanging of arms, & by frowns of a considerable body f hunting Shirt men, which accidentally lined a 
road, by which he approached to the council House. 
127 Badollet, Correspondence, 188. 
128 Badollet, Correspondence, 188. 
129 Harrison to William Eustis, WHH Papers, July 10, 1811; Reel 4, 629.   
 
152 
lend a favourable ear to the calumnies” produced by the governor’s enemies.130  The 
governor also sought out the support of the religious men of Vincennes in order to 
legitimize policies that had come under attack.  He had succeeded at intimidating 
Tecumseh, but had failed to silence the anti-Harrisonians, which fueled his fear that 
Madison might “censure” him.131  The Presbyterian Reverend Samuel T. Scott and the 
Baptist minister Alexander Devin formed a committee to draft a letter advocating an 
attack on Prophetstown.  The anti-Harrisonians viewed the committee as “too ignorant to 
be consulted on public matters” because the men had not played any role in policy 
decisions or diplomatic negotiations.132  Harrison supported the committee, of course, but 
Badollet viewed it “one of the tricks” of the “immaculate governor,” who used th se men 
like “puppets.”133  The committee addressed a letter to President Madison claiming that 
the governor’s measures against the Prophet had stopped the “destruction of this place, 
and the massacre of the inhabitants.”134  Reverend Scott, Reverend Devin, Luke Decker, 
Ephraim Jones, Daniel McClure, Walter Wilson, and Francis Vigo all signed the letter.  
Vigo’s signature, as well as those of Scott, Devin, and McClure added great legitimacy to 
the note.  Three were ministers or associated with missionary work and Vigo had 
acquired great standing in the town after aiding George Rogers Clark in his campaign 
against the British.  Vigo and Decker were both adamantly pro-slavery and Scott and 
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Devin, accompanied by McClure, may have hoped to court Harrison’s favor in order to 
access federal funds for their missionary work.135  Most of these men had a vested 
interest in seeing Harrison and his policies succeed.  Harrison recognized this and used 
their support to remind Eustis that his policies towards Prophetstown were well founded. 
While Harrison and his supporters tried to influence politicians in Washington, 
they also did their best to send one of their own as territorial representative.  Jonathan 
Jennings suffered because of the Harrisonians during his bid for re-election as territorial 
representative in 1811.  Thomas Randolph went throughout the territory claiming that 
Nathaniel Ewing and John Badollet, two of Jennings’s loyal supporters, wanted “to 
prevent the Memorial of our Legislature praying for an extension of credit to the 
purchasers of public lands &c from Succeeding.”136  Randolph hoped that this would 
convince the residents, many of whom needed an extension of credit, to oppose Jennings.  
The Harrisonians went even further by creating election ballots with three columns for 
voting, the first for Jennings, the second for Randolph, and the last for a “Jenni.”  Forty-
six people voted for Jenni when in fact they almost certainly meant to vote for Jennings.  
This occurred largely among the French, but Jennings nonetheless survived and won re-
election to Congress.  Several residents petitioned Congress in reaction to the Harrisonian 
attempts to defraud Jennings, claiming that even Harrison had interfered in the elec ion 
“by haranguing the electors at the Polls by riding through the country, and by writing and 
Sending into [many], if not all the Counties in the Territory violent electioneeri g 
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letters.”137  It was to no avail.  The Harrisonians lost the election even though they had 
done everything possible to throw it to Randolph.   
Frustrated by yet another political defeat, Harrison turned toward preparing the 
militia for a violent confrontation with the Prophet.  However, he encountered problems 
mobilizing an effective fighting force, which, by October of 1811, was not nearly as large 
as he had hoped.  Numbering less than 800 men, or just over half of what he expected, 
Harrison attributed this problem to his personal enemies who had “united with the British
agents” and argued that the “expedition was entirely useless, and the Prophet as one of 
the best and most pacific of mortals.”138  Harrison’s excuse may have been another 
example of him using Indian affairs to hide the events that transpired at Fort Harrison.  In 
October 1811, he marched a force of 1600 regulars and militia eighty miles north of 
Vincennes to construct the fort.  The Americans constructed the fort as a staging area 
near present-day Terre Haute, Indiana.  It was a halfway point for Harrison’s me  to 
prepare, if need be, for an assault on Prophetstown.  While laying the foundation for the 
fort, the regulars and militia argued “to such a pitch that both parties were ready to f ll on 
each other but by the interference of the officers” whose efforts stymied “their mutinous 
conduct.”139  A full-scale fight had nearly erupted within the ranks of Harrison’s army, 
which likely convinced many militiamen to go back to their farms.  Rather than admit his 
failure to unite the militia, Harrison blamed the intra-community factionalism in 
Vincennes. 
The anti-Harrisonians believed that Harrison’s march toward Prophetstown was a 
reaction to his failed policies.  The only option he had left was to destroy the Indian town 
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at Tippecanoe with minimal casualties and hope that the corresponding accolades would 
reinvigorate his leadership.  John Badollet used his son Albert to spy in the activities of 
the militia, who then wrote his father John a few times during their march towards 
Prophetstown expressing his anxieties.  After reminding his son that he was on that 
mission “involuntarily” and that he possessed pure morals and “conduct unlike that of 
many of [his] age,” he asked his son to keep a journal.  “I beseech you to do it,” he wrote, 
because “it will be an useful exercise for you, and will afford me a greatsatisfaction in 
reading your unsophisticated reflections on the passing events.”140  More importantly, the 
elder Badollet requested that Albert “note down every occurrence as they take place, such 
an exercise [would] have the advantage of making time hang less heavily upon [him].”141  
John Badollet’s requests to his son may have indeed been part of his larger effort to 
undermine the governor given his actions during the previous months.  The anti-
Harrisonians doubted claims that the Prophet and his brother planned a massive attack, 
which is why they questioned the intelligence behind an article in the National 
Intelligencer reporting Tecumseh’s plan to sack Vincennes.142  Badollet could not have 
said it better when he lamented, “All I fear is that such a madman [Harrison] will goad 
the Indians into some act of despair to make good all what he has got published of their 
pretended views.  Oh God! Oh God!”143  Badollet and his supporters were right.  Much of 
the factionalism within Vincennes and the polarization between Indians and European 
Americans had been caused by the factionalism born out of slavery. 
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The factional strife began in the newspaper debate over the ways in which slavery 
would benefit the territory, but ended in a heated fight over the governor’s policies 
towards Prophetstown. Political affairs initially drove the dispute, specifically the 
election for territorial representative to Congress in 1809.  The anti-Harrisonians ran 
Jonathan Jennings for territorial representative and the Harrisonians supported Thomas 
Randolph.  However, the opposing factions continued to contest each other even though 
they both wielded power within the territorial political structure.  The Harrisonians hoped 
to silence the anti-slavery faction by accusing them of aiding the nearby militant Indians, 
an accusation of treason which would force them out of the political structure.  The anti-
Harrisonians believed that the governor’s aggressive policies towards Prophetst wn were 
simply a ruse designed to reinvigorate his leadership that had declined steadily after the 
Harrisonians lost the territorial election in 1809.  The defining issue for both of these 
groups had been slavery, but using Indian affairs to challenge each other provided more 
opportunities to silence their enemies.  Petitioning Congress against the use of slav s 
proved less effective than accusing your neighbors of treason or of instigatig an Indian 
war to defend one’s policies. 
The Printer 
The Prophet’s influence not only fueled political and cultural divisions within 
Vincennes, Tenskwatawa’s power altered the daily lives of individuals.  This was 
nowhere more apparent than in the life of Elihu Stout.  The stress of frontier life, often 
extreme in settlements located near Indian villages, served as a breeding grou d for 
destructive rumors and paranoia about Indians waiting to murder American settlers.144  
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Stout’s relationship with Harrison placed the printer in a unique position to inform 
settlers about the Wabash Indians.  However, rather than simply report Indians affairs in 
an objective fashion as he did other local news, Stout became increasingly obsessed with 
the Wabash Indians often in direct correlation to Harrison’s warnings.  Although he never 
suffered from an Indian attack or watched Vincennes assailed by Indians, Stout’s life and 
identity increasingly revolved around the machinations of various Indian communities 
along the Wabash.  From the early Indian hostilities of 1808 that did little to threaten his 
safety, to a physical attack initiated by Colonel Jon Boyd after the Battle of Tippecanoe, 
Elihu Stout’s thoughts and actions from 1808 to 1812 focused heavily on Prophetstown 
and its leader.  Deeply involved with the political factionalism over slavery and Indian 
affairs as a Harrisonian, Stout also found himself engrossed in a personal battle to protect 
himself and his town.  His life and his town changed drastically because of the Prophet.  
A resident of Vincennes since 1803, Stout spent the majority of his time raising a 
family with his wife Lucy, setting up his printing press, and socializing in town.  Stout 
charged two dollars for an annual subscription to his newspaper and he allowed those 
without access to cash to pay him with food or merchandise.  He did well enough in 
printing to own a slave and donate money to public causes like Jefferson Academy and 
occasionally played pool at the local taverns.  However, he abandoned most of his 
leisurely activities after the Prophet settled north of Vincennes.  Stout initially believed 
that the Prophet was an “influential Fanatic” who Harrison would use as an “instrument 
to forward the benevolent views of the Government in introducing amongst the Indians 
the arts of civilized life.”145  This allowed Stout the time to facilitate the debate over 
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slavery in his newspaper.146  In comparison to what was coming, this period of his life 
was far more relaxed and unburdened, except for family responsibilities.  In early 
January, his wife Lucy gave birth to their son James.147  No pressing news kept Stout 
from his home and the joy of his first son, but as the choking winter snows of 1809 
melted away, things began to change.148   
Stout’s obsession with the Prophet grew steadily during the spring of 1809 due 
largely to reports that violence had erupted at Prophetstown.  The vicious winter had 
challenged the Prophet’s town on the Wabash – too many Indians, too little food, and a 
heavy blanket of snow assured the quick spread of famine and disease throughout 
Prophetstown, forcing many Indians to abandon the winter camp.  Few Shawnees died, 
which angered the Ottawas and Ojibwas who had suffered many deaths, which in turn 
fueled intertribal conflicts, forcing the American government to intervene and settle the 
disputes.149  These quarrels, together with news that the Sacs and Winnebago Indians had 
attacked the newly constructed Fort Belle View, fueled false alarms of an Indian attack at 
Vincennes.  The intertribal conflicts as well as the uprisings farther west frightened Stout.  
While Harrison told him “the tribes of the Wabash continue firm and unshaken in their 
attachment to the United States,” the governor also mobilized the militia.150    Harrison’s 
indecisive behavior confused Stout who was unsure of what to make of the situation.   
Stout’s growing personal concern about the Prophet overrode the governor’s 
initial reassurances.  Accordingly, Stout began to search for information on his own in 
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order to protect himself.  His newspaper no longer reflected a man who simply reprinted 
articles and reports that he received from the governor.  Rather, Stout was becoming a 
man who sought answers to rumors about the Prophet’s intentions.  He began waiting on 
the governor and started interviewing soldiers and post riders when they ventured i o 
town.151  Harrison guaranteed him of “the pacific disposition” of the Wabash Indians and 
that he did not “apprehend any danger from the more distant tribes.”152  The governor 
reassured Stout because his spies had yet to return from Prophetstown with news about 
Tenskwatawa’s militancy.  Furthermore, the Indian agents at Fort Wayne t rgeted Wells 
as the source of frontier animosity, not the Prophet.  Nonetheless, Stout remained 
paranoid about the distant tribes as was evident in his articles.  Even when Stout 
discussed the friendly intentions of the Wabash tribes, he also commented about the 
hostile Indians farther west.153   
Stout found himself trapped between the words of his friend the governor and the 
rumors spreading throughout Vincennes.  What was stronger: Harrison’s assurances o 
frontier rumors?  It was not as though Stout had abandoned reality and barred himself in 
his office; rather, he looked to alleviate his fears.  During the early spring of 1809, the 
Prophet and several of his supporters visited Vincennes, promising allegiance to the 
Americans.154  Surprisingly, it was the assertions from the Indians and not the earlier 
professions of his loyal friend and governor months before that convinced Stout that 
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Vincennes was safe from an Indian attack.  The headline of his article that week read 
“ALL PROSPECTS OF AN INDIAN WAR AT AN END.”155  Stout communicated  
that there existed not the smallest probability of hostilities with any of the neighboring 
tribes.”156  The Indians denied “very strenuously deny the existence of any intention on 
their part to attack our settlements, and that their dispersion was attended with some 
indications of terror and apprehension.”157  The situation and Stout’s life changed 
drastically a month later after Harrison’s spies reported that the Prophet secr tly planned 
to attack and destroy Vincennes.158  Stout’s waffling over the Prophet’s militancy turned 
into absolute fear that Vincennes might be ruined.   
 By the spring of 1810, Stout’s paranoia that the Indians would attack his town 
evolved into an irrational fear that the menace was actually so big as to threaten the 
United States.  After hearing rumors that the Sacs, Foxes, and Kickapoos had visited 
Prophetstown during the early spring, Stout sought out Governor Harrison for more 
information about the rumors of Indian mobilization.159  After several discussions with 
Harrison, Stout discovered that Vincennes was indeed under immediate danger. 
Tenskwatawa was not only advocating war against the United States; he had forme a 
military alliance with the Indian tribes west of the Wabash.  Harrison told Sut that an 
“interpreter maintained by the government amongst the Delawares arrived her , to inform 
the governor that that tribe had heard of the hostile movements of the Prophet.”160  It 
made perfect sense to Stout.  The western tribes “had come into [the Prophet’s] sc me , 
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and they had agreed with him - that everything that had been done between the white 
people and Indians, since the Treaty of Greenville, was void and good for nothing, and 
that they were determined to stop the progress of the white settlements.”161  The threat for 
Stout was no longer simply against his town.  Rather, it was against all of the small 
American settlements that sat precariously along the American frontier. 
The stress arising from the intelligence Harrison provided suggesting that the 
Prophetstown Indians planned an imminent attack on Vincennes convinced Stout that he 
needed to be more vigilant.  He made a greater effort to gather intelligence about 
Prophetstown and started publishing his own viewpoints about the Indians in his 
newspaper.  By speaking with the French merchants in town, particularly those who 
traded at Prophetstown, Stout discovered that the Prophet planned a grand council at 
Prophetstown.  The traders carried news from Michel Brouillet that included an estimat  
of Prophetstown’s strength at nearly 400 warriors.  Stout reported this information in his 
newspaper while also calling a meeting “at the court house in Vincennes” to “consult 
upon the best plan of avoiding the threatened war with the Indians” and of course to 
protect their families.162  Stout’s paper reflected his desire to mobilize the settlers.   
After learning both that the Prophet’s supporters assaulted agents trying to deliver 
salt to Prophetstown and that the British planned to incite the Indians, Stout allowed his 
fear to get the best of him.  Rather than using the many letters he received at his office to 
shape the news, Stout let them serve as his news.  A man from Kaskaskia wrote Stout 
about a skirmish between Indians and army officials south of Fort Massac.  Though 
surprised by the Indians, the Americans had killed a few of them.  The man feared th t 
                                                




the Indians would retaliate, “for such is the common disposition of this race of human 
beings, that they never forget to revenge their losses by some act of barbarism.” 163  
Though he did not explicitly endorse the story, Stout included the racial comments.  
Unlike his other articles that rephrased the intelligence he had received from va i us 
sources, Stout allowed this story to stand on its own.  The racial commentary likely 
reflected Stout’s own feelings that were born out of his fear that the Prophetstown Indians 
might do the same to his town and family. 
Indeed, Stout involved himself in the politics of Indian affairs even further.  Even 
though he was a relatively short and meek man, Stout served as one of Harrison’s guards 
when Tecumseh visited Vincennes that August.164  He witnessed the great oratorical 
skills of Tecumseh and heard his voluminous complaints about American diplomacy and 
treaty negotiations. The meeting took place outside because Tecumseh refused to enter 
Harrison’s mansion.  As the two men argued about policy, the situation grew tense.  
Harrison was professing his goodwill towards all Indian tribes when Tecumseh jumped 
up abruptly, as did his entourage.165  Lieutenant Jennings quickly formed a guard of 
twelve men to protect Harrison and thwart Tecumseh’s apparently hostile actions.  Stout 
was standing a few feet away from what might be the first battle of a fr ntier war.  
Harrison defused the situation by ending the council and returning to his home.  The next 
morning, the council resumed and Stout listened as Tecumseh apologized to Harrison.  In 
a mild manner, Tecumseh explained that “two Americans had paid him a secret visit, one 
in the course of last winter and one other lately, and had informed them that Governor 
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Harrison had purchased the lands without the consent of the government, and that one 
half of the [American] people were also opposed to the purchase.”166  The American 
traitors, William Wells and William McIntosh, claimed that if Tecumseh stopped the 
Indian tribes from accepting annuity payments then the American government would 
replace Harrison.  In turn, a governor more favorable to the Indians would take his 
place.167  While Tecumseh’s confession shocked Stout, he thought it to be true.  Stout 
thought that “the confederacy which has been formed by the Prophet, was the effect of 
British intrigue” and that “the secret agents of that power, which are known to exis  in 
every part of America, but particularly in the Indian country, gave it all the countenance 
in their power.”168  However, Stout could hardly believe “that any American was engaged 
in this nefarious project – we [Stout] fear, however, that it is but too true.169  Angry that 
his fellow settlers might have actually helped the Indians, Stout did his best to contr l the 
emotions boiling inside of him.   
Stout’s angry tone lasted weeks after Tecumseh’s visit, culminating in an article
in which he expressed his personal feelings about rumors that European Americans had 
been working with Tecumseh.  Overjoyed that the United States government had ratified 
the Indian treaties of the previous fall, but still bitterly incensed at the reasonous 
Americans,  Stout said that “every lover of his country will estimate corretly the conduct 
of those, who, by unfounded rumors, have excited discontent among the Indians, and 
encouraged their opposition to carrying into effect, treaties made with them in the most 
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normal manner, upon just and fair principles.”170  A week later, Harrison showed Stout a 
letter from John Johnston, the Indian Agent at Fort Wayne.  The letter described a ecent 
council of Indians that had ended prematurely near Fort Wayne because the Indians had 
not been able to agree upon a time to attack the United States.  Johnson also told Harrison 
“that an attempt was made by a white man, on some of the Miami and Potawatimi [sic] 
chiefs, to entice them to petition the president to remove Governor Harrison from his 
office.” However, many of the Indians refused to do so.  Other citizens had also pres ed 
the Indians to reject the treaties.171  Stout questioned the loyalty of these men and 
expressed his hope that they receive just punishment.  For Stout, their treasonous 
behavior constituted a threat to both Stout’s governor and his patriotic pride.172   
By the end of summer of 1810, Stout’s life had changed drastically.  Not only did 
his newspaper reflect an angry and worried man who had become far more vocal in print, 
but Stout had also become deeply involved in the actual events at Prophetstown.  Rather 
than play pool, Stout walked around town and spoke to as many sources as he could find.  
It was not enough for him simply to report the news because in many ways he had 
become part of it.  Standing guard over Harrison when Tecumseh visited, questioning the 
French traders who delivered news from Brouillet, or pressing post riders and the 
governor for information, Stout acted first as a paranoid settler and second as a 
newspaperman.  By the following summer he had grown even more confident, 
demanding that the government not “submit to so flagrant a violation of their 
sovereignty” on behalf of the Prophet.173  As the protector, rather than simply provider of 
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news, Stout demanded action.  He also promised the same, stating that he would “spare 
no pains to obtain and lay before our readers the earliest possible information” about the 
Prophet and his actions.174  He was not simply reporting the news - he was experiencing 
it.  It was personal for Stout – it was his town, his governor, and his family whose live  
remained in the balance.175   
Stout’s support for Harrison’s policies towards Prophetstown was as much a 
product of Stout’s fear for the safety of his family as it was a testament to the political 
views he and the governor shared.  In late July of 1811, a large number of citizens called 
a meeting at the courthouse to discuss the Indian threat.  Stout attended, recorded the 
discussion, and crafted a letter that the citizens addressed to President James Madison.  
The group passed a resolution with seven stipulations concerning the Prophet, all aimed 
at showing that the settlement at Prophetstown was a British scheme and that a milit ry 
force must break it up.176  In his newspaper, Stout printed the council minutes, the 
resolutions adopted, and the letter addressed to President Madison.  At the same time, 
Secretary of War Eustis dispatched the Fourth Infantry Regiment from Pittsburgh to 
Vincennes, instructing Harrison to construct a fort near Prophetstown and attack 
Tenskwatawa’s forces ‘“if the prophet should commence or seriously threaten 
hostilities.”177  Stout could not help feel that he had played a part in getting Madison and 
Eustis to order military forces into the area.  He hoped that the unity expressed by th  
resolution would lead to a more unified Vincennes, but Harrison’s mobilization against 
Prophetstown only provided more opportunities for the anti-Harrisonians to attack the 
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governor.  Most anti-Harrisonian’s balked at Stout’s newspaper anyway.  They felt it was 
just Harrison’s mouthpiece. 
Unaware that Harrison had encountered stiff resistance from his own men, Stout 
treated Harrison’s march towards Prophetstown like a victory parade.  He used letters 
from Harrison and other soldiers encamped along the Wabash for the content of his 
articles.  He headlined them “Army on the Wabash” and described the interaction of John 
Connor, an Indian interpreter, and a deputation from the Prophet.178  The letters 
proclaimed that the Prophet’s “tomahawk was now up and that nothing on earth should 
induce him to lay it down . . . that they might do as they pleased” and a speech “delivered 
in great rage” by one of Tenskwatawa’s followers.   Connor claimed “the speaker” was 
“stamping & foaming whilst delivering it.”179  Including Connor’s characterization of the 
Indian speaker as a wild animal allowed Stout to justify the governor’s actions.  The 
governor could not negotiate with a wild beast.  Rather, he had to tame it.  By destroying 
the wild Indians at Prophetstown, Harrison would finally place the territory in a position 
to prosper and Stout would never have to hear of the Tenskwatawa’s “banditti” again. 
Stout, like most of the European Americans in Vincennes, believed that his 
prospects were tied directly to bringing down Prophetstown.  The French hoped that 
Harrison’s army would drive the nativist Indians from the region and reinvigorate trade 
between the French and Indians.  Two years of increased violence in the valley, coupled 
with the Prophet’s success in restricting trade between European Americans and Indians, 
strained the French who were already suffering from oppressive American taxes.  Equally 
challenged in some respects were the Americans who divided over Harrison’s policies 
                                                




toward Prophetstown.  The anti-Harrisonians believed that Harrison’s march north to 
Prophetstown was really a final effort to regain influence as governor by ridding the 
territory of an Indian menace.180  However, the anti-Harrisonians believed that the 
governor’s Indian menace was nothing more than a rhetorical construct used by the 
governor to belittle his political enemies and gain admiration from Washington.  The 
governor’s supporters adamantly disagreed.  Months of failed negotiations between 
Harrison, the Prophet, and Tecumseh convinced the Harrisonians that the only logical 
policy towards the nativist Indians was military action.  The political factionalism in 
Vincennes had also persuaded the Harrisonians that they were also battling a treasonous 
faction from within their own town, which they used to legitimize their actions.  The 
Harrisonians believed that an attack on Prophetstown would justify their governanc th t 
had become increasingly unpopular while the anti-Harrisonians believed that the 
Harrisonian vision of Prophetstown was yet another example of a failed and corrupt 
policy.  Conflicting perceptions of Prophetstown prevented the town of European 
Americans from uniting racially against Tenskwatawa.  Their interests were simply too 
diverse.   
In an ironic twist, Harrison had more in common ideologically with the Shawnee 
brothers than he did with John Badollet and some of the other Americans living in 
Vincennes.  Despite the heated rhetoric between the two men, Harrison and Tenskwatawa 
shared a similar goal of uniting their towns in order to promote the best interests of their 
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communities.  Both men agreed that Indians and European Americans should remain 
separate from each other and that inter-cultural associations had been destructiv  to both 
their peoples. However, Harrison found himself trapped between his ideology and his 
mission, for allowing the Indians to identify collectively meant that he would undermin  
his own attempts to gain Indian lands.  By emphasizing the rights of each Indian polity, 
Harrison pitted Indian groups against each other and negotiated various lucrative land 
sessions from them.  The governor’s goals were based in racial ideology, but his met ods 
were not.   
Harrison’s language became more centered on racial relationships once he 
decided to move against Prophetstown.  Harrison emphasized the racial differences by 
warning the Shawnee brothers that “all the white people in this country have been 
alarmed” at the proceedings at Prophetstown and that attempting to unify “all the tribes to 
the north and west” of Vincennes amounted to a declaration of war.181  His comment was 
explicitly racial.  “All” the whites were alarmed at the assemblage of unified Indians 
from the north and west.  Such a statement overlooked the divisions within both 
communities that prevented the people of each settlement from uniting racially.  Yet, 
Harrison’s rationale drove frontier policy and his racist views proved practically 
insurmountable.  His loss of popularity, Jennings’s movement to impeach him, and the 
growth of a more democratic government in Indiana Territory forced Harrison to use 
Prophetstown to protect his career.  Although Harrison stated that he would rather 
negotiate than fight, he had argued in several letters to Secretary of War Eustis that 
decisive action was necessary against the Prophet or the Americans would never settle 
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the lands won in recent treaty councils.182  His behavior, although outwardly diplomatic, 
was very personal.   
Harrison’s march toward Prophetstown was more in line with his ideological 
views on the racial nature of Indians.  It allowed him the opportunity to attack the Indians 
rather than to meet them in council.  Rather than spending more time negotiating with the 
Indians, the governor finally had an opportunity to use a superior military force to 
disperse Tenskwatawa’s wild and bloodthirsty Indians.  At the end of October 1811, 
Harrison, with a contingent of well-trained militia and a contingent of regulars under the 
command of Colonel John P. Boyd, left Fort Harrison and began making their way 
toward Prophetstown.  No longer would Harrison have to deal with John Badollet’s 
complaints or confront the inept French traders.  The governor was finally in control and 
could do as he pleased.
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Chapter Four: The Prophet, His Town, and its Image 
Much like the pluralistic settlement at Greenville, Tenskwatawa’s village at 
Tippecanoe Creek was not Shawnee.  It, like most settlements in the region, was a 
contested space.  The Prophet’s view of his town and the town itself are in fact not the 
same.  The latter was a physical reality, the former only a personal vision.  
Tenskwatawa’s rhetoric overshadowed the varying interests of the people living in the 
town, much like William Henry Harrison’s polarizing language about Prophetstown 
eclipsed the concerns of settlers at Vincennes.  Historians rely on the Prophet’s 
characterization of his town as a unified community because few Indians actually 
described it in the historical record.  Furthermore, other Indian characteriztions of the 
settlement, like those of Little Turtle or William Wells, tend to corroborate the Prophet’s 
descriptions.  Yet these descriptions reflect the bias of Indian authors interested in using 
Prophetstown to their own benefit.  Prophetstown was in fact a diverse, fluid, and 
evolving community that lacked a static identity.  The complex nature of the town has led 
some historians to settle for the more simplistic descriptions given by Tenskwatawa nd 
Wells.  Exploring Prophetstown’s contested internal and external boundaries enables us 
to evaluate more completely the motives of its residents.  It allows us to understand why 
such a divided town eventually moved toward conflict with the European Americans.  
Although some historians have examined the adversarial relationships between 
Prophetstown and the Wabash Indians, their categories of analysis have taken the Indians 
out of their geographic and cultural context.  Gregory Dowd’s analysis frames the 
regional factionalism as a product of nativist Indians opposing their accomodationist 
brethren, and while these categories facilitate greater understanding of Indian-European 
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American relationships, they tend to frame Indians as reactive.  Furthermore, the 
accomodationist/nativist scheme ignores the vastly different histories that Indian 
communities had with the European Americans.  It structures their behavior primarily as 
the product of racial identities rather than identifying their varying interes s in relation to 
the Americans and each other.  Most historians have interpreted Prophetstown’s diversity 
as a product of Tenskwatawa’s nativist ideology that focused on renewing Indian culture.  
However, this ignores how Indians may have used Prophetstown for their own purposes 
irrespective of Tenskwatawa’s larger agenda.  By reorienting thesecategories of analysis 
to reflect the cultural politics of the individual Indian communities, it becomes apparent 
that the Prophet’s town was not entirely his. 
Rather than abandon the nativist interpretive construct, it should be redefined in 
terms of varying cultural methods for renewal.  Nativism was not simply a reaction to 
accomodationist Indians and their non-Indian collaborators, nor was it a regressive act.  It 
called for a renewal of ceremony and ritual in an attempt to unite and protect disparate 
Indian communities.  Many Indians believed that their suffering “stemmed from Indian 
spiritual failure.”1  We need to consider the relative nature of nativism and understand 
how Indian communities protected their interests and asserted their Indianness in 
different ways.  This is especially important when evaluating Shawnee Indian ativism in 
relation to what Dowd has labeled “Miami accomodationist behavior.”2 Both groups 
sought cultural renewal but in diverse ways.  It is essential that we identify 
Tenskwatawa’s nativism as Shawnee, as partially a product of his culture’s beli fs and 
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traditions.  To use a Shawnee cultural construct in order to interpret the behavior of non-
Shawnees ignores those Indians’s own distinctive tools for revitalization. 
Characterizing the Indian inhabitants at Prophetstown as collectively nativist 
overlooks their unique cultural identities and assumes that they united fully behind the 
Prophet’s vision.  Entering the Prophet’s town did not make one nativist.  Nativism at 
Prophetstown required that the Indians give up alcohol, support racial unity above that of 
individual tribal interests, and reject Christianity and the corrupting influences of the 
missionaries.  Supporting racial unity above tribal interests proved to be the most 
challenging of these precepts.  Much like the Miamis, non-Shawnee Indian groups 
associating with Prophetstown found themselves caught between their ethnic and rai l 
interests during a period of great change.  Some Potawatomies and Kickapoos in the 
Wabash-Maumee Valley supported aspects of Tenskwatawa’s nativism, but at the s me 
time they continued to live primarily as Potawatomi and Kickapoo Indians in direct 
contradiction to the Prophet’s directives.  The Kickapoos continued to war against the 
remaining Kaskaskians; the Potawatomies did not stop attacking Osage Indians.  
Following Tenskwatawa did not mean that the Kickapoos and Potawatomies abandoned 
their own distinct cultural concerns.  Prophetstown did not simply represent a division 
between those Indians who sought to accommodate the Americans and those who wanted 
to separate permanently from the European Americans; it was also a community divided 
over traditional cultural practices and leadership roles between varying Indian polities.  
These divisions spurred violence at Tippecanoe and prevented the large-scale 
unification often attributed to the town.  Groups like the Wyandots rejected making 
themselves subservient to Tecumseh’s political dictates.  The Ottawas and Ojibwas 
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agreed to not cede any additional lands while rejecting the Prophet’s leadership.3  Both 
groups maintained their communal and corporate identity rather than identify with the 
racial unity prescribed by the Shawnee leaders.4 Shared animosity among the Indians 
toward continued American expansion did not mean that an Indian community was 
nativist, but rejecting some of nativist precepts did not make an Indian group 
accomodationist either.  To a large extent, the majority of Indian communities i  the 
Wabash-Maumee Valley were involved in efforts to protect their lands and culture, but 
on culturally specific terms.  In this case, one should not dismiss the varying Indian 
identities for larger methodological constructs which generalize about Indian behavior.   
By differentiating the Prophet from his town, it is possible to understand the 
divisions within Prophetstown.  The polarizing rhetoric used by Tenskwatawa, 
Tecumseh, William Wells, and Harrison is remarkable for its racial substance, but this 
focus on racial divides should not overshadow other pictures of Prophetstown.  In many 
ways, the Prophet represented the antithesis of his town.  He was relatively sedentary, 
identifying first as Indian and secondly as Shawnee, and willing to reject all connections 
to the polluting aspects of European American culture.  At the same time, many of his 
followers migrated seasonally and maintained traditional tribal identities while they 
traded with European Americans.  The Prophet’s racial rhetoric was, in part, areaction to 
the divisions in his town and not a reflection of a unified town. 
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I argue that Prophetstown never fully united behind the Prophet’s nativist vision 
and that it never posed a substantial militant threat to the surrounding European 
American settlements.  First, I look at Tenskwatawa’s frustrated efforts to establish a 
nativist Indian community at Prophetstown.  I critique the historical characterization of a 
militant and unified Prophetstown by examining the interests and actions of its residents, 
namely the Potawatomies, Kickapoos, Ottawas, and Ho-Chunk Indians.  Those divergent 
factions allow me to consider what life might have been like in Prophetstown, including 
disagreements between the Prophet and his brother and contentious council house 
meetings in town.  Second, I evaluate the ways in which outside Indians, French traders, 
and the Americans constructed an idea of militant Prophetstown.   I do so by analyzing 
the intelligence sources on which Harrison relied, starting with Little Turtle and William 
Wells.  These two men provided biased and false information to Harrison in order to 
serve the interests of the Miamis.  I then expand this analysis into an examination of the 
French traders who also provided information to Harrison.  The intelligence on which 
Harrison relied largely determined his policies towards Prophetstown, which became 
increasingly problematic after the 1809 Treaty of Fort Wayne, when the town appeared 
more militantly opposed to the Americans.  The unrest was largely created by he
massive land cession agreed upon by various Indian signatories to the treaty, and factio s
of the Miamis reacted by rejecting American overtures in favor of the British.  However, 
most Americans interpreted the behavior of the pro-British Miami as an indication that 
the Prophet had gained new converts.  Lastly, I frame much of the intelligence regarding 
the Prophet as a product of Harrison’s personal biases and the factionalism within the 
Miami nation during this period.  By re-examining the evidence in the context of a 
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factionalized Wabash-Maumee Valley, it becomes evident that Prophetstown was more 
of a contested town than a militant settlement. 
The Prophet and His Town 
In the spring of 1805, Tenskwatawa slipped into a deep trance in which the Great 
Spirit revealed a plan that would allow Indians to renew their culture.  These visions 
became the basis for Tenskwatawa’s community at Prophetstown.  A noted historian 
states that the Prophet had three major goals: “the revitalization of Native American 
communal life everywhere through the elimination of practices offensive to the Great
Spirit, . . . the establishment of a new, separatist sacred community free of corruption, 
and the forging of a pan-Indian alliance to preserve Indian lands from further whit  
encroachments.”5  To that end, Indians were to give up alcohol, have only one wife, 
refrain from dressing in European American clothing or eating their food, abandon the 
domestication of animals, and avoid trading with non-Indians at all costs.  According to 
Thomas Forsyth, “Indians were to endeavor to do without buying” European American 
merchandise.6  Instead, Indians should “hunt and kill game as in former days, and live 
independent of white people.”7  Tenskwatawa also declared that Indians unite politically 
and militarily in order to resist the destructive forces of European American culture.  
Tenskwatawa believed that all of his followers were “determined to practice what [he 
had] communicated to them, that [had] come immediately from the Great Spirit through 
[him].” 8  The Prophet argued that Indians throughout North America needed to consider 
themselves as “one man” so that they could avoid the destructive forces of European 
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American trade goods like whiskey.  However, such unity proved elusive at 
Prophetstown because factionalism continued to undermine Tenskwatawa’s nativist 
ideals. 
Prophetstown’s success depended as much on the willingness of the Indians to 
abide by the Prophet’s teachings as it did on Tenskwatawa’s leadership.  In addition for 
the chance to trade and rest, as well as the region’s spiritual significance, opportunities to 
hear Tenskwatawa’s teachings attracted hundreds of Indians to the area.  The core group 
of Indians at Prophetstown consisted of Ho-Chunk, Kickapoos, Potawatomies, and to a 
lesser extent Shawnee Indians.  The Shawnees numbered less than forty Indians while the 
Ho-Chunk numbered between two and three hundred and the Kickapoos and 
Potawatomies near two hundred each.  While many of these Indians migrated to 
Prophetstown in order to hear Tenskwatawa’s teachings, they did not arrive as nativists 
nor did they necessarily adopt and abide by all of his teachings.  Indians who visited and 
lived at Prophetstown did so as much for their own benefit as they did because they 
supported Tenskwatawa’s efforts to unite the heterogeneous Indians throughout the area.  
Residents of Prophetstown continued to trade with European Americans, ignore the 
Prophet’s teachings in favor of their own traditions, and even domesticate animals.   
Despite these problems, the Prophet and his followers constructed a vibrant and 
fluid town at the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash rivers.  At its height, the 
Indian residents cultivated between 100 and 200 acres of corn in order to feed the 
seasonal migrations of Indians to the town.  The Indians also maintained a small herd of 
domesticated cattle for that same purpose.  Tenskwatawa led many of his followers to 
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work daily in the “immense field . . . beautifully fenced in” by the Indians.9  There were 
some lodges near the crops that lined the Wabash River, but the center of Prophetstown 
developed up the hill from the river’s edge where Tenskwatawa constructed the meeing 
house and storage facilities.  A few Frenchmen built their trading houses near the 
outskirts of Prophetstown, but the Prophet prohibited any trading or consumption of 
alcohol in or near his town.  For the most part, Prophetstown was an Indian community 
void of outside interference from European Americans.       
However, Prophetstown’s isolation did not prevent the Shawnee brothers from 
establishing a relationship with the Americans at Vincennes.  The practical necessities of 
supporting several hundred Indians at Prophetstown challenged Tenskwatawa and 
Tecumseh during their first few months in the valley.   Although they were busy planting 
crops during the late summer of 1808, the Shawnee brothers did not have enough 
harvested food to support their followers and Harrison offered them assistance in ord r to 
alleviate their suffering.10  The governor did so because the local Indians initially assured 
Harrison that the Prophet intended to live peacefully with his fellow Indians and the 
European American communities nearby.  One of these men claimed that he had never 
heard the Prophet “give any but good advice . . . he tells us not to lie to steal or to drink 
whiskey not to go to war but to live in peace with all mankind, he tells us also to work 
                                                
9 John Louis Badollet, Albert Gallatin, and Gayle Thornbrough, The Correspondence of John Badollet and 
Albert Gallatin, 1804-1836 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1963), 159, 166.   Badollet to 
Gallatin, September 25, 1810. 
10 Harrison to Dearborn, WHH Papers, Reel 3, 302.  Harrison states, “The part of the Sawanoe Tribe 
which is attached to the Shawnee Prophet having remov d last Summer to the Wabash and being almost in 
a starving condition applied to me for relief - - this I did not think it proper to afford them to the extent 
required but as the Annuities for their tribe have be n generally engrossed by the Blackhoofs band I offered 
to advance them provisions to the Amount of one hundred dollars to be deducted out of their next years 
Annuity.”     
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and make corn.”11  Residents of Prophetstown were industrious.  They shared similar 
values with European Americans who also emphasized the importance of agriculture.  
Indian women at Prophetstown cared for the fields of crops while the men hunted for 
game.  The initial discussions between Tenskwatawa and Harrison about farming, 
worshipping a higher power, and constructing a peaceful settlement were promising in 
that they reflected shared values and visions that transcended racial divisions.   
Despite the initial goodwill between the Prophet and Harrison, Tenskwatawa’s 
message helped to polarize Indian and European American relations.  The Prophet 
advocated that Indians live completely independent from European Americans by 
returning to traditional forms of hunting and never trading with non-Indians.12  In turn, 
the Great Spirit would return the land to the Indians.  European Americans interpreted th  
growing community of Indians and their efforts to abstain from trading with non-Indians 
as a threat because Indians were becoming increasingly resistant to European Americans.  
They feared that his religious mission was a guise for Indian militancy.  Tenskwatawa 
had dealt with the paranoia of European American settlers before at Greenville a d did 
his best to counter their fears.  The Prophet told Harrison that he “was spoken badly of by 
the white people, who reproached [him] with misleading the Indians.”13  The Prophet 
wanted his followers to separate from European American communities in order to foster 
spiritual growth, but few European Americans saw Indian unity as peaceful.   
Tenskwatawa also hoped to convince his own people to respect his authority and 
teachings.  However, the Prophet’s own dictates made governing Prophetstown 
increasingly challenging.  His efforts at centralizing authority by undermining village 
                                                
11 Harrison to Dearborn, WHH Papers, Reel 3, 302. 
12 Cave, Prophets of the Great Spirit, 66-69. 
13 Speech of the Shawnee Prophet, WHH Papers, Reel 3, 224. 
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chiefs in order to make Indian warriors more responsive to his dictates left him solely 
responsible for their behavior.  Furthermore, by marginalizing the village chiefs, 
Tenskwatawa lost many influential allies who might have helped him control the younger 
warriors.  But even the Prophet’s teachings served to undermine his authority.  By 
supporting a much more patriarchical community, he effectively abandoned the council 
of Shawnee women leaders who traditionally played an important part in diplomatic 
negotiations.14  In the end, he could rely only on his own authority.  The lack of village 
chiefs and Shawnee women proved disastrous when he could not control the competing 
interests within his town.  
Various people came to the area to trade just as they always had and the Prophet 
recognized that he could not necessarily control who ventured into his town.  The town 
was multi-layered in that people from several different cultures lived there, each with 
their own histories and attachments to the land.  The French had traded at Ouiatenon for 
almost a century when the Prophet settled along the Wabash, and there was little reason 
for them to leave the area since they profited from the Indian trade.  For them, more 
Indians meant more money.  The Miami-speaking Indians had much the same 
relationship with the area around Ouiatenon and the village at Kethtippecanunk.  
Settlement patterns had shifted throughout the area for centuries and Prophetstown 
represented yet another shift in Indian populations along the Wabash.  Preaching at 
Prophetstown gained some converts, but it also proved to be a frustrating endeavor as 
various Indians and European American traders lived in or near his town and undermined 
                                                
14 Alfred Cave, regarding Tenskwatawa’s emphasis on amore patriarchical order, states that the Prophet 
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his authority.  Speaking to Harrison and forcing him to stop making treaties and allowing 
traders to sell liquor was a more pragmatic approach.  Dealing with the multi-layered 
history at Prophetstown was far more difficult than negotiating with the American 
governor who appeared to have total control over his people. 
The Prophet was not always capable of supporting the large numbers of Indians 
who lived at his town.  The population of Prophetstown averaged around 1000 Indians, 
but this number varied regularly depending upon seasonal migrations and disagreements 
within the town.  Although the Prophet’s visions attracted new Indian settlers to the area, 
the physical limitations of the town convinced many that they were better off on their 
own.  The drawbacks to Prophetstown’s size were especially apparent during the winter 
of 1808 and 1809.  The heavy snows forced most to live off the stores of agricultural 
goods rather than to hunt for game.  Starvation and disease struck the town, forcing many 
to eat their horses and dogs.  Most of the Shawnees and Kickapoos survived, but the 
Ottawas and Ojibwas suffered.  The agony of starvation convinced many residents that 
the Prophet lacked the powers he claimed to possess, but it also showed how the 
Shawnees and Kickapoos reserved food for their own families and communities at th  
expense of the recent immigrant Indians.  This caused great consternation among the 
residents of Prophetstown.  In fact, two subordinate Indian traders who resided at th  
Potawatomi villages south of Prophetstown reported that the various Indian communities 
associated with the Prophet, except the Kickapoos, had turned against Tenskwatawa th t 
winter.  The lack of food and the self-interested behavior of some of the Prophetstown 
Indians undermined Tenskwatawa’s pan-Indian mission.  Some who visited his town left 
disgusted, discouraged, and dying. 
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Utilizing Prophetstown for the betterment of one’s Indian community at the 
expense of the other Indians in town was not out of the ordinary.  Indians traveled to the 
town for a variety of reasons.  Main Poc settled along the Wabash because of the region’s
spiritual significance, but Main Poc’s religious connection to the region was not the 
product of Prophetstown.  The region near the St. Joseph’s River, which they called 
Sahg-wah-se-pe (Mystery River), was sacred to the Potawatomies.  Other lakes and 
waterways in the valley were important as well, including Manitou Lake. 15  The 
Kickapoos too shared a spiritual connection with the region before the arrival of the 
Shawnee brothers.  The Wea and Miamis valued the area because it played an importat 
part in the migration story of Miami-speaking Indians down the Wabash River.  The 
Miamis spoke of the first immigrant to the area named Quyoukeetonwee born near the St. 
Joseph’s.  He founded a village there that became the traditional homeland for the Wea 
Indians.16  Wea leader Lapoussier commented that the “Great Spirit has placed them 
[Prophetstown] on the choicest spot of ground” which suggests that the area remained 
spiritually important for the Wea.17  Associating with the Prophet was as much a sign of 
individual Indian communities protecting their interests as it was a product of Indians 
unifying behind the Prophet’s ideological mission.    
By mid-1809, the settlement at Prophetstown had grown from the initial wave of 
sixty followers who accompanied Tenskwatawa in the spring of 1808.18  Hundreds of 
Indians now lived there, but only a minority did so out of an ideological affinity for the 
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16 Vernon Kinietz, ed., “Meearmeear Traditions” by C.C. Trowbridge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1938), 4. 
17 Speeches of Miami, Et Al Chiefs, WHH Papers, September 4, 1811; Reel 4, 756. 
18 Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 67. 
 
182 
Prophet’s teachings.  The small French trading posts just outside the town and the fertile 
agricultural lands provided ample opportunities for Indians to trade and live comfortably.  
While these trading posts challenged the Prophet’s requirement that his followers 
abandon any material and ideological association with European Americans, they also 
brought potential converts into Prophetstown.  Other Indians, like the followers of Miami
leader Pacanne, willingly ate, traded, and slept at Prophetstown because it wa  their 
traditional territory and because they could access trade there.  Tenskwatawa alked by 
their wigwams that dotted his town, well aware that he could never truly trust many of 
the Indians living in his town, in particular the Kickapoos, the Potawatomies, and the 
Miamis.  The Potawatomies were especially problematic because they had invited the 
Shawnee brothers to the region yet they remained relatively independent.  From 1806 to 
1813, Main Poc challenged Tecumseh’s demands for intertribal cooperation by attacking 
American communities in southern Illinois and Osage villages in western Illinois, even 
though the Prophet had forbid such action. 19   
Main Poc wanted Tenskwatawa to settle at Tippecanoe to bolster his Potawatomi 
efforts to oppose the Americans.  He accomplished two things: Main Poc gathered larger 
numbers of Indians who opposed the Americans and the Potawatomies gained more 
support in case the Americans attempted to stop him.  Increasing the number of anti-
American Indians was especially important in a region dominated by Miamis.  Main Poc 
understood his status as a rogue Indian leader.  By convincing other marginalized Ind ans 
to come into the region, he effectively leveled the playing field between his community 
and those who opposed him.  
                                                
19 James A Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1965 
(Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 194-195. 
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Although Main Poc forged a relationship with the Prophet at Greenville and 
Tippecanoe, Main Poc was not necessarily a nativist.  He clearly objected to several of 
Tenskwatawa’s teachings, particularly those requiring Indians to refrain from trading 
with European Americans and to place community interests above individual ones.  Main 
Poc remained independent from the Prophet’s control in an effort to protect Potawatomi 
interests.  Main Poc feared losing his religious power if he abandoned his assaulton their 
traditional enemies the Osage.20  Therefore, he forged an alliance with the Prophet in 
order to gain provisions and support for his efforts, but not necessarily to subject 
Potawatomi interests to the direction of the Prophet.  For example, Main Poc continued to 
trade for and use alcohol.  As one historian noted, he refused to abandon his “much-
rewarded personal identity.”21  The Potawatomies who followed Main Poc frustrated the 
Prophet because they were unreliable allies who associated with and lived at 
Prophetstown without wholly aligning themselves with the Prophet.  Potawatomies could 
find shelter, food, and build social connections with fellow displaced Indians at 
Prophetstown, but not sacrifice their identity and tribal interests.   
The Shawnee brothers needed Main Poc’s support even though it proved to be 
detrimental to their nativist mission.  Main Poc possessed great influence and represented 
a key ally for the Shawnee leaders at Prophetstown.  If they could persuade the 
Potawatomi leader to follow the Prophet’s teachings, the Shawnee brothers hoped to gain 
the support of the various communities of Potawatomies nearby.  They failed to convince 
Main Poc.  The Potawatomies at Prophetstown maintained their independence from the 
                                                
20 Cave, Prophets of the Great Spirit, 98.  Cave states that Main Poc “rejected as well th call to Indian 
unity and brotherhood, “insisting that he would become weak and lose his medicine power if he were to 
give up warfare against the Osage and other enemies.’”   
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Prophet’s dictates largely because Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh were so desperate for 
their support.  It frustrated the Prophet when Indian agents William Wells and John 
Conner marched into their town demanding compensation for horses stolen during the 
summer of 1808.  Well aware that he had little control over the Potawatomies, the 
Prophet confessed that Main Poc’s followers had stolen the horses from Bosseron, a 
small settlement north of Vincennes.22  Their behavior undermined the Prophet’s goals.  
Unwittingly, Main Poc’s assaults on the Osage Indians and other settlements in southern 
Illinois convinced many Americans that the Prophet was indeed a militant leader.  Many 
of the Americans felt that it was only a matter of time before Main Poc attacked 
European American settlements in the same manner he did the Osages.23  Th  
Potawatomi, like the Miamis, added to the pluralistic but not necessarily united soci ty 
along the Tippecanoe.   
Evaluating the loyalty of the Kickapoos was especially difficult for the Prophet 
because they resided near Ouiatenon before the founding of Prophetstown.  An American 
identified several Kickapoo towns and sugar camps along the Wabash River near the 
mouth of the Tippecanoe in the late 1780s.24  In 1808, the Prophet and his followers 
settled adjacent to the Kickapoo village of nearly 160 cabins.  Thus, the Kickapoos were 
in a unique position to associate with, yet not necessarily support, Tenskwatawa.  They 
welcomed the trading opportunities created by the increased numbers of Indians 
migrating throughout the region, but they had also pre-established relationships wit  the 
Miami-speaking Wea Indians.  They enjoyed the best of both worlds, although they did 
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experience increased pressure from the Americans who hoped that the Kickapoos would 
cede their lands.  The Kickapoos resisted the pressure, which Harrison attributed to the 
Kickapoos being “very much under the influence of the Prophet.”25  Harrison’s 
comments ignored the fact that the Kickapoos had interests in the area near Prophetstown 
that had nothing to do with Tenskwatawa.   
There is some evidence that the Kickapoos associated with Prophetstown because 
of their affinity for Tecumseh with whom the Kickapoo had familial connections.  A 
Kickapoo informant claimed that he had “often heard Tecumseh describe the leading 
events of his life . . . that he was born of Kickapoo parents and lived among them until he 
was eight or nine years old, when he accompanied a War party against the Creeks and 
was taken prisoner by them, but was well treated by an Aunt who had married in that 
nation.”26  Tecumseh joined the Shawnees when he was nearly thirty years old, 
eventually settling at Tippecanoe after his brother the Prophet established a town there.  
Tecumseh “frequently counseled with the Kickapoos & expressed his desire to form an 
extensive village, which should embody the surrounding nations.”27  Although the 
Kickapoos admired Tecumseh for his bold efforts, they also believed “that he was l d 
astray from time to time by his brother the Prophet” whom they called 
“Paamaunawaashikau or sounding tongue, because they say he cannot command that 
member, but is constantly talking, and must of course invent many stories to suit the 
credulity of his heaven.28  Not only did the Kickapoos make a direct familial connection 
between themselves and Tecumseh, but they did so while characterizing the Prophet as a 
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liar.  Their story suggests that some people may have associated with Prophetstown 
because of Tecumseh but not his brother.  The familial connections, although proven 
false by historians, likely reflected how the Kickapoos viewed the efforts of the Shawnee 
brothers during the War of 1812.  Possibly, the Kickapoos created a fictive relationship 
with Tecumseh as a way to express their respect for his efforts during the war as well as 
their distaste for the Prophet.  The Kickapoos certainly did not benefit from associating 
themselves with a militant Indian leader.   
The Kickapoos’ story also suggests that there were ideological differences 
between the Shawnee brothers.  Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa disagreed as to the 
relationship their followers should have with outsiders.  When describing the goals 
behind Tecumseh’s quest to unify the Indian nations, the Kickapoo informant claimed 
that Tecumseh supported Indians associating with European Americans in order to access 
farming implements.29  A noted historian suggests that Tecumseh accepted French traders 
and gunsmiths at Prophetstown because they provided tools necessary for uniting various 
Indian communities.30  Such associations would have undermined the Prophet’s nativist 
vision that required Indians to separate ideologically and materially from European 
Americans.  It is also likely that the Kickapoos had established trading connections with 
Miami-speaking Indians in the period before the Prophet’s arrival, which would have 
complicated their relationship with Prophetstown.  The Kickapoos enjoyed the best of 
both worlds, which meant that Prophetstown would not enjoy the ideological unity 
Tenskwatawa preferred.31  The Prophet found himself trapped between his desire to force 
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the residents at Prophetstown to conform to his teachings and the reality that they were 
surrounded by circumstances outside his control.   
Self-interested behavior by Indians at Prophetstown must have made the meetings 
at the Prophet’s council house contentious.  The meetings would have included various 
Kickapoos, Miamis, Potawatomies, and other Indians, and while the Prophet and 
Tecumseh would have appreciated such an audience, they knew that many Indians were 
causing problems for the community.  Main Poc’s Potawatomies ventured in and out of 
the town, using its resources for their expeditions against the Osage and American 
settlements farther west and they likely convinced many of the other Indians to join them.  
Outraged that he could not control Main Poc, the Prophet accused the Potawatomies of 
undermining his efforts.  The Shawnee brothers recognized that Main Poc’s behavior 
convinced American settlers that the Prophet was as militant.  Tenskwatawa likely 
distrusted many of the Miamis in his town because he could not distinguish between 
those who were loyal to him and those who spied for the Americans.  Much the same 
applied to the Kickapoos as well.  Rather than ostracize those Indians whom he 
suspected, the Prophet probably held secretive meetings that only his trusted advisors
could attend.  Ironically, as the Prophet welcomed more Indians into his town, he likely 
had to segregate himself from certain townspeople in order to protect his nativist agenda.  
The multi-layered identity of Prophetstown proved remarkably problematic for the 
Shawnee leader who found himself distrusting members of his own settlement at a time 
when he desperately needed their support.   
  At times, the town was so divided that the Prophet could not even silence his 
detractors when non-Indians visited.  An Indian agent, Joseph Barron, reported in August 
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of 1810 that the “Kickapoos & other Indians” were greatly “displeased” with the Prophet 
because they feared violence between themselves and the Americans.32  While there, 
Barron witnessed a Potawatomi leader and some Kickapoos confront the Prophet over the
death of three Kickapoos.  Tenskwatawa accused the Potawatomies of lying and stated 
that no one had died in the town.  The deaths presented a challenge to the Prophet’s 
medicine because Tenskwatawa had promised “that no man should die in his town.”33  
Furthermore, that argument occurred in the presence of Barron, a man the Indians knew 
to be in Harrison’s employ.  Rather than conceal their disagreements for a late time, the 
Indians argued in public for outsiders to witness.  Their personal disputes trumped the 
corporate good.  Even though the Prophet had won new supporters among the Ho-Chunk 
nation, it appeared that other, long time residents were not as supportive of the Shawn e 
leader.   
 Prophetstown remained factionalized because Indians were unwilling to set aside 
their customary practices and traditional forms of social organization.  Village chiefs 
disagreed with the Prophet’s attempt to centralize power and their efforts to reclaim 
influence spurred open disagreements at Prophetstown.  An Iowa, after speaking to a 
relative among the Ho-Chunk Indians at Prophetstown, reported to Harrison that “all the 
village Chiefs had been divested of their authority,--and that every thing was managed by 
the warriors, who breathed nothing but war against the U. States.”34  The Iowa Indian did 
not perceive any immediate danger to Vincennes, even though several Indian nations h d 
recently returned a “great belt which had been sent round to all the Tribes for the purpose 
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of uniting them” by the Prophet.35  Of the Indians residing at Prophetstown, the Ho-
Chunk supported Tenskwatawa to a far greater degree than any other Indian group 
besides the Shawnee, but that did not mean that the Ho-Chunk were immune to 
factionalism.  For example, a Ho-Chunk leader at Prophetstown wept openly after a
lengthy debate because his warriors wanted to attack European American settlements.36  
These open arguments likely heightened emotions between the residents and their 
villages in the surrounding hinterland.  In fact, some members of the Ho-Chunks 
“murdered some of the Kickapoos and Sacs” and the Kickapoo were determined to 
avenge such atrocities.37  Even Harrison, a man predisposed to see Prophetstown as 
militant and united, commented that there were “other causes of jealousy between the 
Prophet’s followers” which he hoped would further the divisions at Prophetstown.38  
While outsiders believed this was just another example of jealousies among 
Tenskwatawa’s followers, the violence was actually the result of legitimate cultural and 
political disagreements between Indian groups.  Many Indians at Prophetstown continued 
to favor their cultural, rather than nativist, interests.   
 Factional strife undermined the Prophet’s vision throughout 1810 and well into 
1811.  A large contingent of Sac and Fox, Ottawas, and even some Potawatomies 
departed from the town in protest to the Prophet’s bad medicine.  Main Poc and his 
Potawatomi followers continued to raid European American settlements, which had 
quickly turned the Americans against the Shawnee brothers.  The Kickapoos balanced 
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their desire to associate with Tecumseh, even though they distrusted the Prophet, and 
their hope to remain independent.  While Prophetstown was not the Kickapoos’s enemy, 
it altered the dynamics of the region and placed them in a delicate position.  Oppose the 
Prophet and they would draw his ire, but support him entirely and the Americans and 
outside Indian groups might quickly turn on them.  Unlike the Sac and Fox Indians, the 
Kickapoos could not simply go home. 
 Rather than return to their traditional homelands, most Indians refashioned 
Prophetstown to fit their needs.  Hundreds of Indians gathered near the Prophet’s lodge 
anxiously anticipating his spiritual message, while many others tended to the acres of 
corn lining the Wabash River.  In their free time, Indians traded furs and other items for 
goods from the French traders who had trading posts near the town.  Most of the 
inhabitants of Prophetstown enjoyed relative comfort, but few could call the town home.  
This was largely due to the conflict arising from Tenskwatawa’s efforts to forge a new 
racial Indian identity that would supersede the ethnic interests of his followers.  F w 
Indians were willing to subvert their ethnic identity to the extent that Tenskwatawa 
desired.  Prophetstown was partially their town.  While they were willing to support the 
Prophet, they also believed that the town was theirs to shape.  
The Prophet’s Challenges 
Tenskwatawa’s challenges at Prophetstown were two-fold.  Not only did he have 
to address his town’s internal divisions, but the Shawnee leader also had to confront the 
militant image of Prophetstown promoted by the Miamis, their French counterparts, and 
William Henry Harrison.  Perceptions of Prophetstown were as important as thectual 
realities because descriptions provided to the Americans often dictated Harrison’s 
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policies towards the Indians.  Moreover, while Harrison recognized some of the problms 
inherent in using the French and Miamis for intelligence, his personal bias often helped 
him dismiss any inconsistencies present.  He believed that relying on William Wells, 
Little Turtle, and the French traders might prove problematic because of their ul erior 
motives but that those problems would not be detrimental to his governance.  In order to 
negate the conflicts of interest, Harrison handled diplomacy in the region by framing 
Indian behavior as either for the Americans or for the Prophet.  There was no middle
ground.  Harrison’s mentality challenged Tenskwatawa’s efforts, especially as it affected 
the French and Miami residents of the region.   
One of the Prophet’s first diplomatic challenges was Wells.  Wells’s position as 
Fort Wayne Indian agent allowed him to influence Harrison by manipulating 
Tenskwatawa’s general comments about Indians and European Americans for his own 
political purposes. When Tenskwatawa resettled his community, the Miamis grew so 
angry that Wells wrote Harrison that the Shawnee leader “should be the first object of our 
resentment.”39  Wells knew that the Americans would be far more likely to act out against 
Prophetstown if they thought their capital at Vincennes was threatened.  The Prophet 
realized Wells’s motives and sought out Harrison’s acceptance.  Tenskwatawa needed to 
find common ground in order to lessen any anger created by his movement to the 
Wabash-Maumee Valley. Realizing his predicament and Wells’s influence with the 
governor, the Prophet reassured Harrison by discussing their similarities.  He emphasized 
their common ground concerning agriculture, worshipping a higher power, constructing a 
peaceful community and by emphasizing their shared racial heritage.  Tenskwatawa 
claimed that the same being created European Americans and Indians even though the 
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two differed “a little in coulour.”40  Tenskwatawa’s hope, at least in public, was to “live 
in peace and friendship” with his American brothers.41   
Emphasizing the racial affinity between the two groups was only part of this 
process.  After meeting John Conner and learning of the “bad reports” from Wells in late
June of 1808, the Prophet sent several lesser chiefs and a letter to Harrison.42  
Tenskwatawa assured the governor that his intentions were peaceful, and offered proof of 
his supposed sincerity by reminding Harrison that he would do nothing “to risk the safety 
of our children.”43  By discussing similarities between himself and Harrison, the Prophet 
reoriented the discussion from one of European Americans versus Indians to one of two 
communities both concerned with the safety of their neighbors.  He effectively changed 
the topic of discussion while also asking, and eventually receiving, aid from Harrison.  
The Prophet’s success at settling a community at Tippecanoe provided ample 
motivation for Wells to use his relationship with the Americans to rid the region of 
Prophetstown.  In the spring of 1809, Wells warned Harrison that many Ojibwas, 
Ottawas, and Pottawatomi Indians fled Prophetstown because Tenskwatawa “has told 
them to receive the Tomahawk from him and destroy all the white people at 
Vincennes.”44  He then added that he did not “believe that any harm is intended, or will 
be attempted by the Prophet or any other Indians against the White people.”45  W lls’s 
conflicting advice hid deep-seated emotions about the Prophet’s community.  He 
intended his letters to appear impartial while sowing doubt and insecurity.  It also seems 
                                                








that Wells had goals beyond turning the Americans against the Prophet.  After warning 
Harrison that the Prophet “only wanted power [supporters] to make him dangerous,” 
Wells described the starving Indians who were leaving Prophetstown.46  Wells felt that 
humanity compelled him to “give them some provision,” but he was probably using the 
opportunity to expand his influence among the Indians in order to check Tenskwatawa’s 
growing popularity.47  By convincing Harrison that the Prophet wanted to murder the 
Americans, Wells made his gift-giving seem a necessary step to keep Indians away from 
Prophetstown.  In doing so, Wells used Prophetstown to empower his Miami polity.48  
Even though Harrison recognized Wells’s duplicity and “disposition for intrigue & for 
the accumulation of property,” he continued to rely on the Indian agent to distribute 
annuity payments to the Indians from Fort Wayne.49    
French traders only compounded Tenskwatawa’s efforts to combat Wells by 
spreading biased intelligence corroborating Wells’s accusations.   Their estimates of the 
number of Indians at Prophetstown falsely amplified its militant character.  The French 
created a racial entity for Harrison to consume.  By associating non-Prophetst wn Indians 
with the Prophet’s followers, the French intelligence created a racial associ tion among 
all of the Indians.  The French then contrasted the Indians with the “whites” which ere 
also constructed at the same time.  Two French traders, Peter Lafontaine and Toussaint 
Dubois, estimated that the Prophet had nearly 500 supporters “within the distance of 40 
or 50 miles of his Village.”50  Such an approximation ignored the historical factionalism 
                                                
46 William Wells to WHH, WHH Papers, Reel 3, 380; April 8, 1809. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Harvey Lewis Carter, The Life and Times of Little Turtle: First Sagamore f the Wabash (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1987). 
49 Harrison to Eustis, WHH Papers, Reel 3, 668; December 3, 1809. 
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in the region.  Groups of Miamis and Potawatomies who opposed the Prophet lived 
within the twenty-five mile radius around Prophetstown but had little or no connection 
with the settlement.51  Lafontaine then warned Harrison that the Prophet “and his 
followers had determined to commence hostilities as soon as they could be prepared & to 
‘sweep all the white people from the Wabash and white River’ after which they intended 
to attack the Miamis.”52 Lafontaine had received the information from two Miamis.  
Eventually Harrison received information from his other information sources, including 
Indian agent John Johnston, which helped him see beyond the biased Frenchmen.    
The large amount of misinformation about Prophetstown forced Tenskwatawa to 
confront the Miamis and French.  Tenskwatawa recognized that building a vibrant 
community at Prophetstown was as much about controlling the perceptions of his town as 
it was about attracting new Indians to it.  In May of 1809, he traveled to Fort Wayne to 
speak with John Johnston, the Indian agent.  Tenskwatawa begged Johnston to 
recognized Little Turtle’s “personal and private motives” for protecting his small 
community of followers and tried to reinterpret Wells’s statements.53  Challenging 
Wells’s statements was increasingly difficult for Tenskwatawa becuse Black Hoof, a 
Shawnee leader, who was friendly with the Americans, had recently expressed hi  
fondness and friendship for Wells.  The factionalism among the Shawnees undermined 
Tenskwatawa’s complaints because it showed that some Shawnees did support Wells.  
                                                                                                                                                 
dismission would have been the Consequence if I had not solicited his pardon—this I did from a belief that 
his promises of future good Conduct would be observed and from a persuasion also that the qualifications 
he possessed for the appointment of Indian Agent could not be found in any other individual.   
51 Benjamin Stickney mentions a Potawatomi town six miles north of Prophetstown in a letter to Secretary 
of War Eustis in 1812. United States, Gayle Thornbrough, John Johnston, and Benjamin Franklin Stickney. 
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52 Harrison to Eustis, WHH Papers, Reel 3, 409; May 3, 1809. 
53 Johnston to the Prophet, May 3, 1809, in Thornbrough, Letterbook, 49-52.  Johnston to William Eustis, 
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Johnston believed Tenskwatawa.  He accepted the Prophet’s professions of peace because 
he hated Wells, who Harrison had recently dismissed as Indian agent for misusing his 
office for personal benefit.   
Harrison, however, was not so forgiving.  Rather than accept Johnston’s 
assessment, the governor sent two spies to Prophetstown to see if the Prophet had been 
truthful.  They witnessed what Harrison described as anti-American activity. In early 
June, Tenskwatawa and several of his supporters visited Vincennes to defend their 
actions, but Harrison remained convinced that the Prophet hated the Americans.54  While 
Harrison distrusted the Prophet, he believed that the Shawnee leader would eventually 
abandon his mission.  Intimidated by the large numbers of European American settlers, 
many of the Prophet’s followers would defect from Prophetstown.  In turn, Harrison 
hoped that the increased pressures brought on the Prophet would convince other Indian 
communities to cede more lands to the Americans.  Harrison began organizing a council 
in Fort Wayne to that very end.   
Tenskwatawa believed that any further attempts by Harrison to gain India lands 
would backfire and compel more Indians to accept his nativist agenda.  Federal agents 
recognized this, as well, and warned Harrison that summer not to negotiate any more land 
cessions without making sure that the legitimate Indian leaders were present.55  William 
Eustis feared that Harrison’s overzealous behavior might cause unrest in the region.  
However, the governor disregarded Eustis’s warning and negotiated the Treaty of Fort 
Wayne only with representatives of the Miami, Delaware, and Potawatomi communities 
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who appeared responsive to American needs.  The council itself proved highly volatile.  
A large contingent of Potawatomies tried to bully the Miamis into signing the treaty.  The 
Potawatomies “urged an immediate compliance to the proposal of the United Stat s,” 
however, the “Miamis from Mississinway took the lead in the debate & declared that they 
would never consent to sell any more lands that they havd been advised by the Father the 
British never to sell another foot.”56  In retaliation, the Potawatomies “poured upon [the 
Miamis] a torrent of abuse & declared that they would no longer consider them as 
Brothers but that they would loose the chain which had united them with the Tomahawk 
& setting up a shout of Defiance which was echoed by all the warriors.”57  Like the 
Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 that allowed the Iroquois to cede vast stretches of 
Shawnee and Delaware lands, the Treaty of Fort Wayne enabled various factions of 
Indians to cede three million acres in the Wabash-Maumee Valley.  The Shawnees 
refused to attend the negotiations while the Kickapoos signed a supplementary treay 
shortly thereafter.  Not only did this make the Prophet and his brother more resistant 
toward the Americans, it further divided the Indian communities within the region.  His 
actions produced the negative effects that Eustis feared.  The Treaty of Fort Wayne
galvanized the community at Prophetstown because it forced a faction of the Miamis and 
the Shawnee brothers to take action.  The treaty amounted to a declaration of war for 
many of the communities in the region; it showed blatant disregard for the interests of the 
Miami nation and the nativist Indians at Prophetstown.   
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However, while the treaty angered many Indians in the valley, it did not 
strengthen the Prophet’s town to the extent that he had hoped.  Various Indian 
communities sought greater stability after the treaty because so much land had been 
ceded to the Americans.  For instance, Miami leader Pacanne signed the treaty in order to 
assert his identity as an influential leader in an effort to challenge the abuses of fellow co-
signer Little Turtle.  Pacanne’s Miamis, while protesting the treaty, remained opposed to 
subverting their desires in favor of the Prophet’s nativist goals.  It also compelled other 
groups like the Potawatomies and Kickapoos to forge relationships with Prophetstown 
when they realized that Harrison would no longer recognize their hegemony in the 
region.  Pacanne’s behavior, like that of the Kickapoos and Potawatomies, appeared to 
favor militancy when in fact it represented frustration over another failed treaty.  Indians 
forged relationships with Prophetstown even though they did not agree entirely with the 
Prophet’s message because doing so forced Harrison to recognize their presence in the 
region.  Most European Americans interpreted the actions of Pacanne’s Miamis, the 
Potawatomies, and Kickapoos as another example of Tenskwatawa’s growing influence 




Figure 4.1, The Treaty of Fort Wayne 
Taken from Harry D. Tunnell IV., To Compel with Armed Force: A Staff Ride Handbook fr the 
Battle of Tippecanoe (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Published by Army Command nd General Staff College, 
1998). 
 
While the Prophet had little to do with the factional strife among the Miamis, he 
suffered because he could not stop European Americans from connecting Miami 
factionalism to Prophetstown’s militancy.  Pacanne’s behavior frightened Little Turtle, 
the French, and the Americans, who saw it as a reflection of Tenskwatawa’s neg tive 
influence.  The intelligence Little Turtle, Wells, and their French counterparts rovided 
usually failed to address the ethnic differences within the Wabash Indian community, 
most notably with the Miamis.  It was typical for intelligence gatherers to frame the 
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information they received through the Prophetstown/Vincennes dichotomy.  Francis 
Vigo, longtime trader in Vincennes, reported to Harrison that at least one Miami leader 
“had entered into all the views of the Prophet and even that of murdering all those who 
stand in opposition to his measures.”58  The report also mentioned that an important but 
unnamed Miami leader visited Malden and received gifts in order to renew his 
community’s relationship with the British.  The disaffected Miami leader us d both the 
Prophet and the British to protect his community’s interests and did not intend to place 
himself and his people entirely at the Prophet’s bidding.59  Vigo, Harrison, and even 
Johnston failed to comprehend how the Miami used the British, Americans, and even the 
Prophet to maintain their interests.   
The Miamis used the Treaty of Fort Wayne as they did Prophetstown.  It was a 
instrument for them to fight intra-community disputes.  Pacanne signed it in order t gain 
recognition as one of the head Miami leaders and to displace Little Turtle, whom many 
Miamis felt had too much power.  Before the treaty, some Miamis from the main vill ges 
at Mississinewa removed east to the Wabash-Maumee portage; this was prob bly a 
symbolic statement against the more progressive Miamis who had been more willing to 
cede lands.60  Negotiations during the Fort Wayne treaty only exacerbated these 
divisions.  Little Turtle’s faction continued to argue with those Indians who supported 
Pacanne.  All the while, Richardville remained at the Mississinway due to sickne s, 
although some questioned if he was just trying to avoid the contentious meeting.  Little 
Turtle’s Miamis supported the treaty but “were intimidated by the vehemence of the 
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Chiefs of the Mississinway Village & remained silent . . . parties of young men of the 
Miami Tribe were constantly ariving [sic] loaded with goods from the British Agents at 
Malden.”61  The Miamis used the treaty, like they did Prophetstown, but non-Indians 
continued to interpret the divisions within Miami society as created by outside forces like 
the Prophet rather than because of internal divisions.   
Prophetstown was not nearly as unified as the Americans feared.  After the treaty, 
Tenskwatawa’s town grew in population, but not in unity.  Many of the groups that lived 
at Tippecanoe used Prophetstown as a tool in intra-tribal disagreements like that b tween 
Pacanne and Little Turtle.  The different Indian groups at Prophetstown were trapp d 
between the Prophet’s more progressive ideology centered on a singular Indian identity 
and their more traditional ethnic identities fashioned over the previous decades.  Indians
also hoped to force the Americans to identify the diversity of Indian interests in the
period after the Treaty of Fort Wayne when the Americans only recognized Little 
Turtle’s Miamis as the legitimate Indian polity in the region. 
Evaluating Indian behavior as either in favor of the Prophet or in favor of 
acculturation overshadows the more complicated reasons underlying Indian behavior in 
the Wabash-Maumee Valley.  Factions of Miamis, Kickapoos, and Potawatomi Indians 
used the opportunities provided by the diplomatic dispute between Vincennes and 
Prophetstown as a means to survive.  Categories such as “accomodationist” and “nativist” 
do not work well when analyzing the behavior of the various Indian communities during 
this period.  Robert Mann in his work on Pacanne’s Miamis identifies the factions among 
the Miamis as either progressive or conservative and characterizes the conservative 
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Miamis as “bound by their adherence to an ethnic ideology” based on Miami traditions.  
He concludes correctly that like the Prophet’s ideology, conservative Miami beliefs were 
not necessarily looking backwards or geared towards restoring a golden age.  Rath r, the 
Miamis hoped to renew and protect their ethnic identity during a period of great change.   
Pacanne’s efforts to protect Miami culture resembled the Prophet’s actions all too 
closely.  Few non-Indians separated Pacanne’s efforts to revitalize the Miamis from the 
Prophet’s militancy.  Although he signed the treaty, Pacanne rejected all annuity 
payments, which appeared to rebuff the Americans for the Prophet.  Yet, rather than turn 
his support towards the Prophet, Pacanne traveled to Malden in order to re-establish 
relationships with the British.62  Malden was the same place where the Prophet and his 
brother traveled in order to purchase trade goods and ammunition.63  Most Americans 
believed that Pacanne’s actions reflected his support of Prophetstown and Tenskwatawa’s 
nativist agenda.  However, while Pacanne and Tenskwatawa used the British resources at 
Malden to defend their interests, they differed ideologically.  One hoped to use the 
materials to protect all Indians while the other did so in an effort to renew Miami power 
and ethnic identity.  To the Americans, the Prophet’s vision represented more of a threat
because it required the unification of many more Indians.  Most Americans failed to 
differentiate between the two leaders.  For them, seeking the support of the British and 
advocating unity among the North American Indian community was the same thing.  
They both threatened American interests.   
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It was easier for the Americans to lump Pacanne in with the Prophet than it was 
for the Americans to understand the complex dispute between Pacanne and Little Turtle.  
For Pacanne, Little Turtle’s relationship with the Americans, much like the Prophet’s 
settlement on the Tippecanoe, undermined traditional Miami culture and regional 
hegemony because it silenced other Miami leaders and communities important to trade 
and diplomacy.  Little Turtle hurt the Miamis by willingly ceding Miami lands in order to 
gain annuity payments.   The Prophet angered Pacanne by settling on, and ignoring the 
spiritual significance of, the Miami lands.  For Miami traditionalists, Prophetstown posed 
as big a threat as did the Americans and British, and they used each group to protec their 
own interests.64  They associated with the Prophet to threaten Little Turtle, traded with 
the British in order to maintain a degree of independence from the Americans, and then 
provided information to the Americans to marginalize Prophetstown.  There is no doubt 
that some Miamis associated with the Prophet, but it is also imperative that we question 
the motives for these associations and not simply assume that those Miamis were nativist.  
If Pacanne willingly associated with the Americans and signed a treaty hat he abhorred 
in order to challenge Little Turtle’s authority, then why would he not do the same by 
associating with the Prophet?  Pacanne and his Miami community used the treaty and 
Prophetstown to serve their cultural interests.  However, the French and Americans 
concluded that Indians like Pacanne were secretly supporting the Prophet if they did not 
directly support the Americans.   
The Kickapoos found themselves in a position similar to that of the Miami, which 
only exacerbated negative perceptions of Prophetstown.  Even though the Kickapoos 
eventually ceded the lands northwest of the Wabash in compliance with Harrison’s 
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wishes, the governor continued to question their motives.  He viewed them as allies of 
Prophetstown and promoters of a greater Indian conspiracy against Anglo-Americans.  In 
the spring of 1810, the governor reported that the population of Prophetstown had 
increased because “nearly all the Kickapoos” had joined with the Prophet.65  F aring that 
the Prophet was planning an attack on Vincennes, Harrison instructed Toussaint Dubois 
to visit Prophetstown.  There he could speak to several of his Kickapoo friends about 
Tenskwatawa’s plot.  Dubois’ “old friends” among the Kickapoos said “they had long 
known that War was [Tenskwatawa’s] intention but they were never informed whether he 
designed to attack the United States or the Osage nation.”66   
The Kickapoos’ uncertainty is telling.  The Kickapoos did not know what the 
Prophet planned to do even though they lived adjacent to his town.  Although Harrison 
claimed that “nearly all the Kickapoos” had joined the Prophet, in reality, they associ ted 
with him at a distance.  Furthermore, if the Miamis knew that the Prophet was hostile to 
Vincennes then why would the Kickapoos have been so oblivious to it?  It was unlikely 
that they lied to Dubois, considering that they were old friends and that Dubois left the 
meeting convinced that the Prophet was not nearly as threatening as others had suggested.  
DuBois had an established history with the Miamis who facilitated the trading network 
and depended upon the local exchange economy for his livelihood.  He recognized that 
the Prophet had kicked out all of the French traders from Prophetstown, which had 
negatively affected trade. 67  Yet, Dubois remained adamant that not all of the Kickapoos 
supported Tenskwatawa.     
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 Balancing the problems within his town with maintaining a diplomatic edge over 
its negative perceptions challenged Tenskwatawa daily.  During the spring of 1810, 
Wyandot, Iowa, Sac and Fox, and Ho-Chunk traveled to meet the Prophet.  The reaction 
from the Miamis was remarkable.  Gros Bled, an aged Piankashaw leader visited 
Harrison personally and requested “to remove over the Mississippi alledging [sic] that he 
heard amongst the Indians nothing but the News of War.”68    Gros Bled told Harrison 
that the Prophet planned to destroy Vincennes, stating that the Prophet intended “to come 
[to Vincennes] with a large body of men that 4 or 5 would be assigned to each House and 
himself with 12 or 15 would enter [Grouseland] and having destroyed [the governor] a 
signal would be given by a person posted for that purpose to commence the Massacre in 
the Town –This fellow [the Prophet] has boasted that he would follow the footsteps of the 
Great Pontiac.”69  Gros Bled’s story, coupled with Michel Brouillet’s estimate that 
Prophetstown’s population was near 3,000 people seemed reasonable to the Americans.  
It also heightened fears that the Prophet was indeed planning an attack.  However, when 
Harrison questioned Brouillet further, the French trader admitted that the Prophet had 
estimated the population of Prophetstown at 3,000 when in fact it only contained about 
650 warriors.70  Brouillet’s estimate, like Gros Bled’s story, reflected their efforts to rid 
the region of a problematic Indian rather than legitimate intelligence concerni g life at 
Prophetstown. 
The Prophet had no way of limiting the extent to which Americans like Harrison 
depended upon the Miamis for information.  Americans relied on the Miamis and French 
so heavily that it predisposed the Americans to thinking that Tenskwatawa was milit nt.  
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Harrison and many of the Americans believed that the fate of the territory depended upon 
the loyalty of the Miamis because they were more numerous and enjoyed a great degree 
of influence among the Wabash Indians.  However, he and his agents failed to recogniz  
the degree to which the Miamis had divided internally due to both American policies and 
Prophetstown’s nativism.  Many Americans viewed Indians in simplistic terms and failed 
to understand their diversity within Indian society.  American agents also faied to 
recognize how some Miamis used Prophetstown as a way to protest rogue leaders like 
Little Turtle.  Americans mistakenly concluded that the Miamis who opposed Little 
Turtle in turn supported the Prophet, which amplified negative perceptions that the 
Prophet had won many Miami converts.  John Johnston, the Indian agent at Fort Wayne, 
noted the Massasinway Miamis “reluctance” to council with the Americans.71  Johnston 
feared “that there was mischief going on among them” and he tried in vain to “remve 
the existing bad impressions” they had of the Americans.  In council, Miami leader 
Pacanne condemned the Fort Wayne Treaty and the belligerent Americans who forced 
the Miamis to cede lands.  Pacanne remained adamant that “they would not agree to the 
treaty, that it must be broke, that for their part they would not receive any part of the 
annuity.”72  Johnston believed that the Miamis were a “band of the Prophet’s followers” 
because “every sentiment they uttered was in unison with those of the Prophet.”73  This 
was not the case.  Pacanne hoped to protect Miami interests and believed that the best 
course of action was to renew their relationship with the British.   
Tenskwatawa played no part in Pacanne’s decision to take thirty of his men and 
visit British headquarters near Detroit.  If anything, the Prophet wanted Pacanne to 
                                                





remain in the valley so that he would exacerbate the problems already present, but he 
could not control the Miami leader.  Johnston concluded that Pacanne’s Miami had been 
“corrupted by the Prophet’s Council & wished to follow the example of the Weeas [sic] 
in refusing their goods.”74  Sadly, Johnston’s conclusions echoed Harrison’s; neither 
recognized the extent to which the Miami-speaking Indians had separated themselves 
from both the Prophet and the Americans.  More surprising was Johnston’s conclusion 
that the Prophet had won over Pacanne when the exact opposite had occurred.  In fact, 
Pacanne rejected the Prophet’s influence just as he had rejected the Americans.  
Americans did not want to distinguish Miami factionalism from Prophetstown militancy; 
they assumed that these dynamics were one and the same because both seemed to express
anti-American intent.  Miami leader The Owl reminded Johnston that “all the mischief 
that is going among” the Miamis “has sprung from Wells & the [Little] Turtle” but that 
mattered little to the Americans who had grown obsessed with Prophetstown.75   
 Competition between factions was the larger threat to regional stability than the 
nativism at Prophetstown.  The more Pacanne resisted, the more convinced Harrison 
became of the Prophet’s growing power.  Pacanne had proven his antipathy towards the 
Americans during the previous two years, not his support for the Prophet.   Pacanne’s 
Miami, united in their opposition to the Americans and Little Turtle’s faction, visited the 
British at Malden where they received goods and weapons.  Pacanne’s group had 
separated themselves from Little Turtle’s faction while rejecting American policies, in 
particular the Treaty of Fort Wayne, and re-established relations with the Bri ish.  Yet, 
few Americans identified Pacanne’s group as a threat like Prophetstown, even though his 
                                                




supporters mirrored much of the behavior at Prophetstown that the Americans identifie 
as hostile.  They believed that the Prophet was the root of the problem and that Pacanne 
was only acting in accordance with Tenskwatawa’s wishes.  By stopping the Shawnee 
brothers, the governor hoped to force the Miami factions to accept American terms.  
What the Americans never fully realized is that the competition between the Miami 
factions convinced some leaders like Wells and Little Turtle to spread misinformation 
that exaggerated Prophetstown’s militancy.  The factionalism also forced leaders like 
Pacanne to associate with the Prophet even though he did not agree with the Shawnee 
leader’s larger ideological goals.  In the end, the Americans tended to believe the 
intelligence provided by the Miamis while thinking that Pacanne’s relationship with the 
Prophet reflected Tenskwatawa’s powerful influence among Wabash Indian 
communities. 
However, Pacanne’s resistance did not necessarily reflect a powerful 
Prophetstown.  French spies confirmed reports of internal divisions at Prophetstown 
when they returned from a fact-finding mission in early October of 1810.  Brouillet’s 
estimates of the town’s population proved entirely inaccurate and unreliable.  Harrison 
claimed that the Prophet could collect nearly 1300 men in a day, but his spies discovered 
that it was no more than 500.  The Ho-Chunk, Tenskwatawa’s base support, numbered 
less than one hundred; conversely, the larger contingent of Potawatomies continued to 
reject Tenskwatawa’s authority and wanted “to go to war” against Tenskwatawa rather 
“than with the Americans.”76  It appeared that many, if not most, of the Indian nations in 
the Wabash-Maumee Valley in the fall of 1810 were at odds with Prophetstown.  The 
Prophet understood that he was fighting a losing battle.  His efforts to control his own 
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followers proved challenging enough, but controlling the Miamis and their French 
brethren was next to impossible.  Indeed, even if Tenskwatawa somehow managed to 
steady his followers and counteract the propaganda spread by Wells and the Frenc, he 
still would have had to deal with Harrison’s polarizing rhetoric and policies.  The Miamis 
and French could complain about Prophetstown all they wanted, but it was Harrison who 
had the resources to move against it. 
Harrison Polarizes the Valley 
Harrison’s misguided perceptions of Prophetstown were the product of both his 
biased intelligence sources and his personal animosity toward Tenskwatawa.  Hrrison 
failed to change policy because he did not separate his disgust for the Prophet from 
Indian affairs outside of Prophetstown.  It mattered little that Prophetstown was actually a 
village of diverse and competing interests.  The threat was the Prophet.  To maintain 
peace, Harrison needed to silence Tenskwatawa.77  His efforts to do so increasingly 
reflected a deep bitterness toward Tenskwatawa as well as an entrenched fear that 
President James Madison might replace him as governor.  In his effort to maintain 
stability in the Wabash-Maumee Valley, Harrison polarized relationships by claiming 
that Indians were either friends of the Americans or supporters of the Prophet.  The more 
the Indians opposed him, the more Harrison thought that Tenskwatawa represented a 
legitimate threat against his town and his leadership.  While the rebellious M amis were 
not necessarily part of Prophetstown, Harrison rationalized their behavior as a direct 
reflection of the Prophet’s influence.       
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Harrison reacted to Shawnee brothers by taking a territorial crisis and 
refashioning it into a personal threat.  Harrison’s hatred for the Prophet lessened th  
likelihood that he would question the faulty intelligence provided by his French and 
Miami allies.  Furthermore, Harrison firmly believed that his fellow Americans were out 
to undermine his authority as well.  In a letter to Eustis, Harrison complained that “the 
poison” that had been “infused” into the minds of Tecumseh and Pacanne’s Miami 
Indians was part of a larger scheme to ruin him.  At a recent negotiation, Tecumseh 
described in detail how a European American man visited Prophetstown shortly after the 
Treaty of Fort Wayne as “an agent of a large party of white people” who supported the 
Shawnee brothers.78  The agent promised to inform Tecumseh of everything that “the 
Governor at Vincennes is doing against you,” but to succeed, “the Shawnee chief needed 
to observe great secrecy” and not tell anyone.79  The agent stated that Harrison never 
intended to respect his agreements and that the Indians should “take nothing” from the 
Americans until the President replaced him.   
As he had done previously, Harrison suspected his opponents of manipulating 
information about Prophetstown as a ruse to get rid of him.  Harrison believed that “the 
scheme originated with a Scotch tory,” William McIntosh, who lived in Vincennes and 
with whom Harrison had a very hostile relationship.80 Initially the two men had been 
friends, but land speculation had pitted them against each other, culminating in a legal 
decision that awarded Harrison $4000 in damages for McIntosh’s calumnies.  The 
governor concluded that the white men of whom Tecumseh spoke were in fact McIntosh 
and William Wells.  This conclusion was more a product of Harrison’s anger over 
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personal affairs than a reflection of concrete intelligence implicating Wells and 
McIntosh.81  In reference to Wells and his treasonous activities, Harrison stated that there 
really was not any proof that Wells produced “the late disturbances amongst the Indians” 
even though the circumstances suggested that he was indeed guilty.82  Nonetheless, 
Harrison recommended Wells for “an appointment in the Indian Department if a Suitable 
Situation Could be found for him.”83  Harrison’s subsequent statement suggests that  he 
believed that Wells and McIntosh were part of a much larger conspiracy.  He chall nged 
Eustis to imagine the “villainous intrigues” which were “carried on with the Indians in 
this country by foreign agents and other disaffected persons” in an effort to explain his 
accusations against McIntosh and Wells.84  The situation in Prophetstown was far more 
than Harrison trying to protect the territory from militant Indians.  Unreliable 
intelligence, treasonous Americans, and bias made the whole affair deeply p rsonal.  
Separating personal affairs from governance proved remarkably difficult or Harrison. 
 Harrison continued to explain the Prophet’s behavior in terms of a personal attack 
upon both himself and American interests.  This was nowhere more apparent than when 
Tenskwatawa reacted violently to salt annuity payments bound for the Miamis in 1810 
and 1811.  Several Frenchmen including the newly appointed LaPlante (the replacement 
for the recently-fired Brouillet) paddled up the Wabash in order to deliver some of the 
                                                
81 WHH to Eustis, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 322; January 15, 1811. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 WHH to Eustis, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 255; November 7, 1810.  Harrison recounted th  events 
surrounding McIntosh, stating that Harrison “had commenced a suit against a certain Wm McIntosh, a 
Scotchman residing at this place, for slandering me in r lation to my management of the Indian 
Department—The accusations which he brought against me were of the most serious natire—‘Such as 
defrauding the Indians in the treaties I have made with them Making chiefs to answer my own particular 
purposes—Excluding the real Chiefs &c—By this and other conduct producing all the disturbances which 
have taken placec in the Indian Country, & the Alarm produced in this &c’—This suit was tried in the 
Superior Court of this Territory on the 11 Inst:”  WHH to Eustis, Reel 4, 488; April 23, 1811. 
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salt to Prophetstown and then Fort Wayne.  Tecumseh and his men seized the salt upon 
their arrival but then ordered the traders to take it back when they stopped at 
Prophetstown on their return trip.  They also took the Frenchmen “by the hair and shook 
them violently asking whether they were Americans” which the governor and several 
Americans interpreted as an open threat to them.85  The Indians likely rejected the salt as 
a way to express their displeasure at the Miamis further up stream who had welcomed the 
annuity payment.  Yet, Harrison saw the rejection of salt in relation to himself and 
decided that the Prophet’s actions were personally directed towards Vincennes.86   
Although the Indians were certainly frustrated with the Americans, they took their 
frustration out on each other as well.  It had been Little Turtle’s Miamis who supported 
the contentious cession of lands in the Treaty of Fort Wayne in exchange for annuity 
payments like salt. Tecumseh hoped to stop all shipments to Fort Wayne as punishment 
for signing the treaty.  Harrison believed otherwise.  He reminded William Cl rk that “if 
our government” would “submit [to] this insolence it will be the means of making all the 
tribes treat us with conte[mpt.]”87   The Prophet continued to punish self-serving Indian 
communities by seizing their salt, and succeeded in preventing the Miamis from 
receiving any more salt for almost nine years.88  What Harrison interpreted as another 
attack on American hegemony was in fact an assault on the less traditional Miamis.     
                                                
85 WHH to Eustis, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 38; June 15, 1810. 
86 Ibid. 
87 William Henry Harrison to William Clark, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 572; June 19, 1811. 
88 Lewis Cass – Prophet material, Indian Department [446] – Fort Wayne – 9 December 1819  “Your 
Excellency will find enclosed an extract from Mr. Johnstons opinion to me relative to the annual amount f 
salt due the Miami Tribe of Indians under the Treaty of 1803.  ‘During my Agency at Fort Wayne the 
Indians received no Salt taken later than the year 1810, in the year the Prophet’s party seized the salt 
ascending the Wabash, and prevented it reaching the Agents hands.  I cannot say whether Mr. Stickney 
during his Agency received any salt or not, the impression on my mind is that he did not receive any, if I 
am correct, the Miamis has the salt of 9 years due them which at the rate of 30 bushels a year would be 270 
bushels.’”   Harrison to Secretary of War, June 19, 1811, in Esarey, Messages and Letters, 1:518. 
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Harrison’s paranoia and anger toward the Indians and European Americans who 
opposed him led the governor to demand obedience from the Wabash Indians.  Harrison 
believed that recent reports suggested that the Prophet had instigated several murders in 
the Illinois country to divert attention from his town.  Also, Tecumseh boasted that a 
“considerable number of the Wyandots” and “some of the Six Nations” planned on 
joining the Shawnee brothers that fall.89  Fearful that an attack was near, Harrison wrote 
several Miami communities to determine their loyalties.   
I now speak plainly to you—What is that great Collection of people at the mouth 
of the Tipecanoe [sic] intended for?  I am not blind my Children.  I can easily See 
what their object is, these people have boasted that they will find me asleep, but 
they will be deceived.  My children, do not suppose that I will be foolish enough 
to suffer them to go on with their preparations until they are ready to Strike my 
people . . . I now inform you that I consider all those who join the Prophet & his 
party as hostile . . .those who keep me by the hand must keep on one side of it and 
those that adhere to the Prophet on the other.90 
 
For Harrison, the Miamis either supported American interests or stood against them.  
Harrison had a very difficult time understanding how Indians could oppose both 
Vincennes and Prophetstown.  The last statement ignored the difficult situation in which 
many of the Miamis found themselves.  The governor continued to trap them in the 
Vincennes/Prophetstown dichotomy.  Harrison’s polarizing statement placed the Miamis 
in a problematic position; if they followed his dictates, they would undermine their own 
interests.  Harrison forced the Miamis to take sides even when he questioned the 
Prophet’s militancy.  Privately he stated that his top priority was to “find out wha is the 
real object of the Prophet and his friends and if . . . he is really disposed for war.”91  
Identifying Tenskwatawa’s intentions proved quite difficult because the govern r 
                                                
89 WHH to William Hull, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 726; August 20, 1811. 
90 WHH to the Miami, et al., WHH Papers, Reel 4, 731; August 21, 1811. 
91 WHH to John Johnston, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 737; August 23, 1811. 
 
213 
associated Indians resistant to an allegiance with the Americans as pro-Pro hetstown.  
Harrison may have wanted to understand the situation better, but his policies prevented 
him from doing so. 
Many Indian leaders reacted negatively to Harrison’s demands that they take 
sides.  By the fall of 1811, a sizeable contingent of Americans believed that the Prophet 
had convinced large numbers of the Miamis to join him because they refused to support 
Harrison’s policies.  Various Indian leaders felt that Harrison exaggerated the situation 
for the Americans’ benefit and ignored the real motives of the Miamis, Potawat mies, 
and Delaware leaders.  Some Indians did their best to maintain their distance from both 
Americans and Prophetstown by meeting in council during the fall of 1811.  Lapoussier, 
a Wea leader, reminded Harrison that it was a mistake to think the Wea were “of his [the 
Prophet’s] party.”92  In fact, Lapoussier held the governor and “the Shawanoe [The 
Prophet] both by the hand.”93  Frustrated with Harrison’s suspicions, Lapoussier said, 
“we have not let you go; we yet hold you by the hand: nor do we hold the hand of the 
Prophet with a view to injure you.  I therefore tell you, that you are not correct wh n you 
supposed we joined hands with the Prophet to injure you.”94  Lapoussier’s expression 
reflected the ways in which most of the Wabash Indians functioned during this period.  
Lapoussier accepted parts from both groups, rather than to ally fully with one or the other 
because he understood that neither had Wea interests at heart.  Lapoussier informed the 
governor “no information from any quarter has reached our ears” that asked them “to 
injure any of your people [the Americans], except from your self.”95  Lapoussier 
                                                
92 Speeches of Miami, ET AL. Chiefs, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 756; September 4, 1811. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid.   
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recognized the extent to which Harrison’s fears had fueled the rumors of war, but lso 
that the Prophet had played a part in fermenting hostilities.  Lapoussier closed with a 
declaration: “We have our eyes on our lands on the Wabash [River], with a strong 
determination to defend out rights, let them be invaded from what quarter they may.  
When our best interests are invaded, we will defend them to a man.”96  An alliance with 
the Americans or the nativists threatened the Wea’s “best interests” but Harrison 
continued to fear that the Wea were secretly in league with Tenskwatawa.97  The Wea, 
like the Massassinway, continued to protect their village interests and did not want to 
associate with the Americans or the Prophet.  
As the council ended, several Indian leaders stated their desire to remain 
independent even though they strongly objected to Tenskwatawa’s actions.  Miami 
leaders, including Pacanne, Negro-Legs, Osaga, and others signed Lapoussier’s speech as 
a gesture of support.  Nonetheless, their efforts were in vain.  The Cincinnati newspap r 
Liberty Hall reported that the Miami leaders threatened Little Turtle’s life if he were to 
receive any annuities that fall, but contextualized the news in relation to the machinations 
of the Prophet.  Harrison concluded that the Miamis rejected the annuities because they 
feared an attack from the Prophet, but this conclusion ignored reliable intelligence that 
the Prophet’s community remained divided.  As if Harrison’s inability to understand 
Miami factionalism was not enough to cause trouble, Toussaint DuBois stated that 
                                                
96 Speeches of Miami, ET AL. Chiefs, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 756; September 4, 1811.   
97 Silver Heels Speech to Harrison, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 756; September 4, 1811.  Other chiefs wereas 
frustrated as Lapoussier.  Massassinway (Miami) chief Silver Heels emphasized his opposition to the 
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“almost every Indian” north of Fort Wayne had gone to [Fort] Malden” which convinced 
many Americans that war was near.98   
Harrison and his agents failed to interpret Indian behavior outside of the 
Prophetstown/American dichotomy.  Americans continued to misinterpret Indian acto s 
because they compared them with the Indians farther east with whom they had much 
more experience.  Most settlers were acquainted with Pontiac’s Confederacy, the Iroquois 
Confederacy, and Shawnee militancy during the Revolutionary War, but few understood 
that Miami hegemony came through trade, not violence.  The Shawnees had fought the 
colonists during Lord Dunmore’s War, the patriots during the Revolutionary War, and the 
forces under Arthur St. Clair and Hosiah Harmar during the early federal era.  The few 
Shawnees who supported neutrality had removed west, which left the more militant 
Shawnees under Blue Jacket and then Tenskwatawa and his brother to oppose the 
European American settlers.  Harrison indulged European American memories by 
referring regularly to Tecumseh’s affinity for the great Pontiac, which d rectly associated 
the Shawnee leader with a militant past.  The governor wanted the Americans to view he 
actions of the Shawnee brothers as the continuation of long-established patterns of 
violence.  Harrison’s comments negated Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa’s cultural ontext 
for a more familiar one.  For the Americans, Prophetstown symbolized their past violent 
experiences with Indians, rather than a progressive Indian community. 
After three years of difficult negotiations with the Prophet, the Miamis, and a host 
of other Indian communities, Harrison believed that he had no option left but to attack 
Prophetstown.  A large contingent of Miami-speaking Indians refused to support the 
Americans openly, several traitorous Americans were possibly planning a coup, and 
                                                
98 WHH to Eustis, WHH Papers, Reel 4, 784; September 17, 1811. 
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Tenskwatawa refused to negotiate any further or to recognize the right Harrison had to 
buy Indian lands.  Most of all, Harrison had already constructed his own idea of a militant 
Prophetstown and he believed that Indians, especially the Prophet, were predisposed to 
war.  There was little Tenskwatawa could do except to defend his town. 
Conclusion 
As Harrison planned for battle in the fall of 1811, the Indians at Prophetstown 
began defensive preparations in case of an attack.  The Indians were well aware th t 
Harrison planned an expedition north to break up Prophetstown.  The governor had 
assembled and trained the Vincennes militia for months; he hoped a show of force would 
convince the Prophet’s followers to disperse for good.  In response to the growing 
military force near Vincennes, the Indians fortified their town.  A “breast work of logs . . 
. encircled the town from the bank of the Wabash,” which the Indians hoped would repel 
or at least impede any attack by the Americans.99  What had been a fluid town quickly 
became an isolated settlement.  All of the French traders left the town and Harrison 
declared that he would stop any new Indian migrations.  The Indians at Prophetstown 
were compelled to confront the Americans or disperse.  Either option left Tenskwatawa 
in a weakened position because attacking the Americans would have justified Harrison’s 
actions while dispersal would have allowed Harrison to destroy Prophetstown’s crops. 
The Prophet decided on a more militant position because a victory over the Americans 
would have provided an opportunity to attract more followers; most importantly, he 
sought to protect the town and spiritual center he had taken pains to construct.  
Tenskwatawa likely knew the history of American military intervention in the region 
from his association with so many Miamis who had witnessed it first hand.  The 
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Americans destroyed the vast Wea crop fields near Ouiatenon in the late 1780s and did 
the same near Kekionga in the early 1790s.  Leaving Prophetstown was the least practical 
option for the Prophetstown Indians. 
Harrison’s assumption that Prophetstown housed a thousand if not more unified 
Indians ignored the events that transpired there from 1808 to the fall of 1811.  He was 
wrong because he did not consider the factionalism present at Prophetstown, the extent to 
which the French and Miamis influenced his policies, and his own personal frustration 
with and racial bias toward Tenskwatawa.  First, of the many groups Harrison and his 
agents identified as followers of the Prophet, members from six of them openly disagreed 
with Tenskwatawa.  The Wyandots, Ottawas, Ojibwas, Kickapoos, some Potawatomies, 
and several Ho-Chunk challenged the Tenskwatawa’s nativist rhetoric.  These wer  not 
minor disagreements but open, heated, and violent reactions to the Prophet’s attempt to 
build a nativist Indian community.  Second, Wells used his position as an Indian agent to 
convince Harrison that the Prophet was more influential and powerful than he was.  In 
doing so, he divided the Miamis by claiming that fellow leaders like Pacanne supported 
the Prophet in order to protect his Miami faction during treaty negotiations.  In turn, 
Harrison not only viewed Prophetstown as more violent, but also more influential than it 
really was.  The French interpreters who provided intelligence to the Americans only 
added to this false characterization.  Like Little Turtle and Wells, they provided 
information to Harrison that was often exaggerated, poorly researched, or blatantly false.  
They hoped that, by turning Harrison against Prophetstown, they would protect their 
economic and familial interests in the region.  Lastly, Harrison’s inability to understand 
Indians on their own terms convinced the governor that the Prophet’s town was unified 
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and preparing for war by the fall of 1811 even though it remained a contested 
community.  His anger towards the Prophet had made his policies towards Prophetstown 
not only ill-informed but often quite personal.  The events at Prophetstown and 
intelligence surrounding it reflect a community as diverse in ideas as it w s in interests.  
To characterize it as a settlement that enjoyed ideological unity ignores the Indians who 
resisted it from within and outside of its borders.
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Chapter Five: The Battle of Tippecanoe and its Contested Meaning 
Few events have been misinterpreted more than the Battle of Tippecanoe.1  The 
battle which took place on November 7, 1811, has been characterized as a fight between 
the European American and Indian races.  The clash, however, was closer to a pitched 
fight brought on by Harrison’s aggressive movement towards Prophetstown than the 
beginning of a frontier race war.  The battle did not produce any important diplomatic or 
military changes for the Indians and the Americans, nor did it facilitate greater 
ideological unification in either community.  Indeed, the divisions within each 
community prevented the full-scale mobilization that was necessary for eithe community 
to strike a decisive blow against the other.  In many ways, the mêlée at Tippecanoe 
between the Indians and European Americans was an anomaly in a valley where cultural 
interests superseded racial identities.   
The tendency to see the battle as William Henry Harrison’s decisive victory ove  
the Prophet’s radical and militant Indians reaches its apotheosis in the work of Benjamin 
Drake.  The myth of the battle was already established by the mid-nineteenth century and 
subsequent scholars continued to repeat Drake’s characterization of the battle.  Dr k  
concluded that “peace on the frontiers was one of the happy results of this severe and 
brilliant action.  The tribes which had already joined in the confederacy were dismayed; 
and those which had remained neutral now decided against it.”2  Drake even made 
Harrison into a miraculous figure who survived because of much “coolness and bravery” 
                                                
1 Alfred A. Cave states that the recent revisionist h oriography concerning the Prophet has “left onemajor 
part of the old story untouched: Tenskwatawa’s presumed disgrace at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811.  
Both textbooks and specialized histories still generally maintain that the Prophet’s blundering and 
cowardice in that engagement cost him the respect of his followers and the leadership of the movement, 
which was presumable then taken over by Tecumseh who transformed it from a religious crusade into a 
pragmatic political alliance.”  Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, and Tippecanoe: A Case 
Study of Historical Myth-Making,” Journal of the Early Republic Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter, 2002), 639.  
2 Benjamin Drake, The Life of Tecumseh, 153.   
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even though a musket “ball [passed] through his stock, slightly bruising his neck; another 
struck his saddle, and glancing hit his thigh; and a third wounded the horse on which he 
was riding.”3   A “fanatical” Indian Prophet was no match for the heroic William Henry 
Harrison.  Harrison’s victory, however, has often revolved around the concomitant 
decline of the Prophet.  According to historical myth, “the defeated Indians were greatly 
exasperated with the Prophet: they reproached him in bitter terms for the calamity he had 
brought upon them, and accused him of the murder of their friends who had fallen in the 
action.”4  The actual events at Tippecanoe in November of 1811 were often very different 
in several key details than the historical record reflects, as were the ways in which the 
battle affected the inhabitants of the valley. 
Tenskwatawa had little to do with instigating a fight with Harrison’s men, nor did 
the defeat at Tippecanoe undermine the Prophet’s influence or the symbolic value of 
Prophetstown.  The battle erupted because of a small skirmish between American sentries
and some Indians passing nearby.  The initial violence was not part of a larger pln 
designed by the Prophet to destroy Harrison’s forces.  The Prophet attempted to stop his
followers from attacking Harrison’s encampment, but had little success because many of 
his warriors were enraged because two American sentries had assaulted some Ho-Chunk 
Indians.  Years after the battle, Tenskwatawa claimed, “the [Ho-Chunk] struck” 
Harrison’s forces and that he “was opposed to it but could not stop it.”5  John Johnston, 
the Indian agent at that time, agreed that “the [Ho-Chunk] forced on the battle of 
                                                
3 Benjamin Drake, The Life of Tecumseh, 153.   
4 Ibid., 154. 
5 Indian Speeches – Chiefs.  Yealabahcah and the Prophet to Lewis Cass, 1816, Lewis Cass Papers 
(William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan).  Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, 
and Tippecanoe: A Case Study of Historical Mythmaking,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 22, No. 4. 
(Winter, 2002), 655. 
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Tippecanoe.”6  The Prophet’s inability to control his followers was nothing new.  Well 
aware that Harrison would march on Prophetstown after fending off the Indians, 
Tenskwatawa abandoned his town in order to avoid capture by the Americans.  
Abandoning the town, however, did not lead to a loss of influence within the Wabash-
Maumee Valley, even though Harrison burned Prophetstown and its food stores to the 
ground.  In fact, Tenskwatawa remained a significant leader in the region and rebuilt his 
town during the winter of 1811 and 1812.7   
This chapter argues that the Battle of Tippecanoe was the product of intra-
community factionalism and that it did not represent the culmination of racial hatreds 
smoldering between Vincennes and Prophetstown.  Furthermore, despite the violence at 
Tippecanoe, the battle and resulting violence did not promote racial unity among the 
Indians at Prophetstown or the European Americans at Vincennes.  Historians have 
incorrectly identified this battle as the symbolic fight between the European American 
and Indian races when in fact it was an anomaly in a region where behavior continued to 
be defined by factional, rather than racial, relationships.  Tecumseh’s pan-Indi 
confederacy was more a reaction not to the “race” fight at Tippecanoe, but rather to his 
brother’s inability to unite Indian communities in the period before and after the Battl of 
Tippecanoe.  While nativist rhetoric played an important part in Tecumseh’s missions to 
disparate Indian communities in the Ohio Valley, he was forced to adopt a more practical 
approach to unifying Indian communities that were unwilling to sacrifice their ethnic 
interests.  This chapter recontextualizes the Battle of Tippecanoe within the his ory of the 
                                                
6 Indian Speeches, 1816, Lewis Cass Papers (William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan); State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, and Lyman Copeland Draper (Draper Manuscript Collection: Series YY ; 
Tecumseh Papers. Chicago: University of Chicago Library, Dept. of Photo-reproduction, 1966).: 162. 
7 Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, and Tippecanoe: A Case Study of Historical Myth-
Making,” Journal of the Early Republic Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter, 2002). 
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Wabash-Maumee Valley in order to understand the ethnic and factional interests hat 
fueled the fighting.  Subsequently, this chapter reinterprets the actions of the European 
Americans at Vincennes, the Prophets followers, the Wabash Indians, and Tecumseh 
during the post-battle era along the same lines.  Rather than attribute the eventual 
dissolution of Prophetstown to the Battle of Tippecanoe, this chapter argues that the inter-
Indian factionalism that lead to its decline was actually a natural progression of the 
divisions present before the battle.   
Historians have wrongly attributed the changes in the Wabash-Maumee Valley to 
Harrison’s victory at Tippecanoe.  The violence at Tippecanoe did not swell the ranks of 
Prophetstown nor did it convince large numbers of new Indians to support his nativist 
movement.  It was, in many ways, a non-event.  In fact, some residents of Prophetstown 
continued to act on their own in direct opposition to Tenskwatawa’s teachings.  
Vincennes remained as divided.  The battle provided yet another issue for the factions to 
use against each other.  Harrison hoped to exploit the battle to enter a new career in the 
military rather than remain as governor of a territory that was becoming adverse to his 
policies.  Important players within the Miami community, William Wells and Little 
Turtle, continued their attacks on the Prophet, but watched as their influence diminished 
greatly.  The relative insignificance of Prophetstown did not mean that the towns 
remained the same.  By 1813, the relationship between the two towns had changed 
significantly.  Harrison no longer served as the territorial governor and Vincennes was no 
longer the territorial capital.  William Wells and Little Turtle had both died during the 
war, while the Prophet had abandoned Prophetstown in order to help his brother 




It was late October 1811, and large patches of ice hugged the edges of the Wabash
River.  Most inhabitants in the region busily prepared for the arrival of winter by storing 
grain for their cattle and horses, organizing their foodstuffs in underground cellars, and 
splitting the wood that would heat their homes through the bitterly cold months ahead.  
The Indians at Prophetstown and the Americans at Fort Harrison, however, were 
preparing for war.  In the early days of October, Harrison had marched his forces up to 
present-day Terre Haute, Indiana, and constructed the fort as a staging area for an 
expedition to Prophetstown.  Many Americans believed that such a fort was necessary to 
prevent the Prophet from attacking Vincennes.  Harrison thought that the location of 
Prophetstown was perfect for staging an attack on the European Americans be u e it 
was “just so far off as to be removed from our immediate observation-and yet so n ar as 
to enable him to strike us when the water is high in 24 hours.”8  Access to the Wabash 
River allowed the Prophet’s followers quick movement when needed and the dense 
thickets, swamps, and small lakes would prevent an attack by the American cavalry and 
slow any infantry advance.9  Harrison planned to march north to Prophetstown.  The 
governor heard reports that Tenskwatawa fortified Prophetstown in case the American 
militia attacked.  Late fall was an ideal time to move against Prophetstown.  Harrison 
believed that “many of the Potawatomies [had] left” Tenskwatawa for good and H rrison 
remained hopeful that the Kickapoos would abandon Prophetstown as well.10  
Tenskwatawa’s force appeared diminished, which must have comforted Harrison who 
had hundreds of his own men return to their homes rather than fight. 
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Harrison’s force of 742 men was less than half its original size of 1600, but the 
governor rallied his soldiers and marched them north of Prophetstown.11  Relations 
soured to such an extent during the building of Fort Harrison that the regulars and militia 
nearly came to blows.12  Harrison blamed it on sickness.  On October 25, Harrison wrote 
to Governor Charles Scott of Kentucky and complained about how his fighting force had 
been “diminished by sickness.” 13  He was too proud to discuss the near-mutiny among 
his men.  He also told Scott that the Weas and Miami had abandoned Prophetstown, still 
unaware or unwilling to recognize why Miami-speaking Indians had associated with the 
Prophet in the first place.  Despite the defections from Prophetstown, Harrison remai ed 
focused on confronting Tenskwatawa.  The governor’s sources reported that 
Tenskwatawa had declared to the Delaware that he would “attack the troops under [the 
governor’s] command.”14  Governor Harrison used the Prophet’s threat as partial 
justification to move against Prophetstown, but Tenskwatawa likely made such a 
declaration as a way to make Harrison initiate an attack on the Indians.  Prophetstown 
lacked the unity Tenskwatawa desired and believed that a small skirmish between Terre 
Haute and Prophetstown might convince hundreds of Indians to join in support of his 
nativist ideals.  It would also undermine Little Turtle and William Wells who had worked 
with the Americans in opposition to Prophetstown.  However, the actual battle took place 
within a mile of the town.  Picking a fight so close to Prophetstown was not what 
Tenskwatawa wanted because it would provide ample opportunity and justification for 
the Americans to destroy Prophetstown.  
                                                
11 Alfred Pirtle, The Battle of Tippecanoe (Louisville, KY: J. P. Morton and Company, 1900), 27. 
12 Henry Swearingen letter, OM 0066, Indiana Historical Society, October 7, 1811. 




Harrison’s march along the north bank of the Wabash River proved uneventful, 
largely because the European Americans did not encounter any Indians.   The peaceful
nature of the march convinced Harrison that it was safe for his force to camp eleven miles 
northwest of Prophetstown.  The next day, several soldiers noticed that there were 
Indians spying on the Americans as they marched towards Prophetstown, but all attempts 
by Harrison’s Indian agent, Toussaint DuBois, to confront the Indians failed.  DuBois, 
along with the other Frenchmen in Harrison’s force, must have taken some minor delight 
in finally moving against Prophetstown.  The intelligence they had provided to the 
governor was an important reason why Harrison believed that a pre-emptive attack on 
Prophetstown was needed.  Harrison eventually stopped just south of Burnet’s Creek 
where a sodden prairie to the south would prevent any surprise Indian attacks.  Harri on 
wanted to delay an attack until the next day, November 7, because his men were not quite 
ready, but several of his officers begged him to reconsider and to attack Prophetstown a  
quickly as possible.15   
                                                




Figure 5.1,  Harrison’s March to Prophetstown 
Taken from Harry D. Tunnel, To Compel With Armed Force: A Staff Ride 
Handbook for the Battle of Tippecanoe (Published by U.S. Army Command and General 




Meanwhile, the Prophet hoped to confront Harrison’s men and state his desire for 
peace in order to stave off an attack.  Tenskwatawa instructed several of his supporters to 
meet Harrison’s men.  Apparently, the first deputation of Indians missed the Americans 
while the second group located the army and inquired as to why they had moved so close 
to Prophetstown.  The Prophet’s men expressed their desire that measures be taken to 
prevent bloodshed, especially so close to Prophetstown.  Harrison said that he had no 
intention of attacking their town, but that he needed to speak with the Prophet the next 
morning.  Harrison vowed that he would not assault Prophetstown unless the Indians 
rejected his demands.16  Both Harrison and the Prophet considered the benefits of 
fighting.  Harrison likely wanted a battle to prove to federal authorities that his detractors 
were wrong and that they should dismiss calls to replace him.  Dispersing the Prophet’s 
followers would definitely reinvigorate Harrison’s leadership at a time when his support 
was declining.  The Prophet, although hopeful that a skirmish might unite his divided 
community, recognized that he was outnumbered and that any violence so close to 
Prophetstown might compel his followers to flee.  Both men knew that a victory in battle 
would strengthen their leadership, but they also recognized that defeat could do exactly 
the opposite.  Prepared to negotiate first and attack second, Harrison decided to camp 
along Burnet’s Creek while the Prophet rested at Prophetstown.   
Bloodshed erupted between the two groups despite their efforts to prevent it.  The 
standard narrative places the blame on the Prophet for ordering a surprise attack on 
Harrison’s encampment during the night.  However, this characterization reflects 
interpretations based on Harrison’s comments shortly before and during the Battle of 
Tippecanoe.  In fact, the fighting surprised both sides.  In the period before dawn on 
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November 7, 1811, a fierce battle developed along Burnet’s Creek where Harrison’s men 
were camped.  The fighting began when two Ho-Chunk Indians passed near some of the 
American guards who shot and wounded them.  As the sentinels approached, the 
wounded Indians “arose and Tomahawked them,” which spurred a reaction among the 
Indians at Prophetstown who felt that the American soldiers had purposely picked a 
fight.17  The Prophet awoke suddenly to hear that two of his Ho-Chunk followers had 
been wounded by the American sentries.  Well aware that a battle so close to his town 
would prove disastrous, Tenskwatawa pleaded to his people not to rush to judgment in a 
desperate attempt to prevent further bloodshed.  It was to no avail.  A couple hundred 
Indians rushed north to Burnet’s Creek to aid their neighbors, while other Indians 
departed Prophetstown because they were unwilling to suffer the consequences of war.  
The Miami at Prophetstown did not want the Americans to associate them with any 
violence arising from Prophetstown because it would allow Harrison to strip their rights
to the area, which they were desperate to protect.   
Harrison mustered nearly 800 men, but it is unlikely that the Prophet even had 
half that many men considering the defections of the Potawatomi and groups like the
Miami and Wea who saw no benefit in fighting the Americans.18  The Prophet and his 
town were simply not as threatening as Harrison said.  Not only was it improbable th t 
the Prophet ordered a foolish attack on Harrison’s encampment, but Tenskwatawa did not 
                                                
17 Elliott to Brock, January 12, 1812, in Esarey, ed., Messages and Letters, 1:616-17;  Alfred Cave argues 
against Dave Edmunds’ interpretation that the Prophet ordered an attack on Harrison and he concludes that 
the violence was actually spurred on by the American forces.  Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, 
Tecumseh, and Tippecanoe: A Case Study of Historical Mythmaking,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 
22, No. 4. (Winter, 2002), 653-655. 
18 Colin Calloway, The Shawnees and the War for America (Viking Press, 2008), 144.  Calloway states that 
the Indians were outnumbered “as much as two to one.”  That places the number of Indian warriors around 
400, but Stephen Warren estimates the numbers of Indians as low as 250.  Stephen Warren, The Shawnee 
and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 40.   
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have a force equal to the task.  The accepted narrative states that Tenskwatawa 
guaranteed his men a victory because the Master of Life had made them invulnerable to 
Harrison’s men.  In fact, a storm was to have ruined the American’s gunpowder, which 
would allow the Indians to spread throughout the American camp, murder Harrison, and 
then watch as the Long Knives fled into the woods.19  Despite the lack of planning on 
both sides, the battle raged for a few hours.  Josiah Bacon watched it unfold, horrified as 
Indians with “their faces painted black” appeared in the darkness as the muskets fla hed 
and lighted up the surrounding areas.20  The battle continued until sunrise with between 
30 and 50 Indians and almost 200 Americans dead.  Despite losing far fewer men in the 
battle, the Indians fled the area and left Prophetstown for the Americans to destroy.  
Harrison ordered the entire town burned, including all of the wigwams, the 
meetinghouse, and five thousand pounds of stored food.21   
Historians have used the events of the battle and its aftermath to generaliz about 
the Prophet and his town.  They have concluded that the Prophet not only prepared his 
men for the fight, but that he promised them victory.  Their subsequent failure to drive 
the Americans from their encampment greatly undermined the Prophet’s authority and 
his role in the pan-Indian confederacy centered at Prophetstown.  The situation became so 
contentious that several of the nativist Indians tried to kill Tenskwatawa who was nly 
saved by his brother Tecumseh.  Historians use the battle to mark a shift in the balancof 
power away from the Prophet to his brother, Tecumseh, which they use to explain why 
the nativist Indians were so willing to forge a relationship with the British.  With the 
                                                
19 Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 110. 
20 Lydia B. Bacon, Journal Manuscript November 30, 1811, The New York Historical Society, New York, 
New York. Lydia B. Bacon’s journal, November 30, 181 .  
21 Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, and Tippecanoe: A Case Study of Historical 
Mythmaking,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 22, No. 4. (Winter, 2002), 656. 
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Prophet shamed, the Indians willingly turned their allegiance towards Tecumsh.  
However, conclusions that the Prophet ordered an attack on Harrison and that the battle 
destroyed his influence among the Wabash Indians rest on a cursory examination of the 
sources.   
The warriors at Prophetstown attacked the Americans without the Prophet’s 
blessing.  In fact, Tenskwatawa likely demanded that they cease fighting but his inability 
to control the warriors left him helpless.  The Prophet had not hand-picked nearly one 
hundred warriors to participate in the battle, nor had he instructed them to strike before 
dawn.22  Not only could the battle spread to the town, but Indian militancy legitimized the 
American presence in the area by forcing the Americans to protect nearby European 
American settlements.  Traditional interpretations tend to ignore an important question.  
Why did the Prophet wait so long to attack?  He would have had a better chance at 
victory if he had attacked Harrison’s force as it marched towards Prophetstown.  By 
delaying any attack, Tenswatawa allowed Harrison’s men to set up a perimeter and to 
fortify their camp.  Furthermore, after the Indians withdrew, Harrison marched his men to 
Prophetstown the next day and burned the town, including a massive amount of stored 
food.  Harrison’s men also desecrated the Indian burial ground at Prophetstown as well.  
Had the Prophet attacked Harrison’s forces as they marched from Fort Harrison, the 
governor would have been unable to attack Prophetstown on the same day.  The distance 
coupled with the difficulty of marching his men through the tangled underbrush and 
swamps would have delayed their advance.  Such a setback would have allowed 
Tenskwatawa to call for reinforcements and defend his town.  Attacking the governor at 
                                                
22 Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 111. 
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Burnet’s Creek was the worst possible option available because it involved assaulting the 
Americans at their strongest.   
Tenskwatawa did not order an attack.  The Prophet said as much four years later 
when he spoke to Governor Lewis Cass of Michigan and claimed that he never ordered 
an assault.  He argued that “the Winnebagoes struck” Harrison’s encampment and that he 
“was opposed to it but could not stop it.”23  He questioned Cass, “Who began the war?  
Did not General Harrison come to my village? . . . If we had come to you, then you might 
have blam’d us, but you came to my village for this you are angry at me.”24  
Tenskwatawa’s inability to control the residents of his community makes sense given the 
factionalized nature of Prophetstown.25  The Prophet’s language to Cass was entirely 
defensive and pragmatic.  He had not spent three years constructing a community only to 
throw it all away by attacking Harrison’s army camped within two miles of 
Prophetstown.  The problem for the Prophet and Harrison was identifying the Indians 
who associated with Prophetstown for reasons other than Tenskwatawa’s teachings.   
Several of the Miami-speaking Indians in the area used the battle for their own 
purposes.  The Americans, and subsequent historians writing about the event, believed 
Miami descriptions that the battle resulted in the Prophet’s ostracization from his town.  
One Wea leader, Little Eyes, was central to this process.  He participated n the Battle of 
                                                
23 Indian Speeches – Chiefs.  Yealabahcah and the Prophet to Lewis Cass, 1816, Lewis Cass Papers 
(William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan).  Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, 
and Tippecanoe: A Case Study of Historical Mythmaking,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 22, No. 4. 
(Winter, 2002), 655. 
24 Indian Speeches – Chiefs.  Yealabahcah and the Prophet to Lewis Cass, 1816, Lewis Cass Papers 
(William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan) 
25 Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, and Tippecanoe: A Case Study of Historical Myth-
Making,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter, 2002).Cave argues that the Prophet 
probably did not order an attack on Harrison’s forces, but he does so to critique historical conclusions that 
the Prophet lost his religious influence after the battle.  I argue that he did not order an attack because he 
was unable to control his men and that such behavior was in concert with the way Prophetstown had always 
operated.   
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Tippecanoe and recounted for the Americans the events that transpired after the violence 
subsided.  While there is no proof, though, it seems likely that Little Eyes’ story was a 
blatant lie designed to calm the Americans.26  Little Eyes described a tense situation in 
the days after the battle in which Tenskwatawa’s followers wanted to kill the Shawnee 
leader while many others simply abandoned him.  He even said that some Ho-Chunk 
Indians captured Tenskwatawa and tied him up because they were so angry that they had
lost the battle.  Little Eyes fed the story to the Americans in order to give the Prophet 
some time to regain his forces, but also to lessen the likelihood of further violence.  The 
area around Prophetstown was traditional Wea territory and violence in the region would 
only increase the American presence there, further undercutting Wea autonomy.  The 
Miami had everything to gain by playing Prophetstown and Vincennes against each 
other, just like their French counterparts.  Little Eye’s motives remained clou ed in the 
records, but it is likely that he operated under a similar philosophy to that of his fellow
Miami, Pacanne.  Little Eyes had signed the Treaty of Grouseland in 1805 but did not 
sign the Treaty of Fort Wayne in 1809.  Rather, he signed a supplemental treaty less than 
one month later.  Harrison, as he did with Pacanne, concluded that the Little Eyes was “in 
the Interest of the Prophet” but it was more likely that Little Eyes played th  middle to 
protect his interests.27  Serving as an informant for Josiah Snelling at Fort Harrison likely 
                                                
26 Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, and Tippecanoe,” 656.  Cave states that Little Eyes 
“may well have endeavored to mislead the Americans about the Prophet’s actual status after Tippecanoe.”  
Cave offers this conclusion based on tenuous reports tha  Little Eyes was “reputedly an ally of the 
Prophet,” but I argue that it was more likely, given the ways in which the Miami utilized Prophetstown to 
protect their interests, that Little Eyes was neither an ally of the Prophet or the Americans. 
27 Harrison to Eustis, WHH Papers, Reel 5 (495); April 15, 2009. 
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earned the Wea leader some extra goods in addition to his community’s annuity payment.  
He had stolen from the Americans before, but this time he used Prophetstown to do it.28  
Like Little Eyes, other people manipulated information about the battle as a way 
to protect their interests.  Even though the physical fight lasted only a few hours, the 
ideological Battle of Tippecanoe was far from over.  The Prophet and Tecumseh gath red 
their followers together in an effort to rebuild Prophetstown and Harrison spent the res  of
his life defending his actions during the fight.  The battle enhanced intra-community 
factionalism rather than ending it.  Indian groups argued over whether or not the Prophet 
was responsible while the European Americans said much the same about Harrison.  
Each community used the battle for their own purposes, but neither Prophetstown nor 
Vincennes found greater unity after it.  Intra-community factionalism prevent d racial 
unity even though the battle convinced many that a large-scale war between Indians and 
European Americans was only days away.  This, however, was not the case.  The 
Wabash-Maumee Valley remained at peace until the spring, when Potawatomi rriors 
began attacking several American farms in the area.  The Battle of Tippecanoe was not a 
turning point for either side because the battle neither changed the dynamics in either 
town nor altered the power dynamics in the valley.  
 
 
                                                
28 There are some contradictions regarding the role played by Little Eyes.  Cave describes his presence with 
the Prophetstown Indians shortly after the battle, but John Sugden claims that Little Eyes was an 
intermediary sent by Snelling at Fort Harrison to negotiate with the Prophet three days before the battle.  
Sugden in Tecumseh: A Life then claims that White Eyes passed Harrison’s army on his way back south to 
Fort Harrison.  It seems very unlikely that White Eyes could have been at the Battle of Tippecanoe if 
Sugden is correct about the Wea chief heading towards Fort Harrison.  John Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life 
(Macmillan Pressm 1999), 230.  Peter Mancall and James Merrell agree with Cave.  Peter Mancall and 
James Merrell, eds., American Encounters: Natives and Newcomers from European Contact to Indian 
Removal (Routledge, 2000), 392. 
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The Battle of Tippecanoe Comes to Vincennes 
The Battle of Tippecanoe was only a minor disruption in a region divided by 
factional strife.  What appeared to be a racial struggle was in fact a far more complicated 
event built upon factional relationships.   As Harrison’s force marched back to Vincennes 
with nearly 130 wounded, they feared an attack from the many Indians who roamed the 
area.  It was one thing for the soldiers to burn Prophetstown to the ground, but 
desecrating an Indian burial ground was unforgiveable.  Nonetheless, the Americans 
returned to Vincennes safely, minus sixty-two soldiers who had died on the field of 
battle.  The death count included Thomas Randolph, who had been Jennings’ main 
challenger for territorial representative to Congress.  It was ironic that the violence at 
Tippecanoe had resulted in Randolph’s death.  Many anti-Harrisonians believed that the
governor’s rhetoric about Prophetstown was the result of his frustration in not getting 
Randolph elected.  In a way, Harrison had killed his ally Randolph.  Many of the soldiers 
believed that more would die when the Indians counterattacked, but the attack never 
came.  Many of the neutral Miami had fled the area around Prophetstown, while the other 
Indian communities withdrew after watching their harvest and homes go up in flames.  
The Prophet had not organized the first attack, nor would he want to put his community 
at further risk with another.  As Harrison’s men marched into Vincennes, they wer not 
greeted by victorious fanfare or congratulatory cheers.  Most of the soldier  wondered if 
they had just ignited a frontier war while others questioned the need to attack 
Prophetstown in the first place.   
While the residents of Vincennes initially mourned their dead, they spent the 
months following the battle confronting each other.  There was a funeral every day, 
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sometimes two, as injured soldiers died from their wounds.  Each day reminded the 
residents that they had paid a heavier price than the Indians, even though the Americans 
had burned Prophetstown to the ground.   Coffin processions were “followed by a soldier 
. . . marching to the tune of Roslein Castle beat upon muffled drums.”29  As the shock of 
the battle passed, people began questioning the governor’s leadership during the late 
action, and some even wondered if their loved ones had died in vain.  Rumors spread 
throughout the territory that militia had tried to retreat during battle becaus of Harrison’s 
ineffective leadership.  Almost two months later, reports surfaced that the Indians were 
resettling Prophetstown.  Residents of Vincennes, eyeing the many fresh graves, could 
not help but wonder just who had benefited from the battle. 
Within weeks, the factions began using the battle as a way to attack each other.  
They had a well-established tradition of using territorial affairs against each other and the 
Battle of Tippecanoe proved no different.  Harrison reported that his “personal enemies” 
had spread word that “the expedition was entirely useless & the Prophet as one of the best
& most pacific of Mortals.”30  Harrison was right.  John Badollet felt the “little band of 
the Prophet and his brother were not a banditti” but “a set of orderly, sober, and 
industrious men” whom Harrison drove to “despair, in spite of their repeated cries for 
peace.”31  Rumors circulated through town that one of the sentinels who had heard the 
first shots had actually shot himself by accident or been shot by one of his fellow 
soldiers.  If the stories were true, some people believed that the battle stared due to 
incompetence and not because the soldiers had tried to protect themselves.   
                                                
29 Lydia B. Bacon, Journal Manuscript November 30, 1811, The New York Historical Society, New York, 
New York.  
30 William Henry Harrison to Charles Scott, WHH Papers, Reel 5, 147; November 19, 1811. 
31 John Louis Badollet, Albert Gallatin, and Gayle Thornbrough. The Correspondence of John Badollet and 
Albert Gallatin, 1804-1836 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1963), 217.  December 30, 1811. 
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Rumors were also rampant that Harrison was responsible for the death of several 
soldiers during battle because the governor had panicked.  The Harrisonians had to 
confront this story when they discovered a resolution put forth by several of their old 
enemies.  This document praised Colonel John P. Boyd who served as second in 
command at the Battle of Tippecanoe.  It neglected to mention Harrison’s leadership of 
the militia forces.  Several of Boyd’s supporters, including James Johnson (Presiding 
Judge of the Court of Common Pleas), John Caldwell, Nathaniel Ewing, and Badollet met 
in secret and issued a public statement extolling the conduct of the regular army, while 
failing to offer any comment about the local militia.  The Harrisonians took offense to 
such blatant libel.  In response, Benjamin Parke gathered several militiamen at a 
Parmenas Beckes’s Inn on December 7, 1811 and adopted resolutions that rejected the 
public appraisals of Boyd.32  They “resolved unanimously” that the address put forth by 
the anti-Harrisonians was done so to “injure the character of Governor Harrison.”33  
Parke’s group believed that 
the conduct of said individuals [in the Boyd faction] (almost every one of whom 
are the avowed enemies of the Commander in Chief – and several of whom have 
uniformly discountenanced and opposed every measure of the government, in 
respect to the Shawnee Prophet and his party, and none of whom were on the 
Campain [sic]) in daring to speak in the name of the Militia, as highly 
presumptuous and unwarrantable.34    
 
As if to stoke the fire, Stout published these resolutions in his January 4, 1812 edition of 
The Western Sun.  It quickly engulfed the town in yet another dispute.  For the 
Harrisonians, the attack on their governor was personal.  The Boyd faction challenged 
                                                
32 Robert S. Lambert, “The Conduct of the Militia at Tippecanoe: Elihu Stout’s Controversy with Colonel 
John P. Boyd, January, 1812,” The Indiana Magazine of History, September, 1995, 239. 
33 Resolution adopted at a meeting of the Knox County Militia, WHH Papers, Reel 5, 159; December 7, 
1811. 
34 Lambert, “The Conduct of the Militia at Tippecanoe,” 239, 240-241. 
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Harrison’s leadership in regards to the Prophet, a major symbol of Harrisonian politics.  
American settlers incited the Indians in an effort to end Harrison’s governorship; now the 
Regular Army assaulted the governor.  Harrison recognized these problems and tried to 
control people’s perceptions of the battle.  John Johnston, the Fort Wayne Indian agent 
concluded that the Indian force at Prophetstown had been far fewer in number than 
Harrison’s command.   
Such a low estimate of Indians would have looked very bad considering the much 
larger number of Americans who had died.  The governor claimed that “it was impossible 
to believe that there were less than seven hundred Indians in the late action,” an estim te 
that would have made the American and Indian forces relatively equal.35  He questioned 
Johnston’s “false” report and concluded that Johnston’s estimate reflected what the 
Indians had told him which Harrison believed to be unreliable.36  Harrison even claimed 
that Johnston had failed at his duty and replenished “the powder horns and pouches of 
many of those Indians whom he knew” to have participated at Prophetstown.37  Johnston 
was not the only person questioning the governor’s efforts at the Battle of Tippecanoe.  
Residents of Vincennes were mailing out information to national newspapers, including 
Pennsylvania’s The Reporter, which claimed that Harrison was to blame for the death of 
Major Joseph Hamilton Daviess.  After hearing that the New York Commericial 
Advertiser published a derogatory letter that a resident of Vincennes sent to Congress, 
Harrison told Stout that he would pay one hundred dollars for “the names of the Writer, 
and the person to whom it was addressed.”38  Angered by the attacks on the governor, 
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36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 WHH to Stout, WHH Papers, Reel 5, 359; February 12, 1812. 
 
238 
several Harrisonians signed their own letter which expressed their opinion that the 
governor “was calm and deliberate – that his orders were precise and distinct” during the 
battle and that “victory was obtained by [the governor’s] vigilance and activity.”39  The 
debates raging in Vincennes, although framed around the meaning of Tippecanoe, fell 
across the same factional lines that had crystallized during the debate over slavery.     
Similarly, some residents of Vincennes continued to use the Prophet as a means to 
express their feelings by publishing editorials in Stout’s newspaper concerning the battle.  
In line with his newfound independence, Stout continued the fracas with an editorial of 
his own.  After learning that Colonel Boyd planned to travel east on a furlough (an 
underserved trip in Stout’s eyes) Stout published an article that mocked Boyd’s 
leadership and commitment.40   Stout closed with a highly inflammatory and sarcastic 
paragraph: 
We cannot withhold from the Colonel [Boyd] our sense of his merit and the great 
loss our country will sustain by being deprived of his services.  Should there be a 
second expedition against the Indians, the Man, who by his personal skill and 
bravery decided the action of the 7th November, and took with his own hands the 
war club of their great warrior, the magic cup of the Prophet, and the scalp of a 
Chief, together with a number of other acts of bravery not necessary here to 
mention, but which will forever immortalize the Hero.41        
 
Incensed at the articles and demanding vengeance, Boyd’s party (which consisted of 
several anti-Harrisonians) insisted that Stout reveal the author of the articl .  When Stout 
refused, Boyd marched into his office demanding to know the author’s identity.  Angrily 
Stout shouted, “You may consider me as the author!”42  Boyd swung at Stout with his 
cane, but the nimble printer grabbed Boyd and his stick and then beat him in self-defense.  
                                                
39 Statement of Harrison’s behavior during the Battle of Tippecanoe, War of 1812 Material, when? 
40 The Western Sun, January 18, 1812. 
41 Lambert, “The Conduct of the Militia at Tippecanoe,” 242. 
42 Lambert, “The Conduct of the Militia at Tippecanoe,” 244 
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Boyd’s orderly, Josiah Bacon, seized Stout and tried to restrain him, but Lieutenant 
Robert Buntin, a militiaman, yanked Bacon away from the printer and hurled him to the
office floor. 43  Boyd retreated, leaving Stout to gloat in victory, and gloat he did in that 
week’s newspaper.  Stout’s article “ANOTHER BATTLE on the Wabash, or Colonel 
JOHN P. BOYD’S DEFEAT!!” read:  
does not, or is not everyone ready to cry out shame! That such an experienced 
officer who has so highly boasted of his superior skill and abilities, should be thus 
ingloriously defeated, by a man who had never seen a “tented field?”- Can such a 
man be trusted with the defense of our common country?  Has he talents adequate 
to a corporals command?  The Printer pronounces he has not!44  
 
Even after the governor and the army defeated the Prophet at Tippecanoe, Tenskwatawa 
remained influential in Vincennes.  His presence was inescapable.  Physically the Prophet 
was always an outsider, but as a tool for the factions in Vincennes, he became central to 
their political identities.  The people of Vincennes went through years of palpable fe r 
that the Indians at Prophetstown would strike Vincennes.  Few could have imagined that 
the only substantive attack in Vincennes would be initiated by one American upon 
another.   
The French 
The Battle of Tippecanoe continued a process through which the French used the 
opportunities provided by Indian affairs to their benefit.  The war helped the French 
residents who had suffered greatly in the period leading up to Tippecanoe.  After the 
violence in Indiana Territory evolved into the War of 1812, the French found their roles 
as translators and go-betweens replaced by the need to have every able-bodied man b ar 
arms for the American army.  This did not mean that the French abandoned their 
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relationships with the Wabash Indians, but that the opportunities available to them wer  
in military service rather than frontier diplomacy.  Reality had set in.  The population of 
Indiana Territory by 1810 had grown to more than 24,000 (compared to just over 5,000 in 
1800), while Ohio’s population was at 230,000.45  The Americans would have reacted 
swiftly against the French had they refused to participate in the War of 1812 and they 
most likely looked at the chance to serve in Harrison’s militia and the American army as 
a welcomed opening to earn money and respect.46   
Many Frenchmen joined Harrison’s militia force that marched towards 
Prophetstown, although the Americans segregated the men into two distinct French and 
American militia groups. 47  This must have pleased Toussaint DuBois, Hyacinthe 
Lasselle and the other French traders who had watched their community suffer during the 
previous decade.  The Americans had not quite succeeded in forcing the French to 
assimilate, and the necessities of war required that the Americans rely on the French to 
defend their territory.  This had to be especially grating for Harrison who felt that “the 
French for any Military purpose [were] worth nothing.”48  Dealing with American 
bigotries was nothing new for the French who likely appreciated the chance to earn some 
money.  Again, participating in Indian affairs had afforded the French a chance to protect 
their community and culture.  Their membership in the militia demonstrated that the 
French had maintained their culture enough to where Harrison and his officers found it 
impractical to mix them in among the Americans.    
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There must have been a sense of accomplishment within the French community, 
especially among the French traders who had played such an important role in getting 
Harrison to attack Prophetstown.  The French had successfully navigated the shrinking 
ground of diplomacy in order to protect their long-standing relationship with the Miamis 
and trade within the Wabash-Maumee trading network.  T ade in the region around 
Prophetstown had almost stopped in the year leading up the battle and there were 
instances in which the French traders were close to getting killed.  Not only did the 
Prophet attempt to limit trade within his town by physically and verbally abusing the 
French traders, but some of the traders even left Vincennes out of fear that the Prop t 
might attack them.49  Ridding the region of Prophetstown would likely force many of the 
Indian communities into a greater dependency on the Americans, which provided ample 
opportunities for the French traders to direct and profit from land cessions.   
Prophetstown 
The Prophet and many of his followers quickly left Prophetstown before 
Harrison’s men arrived to destroy it.  They had no time to take the massive amount of 
stored food that the Indians needed to survive the winter and Harrison burned it all.  Days 
after the battle, a few Indians returned to Prophetstown and discovered more than their 
burned homes.  Harrison’s men had dug up and desecrated the Indians’ burial ground.  
This infuriated the Indians, even those who disagreed with the Prophet’s teachings.  To 
make matters worse, the burial ground was much older than the town and contained the 
graves of Miami, Wea, and Piankashaw Indians from decades earlier.  This enraged m ny 
more Indians that those at Prophetstown.  It may have convinced some neutral Indians to 
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join the Prophet.  Even though Harrison gloated that his victory at Tippecanoe was one of 
the worst defeats ever suffered by the Indians, he warned Secretary of War Eustis that the 
Prophet remained dangerous.  The danger of which Harrison spoke was largely of his 
own making.  The American’s vengeful attack pushed Indian communities to wage 
retaliatory raids on the American settlements, but it did not fuel racial unity among them.  
In fact, the Indians were caught between their desire to protect themselves and a 
recognition that Tenskwatawa’s message had some benefit. 
Temporarily displaced, residents of Prophetstown made their way to other nearby
Indian villages, but many eventually returned to Tippecanoe.  By January, the Prophet 
and nearly 600 Kickapoos, Ho-Chunk, and Piankashaw Indians had resettled near 
Prophetstown.  However, the Indians returned to the area near Prophetstown for various 
reasons.  They did not settle together and some returned before the Prophet did.  Many 
former residents of Prophetstown resettled near the Tippecanoe and Wabash rivers befor  
the Prophet returned and likely did so to reclaim their lands.  In fact, the Kickapoos 
constructed their own village, the Ho-Chunk settled nearby on Wildcat Creek, and some 
Shawnees began to rebuild a settlement at Prophetstown.50  The physical segregation of 
the Indian communities likely reflected how Tenskwatawa’s revitalization mve ent 
remained secondary to cultural interests.  Shortly after the attack, a delegation of 
Kickapoos visited Vincennes in order to stress their desire for peace while also 
communicating to Harrison that they had refused the Prophet’s request to settle near he 
Kickapoo settlements in the Illinois territory.  They also rejected Tenskwatawa’s plea to 
send some of his followers to Vincennes along with the Kickapoos.51  Their association 
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with the Prophet appeared tenuous, but this did not discourage Tenskwatawa.  He had 
been in this situation before, during his first winter at Tippecanoe.  Lack of food and poor 
living conditions facilitated the spread of disease throughout the town in 1808, and the 
living conditions eventually evolved into vocal disputes and the departure of several of 
the Ottawa and Ojibwa residents.  Rebuilding and planting new crops would be difficult, 
but certainly not impossible.  Tenskwatawa believed that Prophetstown would again 
attract vast numbers of Indians who wanted to hear his message.  Furthermore, the Fr nc  
traders and their goods were gone, making the town more racially homogenous and more 
receptive to his teachings.    
Americans like Harrison interpreted the resettlement of the Prophetstown area as 
a resurgence of Tenskwatawa’s influence when in fact the actions of the Indians around 
Prophetstown reflected their desire to assert their autonomy.  Even though the Americans 
had destroyed Prophetstown temporarily, Indians returned to the area for its historical and 
spiritual significance.  This may explain, in part, why the Piankashaw settled near the 
ruins of Prophetstown.  The destruction of Prophetstown provided an opportunity for 
them to reclaim a sacred place.  However, most Americans simply concluded that Indians 
like the Piankashaw had joined with the Prophet.  Harrison hoped to use the Miamis, 
Potawatomis, and Kickapoos to force the Shawnee leader and all of the other “strange 
Indians” from the area once and for all.52  Some Miamis wanted Harrison to continue on 
the offensive, and they assured the governor that diplomatic measures were futil .  A 
Wea Indian guaranteed Harrison that “many of [the Wabash Indians] still reta ned their 
                                                




confidence in the Prophet.”53  Identifying the varying cultural interests of the Indian 
communities was difficult for Harrison, who continued to emphasize racial identites 
rather than to try and determine the cultural difference between Indian groups.   
Unlike Harrison, the Prophet had no choice but to confront the varying cultural 
interests influencing his community.  He recognized that Indians were receptiv  to his 
message but that they were not willing to abide by all of his dictates nor did they want to 
be attacked by the Americans.  Although delighted that Indians resettled the area near 
Prophetstown after the battle, Tenskwatawa understood that he still faced many of the 
same issues that had disrupted his community during the previous three years.  Little 
Turtle and William Wells remained actively opposed to the Prophet and many other 
inhabitants at Tippecanoe opposed the Prophet because he had usurped their cultural 
homeland.  Maintaining allegiance to a community that the Americans had painted s 
violent proved to be yet another challenge.  Few, if any, Indians wanted to encourage 
another American excursion into the area, but most also had a deep resentment towards 
Harrison and the Americans at Vincennes for the burning and desecration of 
Prophetstown.   
Indians from Prophetstown began killing European American settlers throughout 
the region to avenge Harrison’s destruction of Prophetstown.54  Tenskwatawa had 
undermined tribal leaders so that the Indians would be more responsive to his dictates, 
but this left him in a weakened position.  Not only did the rogue warriors ignore him, 
they ignored their former leader as well.  This proved especially difficult when the 
warriors (namely the Kickapoos and Potawatomies) sought to avenge the American 
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desecration of Prophetstown.  They committed several murders throughout the region 
during the spring of 1812, including one “most distressing” that involved the massacre of 
the Hutson family.  The Indians set the Hutson’s house “on fire with the bodies of the 
woman and children in it” and a young man’s body was “shockingly mangled left in the 
yard.”55  Rather than serve Prophetstown, the warriors continued to upset the Americans 
and draw the ire, if not the military might, of Harrison’s militia.  Some pro-American 
Indian communities continued to use Harrison’s paranoia about Prophetstown to their 
advantage by committing crimes against the Americans and then blaming the Prophet.56   
The frontier violence convinced Harrison that a “war of extirpation” against the Indians 
was necessary.57  Again, he interpreted some isolated events as the product of the 
Prophet’s efforts to destroy European Americans.   
The Shawnee brothers recognized that both the Americans and their fellow 
Indians threatened Prophetstown.  Willing to confront the problematic warriors, 
Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa joined a council of nearly 600 Indians at the Mississinewa 
River in early May 1812.  They hoped to use the public conference attended by various 
Indian communities as well as British and American agents to condemn the frontier 
murders.  Several Potawatomi Indians pinned the frontier violence during the previous 
months on Tenskawatawa during the council, knowing full well that Harrison was likely 
to believe it, but many of the Indians rejected those accusations.  Most Indians at the 
council realized Main Poc’s role in the whole affair.  Main Poc’s followers had raided 
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American settlements throughout April and May, in direct contradiction to the Prophet’s 
request.  Main Poc had ignored the Prophet’s dictates before and Tenskwatawa’s 
settlement proved to be a convenient scapegoat for both the Indians and the European 
Americans.   
Tecumseh used the debate to defend Prophetstown particularly because he was 
busy trying to unite Indian groups throughout the northern and southern Ohio Valley.  
His plans included visiting Creek, Osage, and even Choctaw Indian villages.58   
The last thing Tecumseh wanted was for the Americans to destroy Prophetstown again 
and drive away potential Indian allies permanently.  Tecumseh promised that the Indians 
would never initiate an attack, but that they would always defend their town to the last 
man.59  The Miami and Kickapoos demanded that the Potawatomi refrain from attacks on 
Americans, and Tecumseh promised to control the Potawatomi Indians who had caused 
the violence that spring.  Tecumseh’s statement was likely an attempt to take 
responsibility for the frontier violence in exchange for the Potawatomi’s loyalty.  
Although Tecumseh’s efforts were geared towards protecting his growing pan-Indi  
confederacy, Harrison and the Americans believed that Tecumseh’s comments hinted 
towards his long-term goal to destroy the Americans. Tecumseh’s rhetoric of self-defense 
was, as Harrison believed, a convenient justification for militant behavior.  
While the Prophet continued to confront disunity in his town, Tecumseh 
succeeded in uniting various Indian communities.  Tecumseh offered the Indians an 
opportunity to oppose the Americans by entering into a pan-Indian confederacy but not at 
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the expense of their cultural interests.  Tecumseh recognized that the Prophet’s message, 
while beneficial, was now damaged by the militant relationships produced by the Battle 
of Tippecanoe.  Indians simply were not willing to risk an open alliance with the Prophet, 
especially since they did not need his resources or support any longer after the Britis  
renewed relationships with many of the confederated Indian communities.  One historian, 
Timothy Willig, has discussed the ways in which some of the Prophet’s followers 
rejected his nativist message while still fighting alongside the British during the War of 
1812.  He notes that after the Ottawas and Ojibwas left Prophetstown, “only a wartime 
British alliance could united the nativist faction to the tribes of the northern Lakes.”60  
Tecumseh also recognized that Prophetstown could no longer support large numbers of 
Indians after Harrison’s army destroyed the crops.  In order to make their community 
viable again, the Shawnee brothers and their followers needed to plant vast fields of crops 
to feed the Indians they hoped to welcome to their community.  That mattered little, 
however, if the Shawnee brothers could not control their followers and maintain peace 
throughout the Valley.  This proved remarkably difficult.   
Tecumseh recognized that Prophetstown’s symbolic value was more important 
than its ability to house hundreds of Indians.  Prophetstown’s significance became 
especially important after Harrison burned Tippecanoe because attracting l rge numbers 
of Indians to Prophetstown would likely have only promoted more violence.  As a 
symbol of the militant and expansionist Americans, the Battle of Tippecanoe provided 
Tecumseh with a rallying cry for unity among Indian peoples.  Although the Indians in 
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the immediate vicinity of the town continued to distance themselves from the Prophet in 
order to serve their own interests, new recruits ventured towards the town or agreed to 
defend it in case of an attack.  Rather than respond to its religious significance, Indians 
likely associated with Prophetstown because it represented Indian efforts against 
European American aggression.  However, the growing support for Prophetstown was 
not necessarily a product of Tenskwatawa’s diplomatic efforts in the region.  Rather, 
Tecumseh succeeded in uniting several Indian nations in a military alliance in the event 
that the British and Americans went to war.  War meant easy access to British trade 
goods, an important part of their willingness to join Tecumseh’s confederacy.  Greater 
access to British goods came at a time when the Prophet had grown increasingly 
frustrated in his attempt to unify Indian nations through his revitalization movement.  
Although the Prophet had always hoped to use his town as a means to unite and purify 
Indian communities, he had encountered opposition.   
Indian resistance to Prophetstown was nowhere more apparent than within the 
Miami community.  Some of the more conservative Miami used the diplomatic crisis 
between the United States and Britain to establish an alliance with the Briish during the 
summer of 1812.61  The Miami never made such an overture with the Prophet.62  If the 
Miami and Potawatomi are examples for why Indian nations associated with 
Prophetstown, then we can conclude that Indians used the Prophet to protect their 
community rather than because they supported the nativist vision espoused by 
Tenskwatawa.  The numbers reflect this.  While the Prophet struggled to gain large 
numbers of adherents, Tecumseh won the support of 3,500 warriors living in Indiana, 
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Illinois, and Wisconsin.63  Tecumseh could promise them an alliance with the British, 
while the Prophet’s teachings advocated separation from the polluting influences of 
Europeans.  Tecumseh’s success in constructing such an alliance was largely the product 
of the Indian communities hoping to use an impending war to protect their interests and 
not necessarily because they supported the Prophet’s nativist ideology.  Receiving goods 
from the British went against the Prophet’s teachings, but it also allowed the pan-Indi  
confederacy to mobilize more effectively than it had under the Prophet.   
Tecumseh succeeded in uniting various Indian communities throughout the region 
largely because of the growing diplomatic crisis between the United States and Britain.  
They had failed to reach a compromise over free trade and sailor’s rights during the 
spring of 1812, which pushed President James Madison towards declaring war.  Madison 
signed the declaration of war against Great Britain on June 18, 1812, which drastically 
altered the dynamics in the Wabash-Maumee Valley.64  Britain could distribute goods to 
its Indian allies throughout the Ohio Valley, and many of the Indian communities gladly 
accepted them.  War presented Indian groups with an opportunity to renew their old 
relationships with the British but also to acquire weapons they could use to defend 
themselves in a region flooded by American settlers.  This was a welcome opportunity 
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for Indian communities like Pacanne’s more conservative Miami, who hoped to renew 
their historical relationship with the British.   
The Prophet recognized the benefits of the war as well.  He sent runners 
throughout the Illinois country and northern Great Lakes region to rally the Indians.  He 
knew that the opportunities provided by war were more persuasive than his nativist 
rhetoric.  The chance to attack American settlements and to receive trade goods from the 
British was more important than the Prophet’s efforts to revitalize Indian peoples.  
Tenskwatawa was coming to realize that the ability to beat the Americans mattered more 
than his principles.   
The National Trinity 
News of war did not reach the Wabash-Maumee Valley until early July of 1812.  
Tenskwatawa refused to initiate any attacks on nearby American communities because he 
knew that Harrison would react decisively.  Rather than tempt the governor, 
Tenskwatawa traveled east to Fort Wayne with an assemblage of Kickapoos, Ho-Chunk, 
and a few Shawnee Indians, where he spoke with Benjamin Stickney, the Indian agent at
Fort Wayne.  The Prophet wanted to convince Stickney that he too desired peace on the 
frontier and would accept the stipulations in the Treaty of Fort Wayne of 1809.  Such a 
concession would have marked a drastic shift in his philosophy.  The Prophet presented 
“a large white belt of Wampum with a small spot of purple wampum in the centre, in 
which [he] said, that the speeches of the three nations were combined . . . the purple spot 
in the centre represented their Town on the Wabash ; and one end of the belt extended to 
Vincennes, and the other to Fort Wayne.”65  It was a belt of “National trinity” that 
represented the common goals of the Americans, the Indians at Prophetstown, and the 
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Miami.  Such unity, however, proved elusive.  The three communities involved not only 
lacked a regional alliance but they also remained divided internally, and were therefore 
incapable of functioning as unified entities.  The Prophet used his speech to concealhis 
militant intentions.  Maintaining peace would allow the Indians to prepare for the advent 
of war and attain goods from Britain more readily.  However, peace was unlikely 
considering the interests of the Miami factions and the factionalism within Vincennes. 
Wells refused to accept any sort of alliance with the Prophet and discouraged 
anyone at the council from believing Tenskwatawa’s professions of peace.  Wells’ erratic 
behavior throughout the council was not simply a product of his distaste for Prophet.  The 
Miami were in a difficult position, trapped between Tecumseh’s confederacy, the British, 
and a highly suspicious and paranoid Harrison.  Furthermore, Wells’ father-in-law, Little 
Turtle, had died at his house just a few days before the council convened, undercutting 
Wells’ influence among his Indian community.  Wells’ frustration with Tenskwatawa 
was the culmination of several factors, including Little Turtle’s death.  Wells learned that 
some of the Miami had joined with the British, and he feared that war might soon destroy 
all of his efforts to protect his Miami community.  The inner politics of the council o ly 
added to his anger.  During the meeting, some Kickapoos stole two of Wells’ horses, 
which threw Wells into a tirade.  Wells directed his frustrations at Tenskwatawa, 
claiming that the “Prophet directed them to be stolen” and that the Prophet intended “a  
attack on Vincennes.”66  Again, Wells used Vincennes to voice his frustrations over 
diplomatic affairs.  Stickney was tired of Wells and dismissed his warnings, but Wells 
continued to press the issue by writing to Harrison.  He also used the letter to mock 
Stickney, whom he viewed as the Prophet’s dupe.  The letter likely had an effect, 
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considering that Harrison disliked Stickney and had even referred to him as an “ignorant, 
inexperienced, and outrageously insolent” Indian agent.67   
Wells also used racial tensions as a way to force Harrison’s hand.  By claiming 
that he knew British strategy for war in the southern states, Wells tried to enlarge 
Harrison’s fears of an all-out race war.  Wells claimed that the “Creeks & all the 
Southern Indians as well as the Negroes” would soon have all of the “necessary 
implements of War” and that the Creeks would “raise the Negroes in that Quarter Against 
the Whites.”68  The Creek efforts, coupled with the Prophet’s army, would prove 
disastrous for the European American settlements in the territory.  With Little Turtle dead 
and the Miami community fractured, Wells’ tremendous efforts to orient the Americans 
against Prophetstown produced very little.  Harrison’s men had burned the town, but this 
had not helped the Miami.  Wells’ letters to Harrison were likely a last ditch effort to 
force Harrison to attack Prophetstown, even though the town itself no longer mattered.  
The rhetoric was nothing new.  Wells tried to make the Prophet a bigger issue by 
emphasizing the threat Tenskwatawa presented to Vincennes and then stoking racial fears 
he knew would sway Harrison.  Wells played Harrison as though it was still 1809.  He 
was unable to see that Harrison could not attack Prophetstown without inviting a frontier 
war with the British.  Wells continued to think locally while Harrison thought nationally. 
The post-Tippecanoe Prophetstown was quite different from the town 
Tenskwatawa and some of his supporters constructed in 1808.  The Prophet remained an 
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important figure in the Indian resistance, but his town could no longer support large 
numbers of Indians.  Furthermore, most Indians did not need to venture to Prophetstown.  
The declaration of war allowed the Indians to associate with the British who had repl ced 
Prophetstown as the titular head of resistance.  Although the fields along the Wabash 
River were full of corn, many of the Indians who supported Tecumseh’s confederacy 
received goods from the British, which enabled them to remain at their villages.  Many
Indians ventured to Malden where they could discuss strategy and receive gifts rather 
than uproot themselves and live at Prophetstown.  The Prophet understood that a victory 
against the Americans would provide greater opportunities for Indian conversions by 
stemming the tide of American settlement.  He likely accepted the changing identity of 
Prophetstown even though he must have also realized that associating with the Britis 
challenged his religious vision.  Most Indians participated in the war for practical 
purposes, which forced them to abandon many of the Prophet’s dictates.  The last thing 
the British could do was win over Indian allies by reinforcing the Prophet’s nativist 
agenda.  Rather, they offered the Indians guns, European American trade goods, and even 
alcohol, which brought many Indians into the British camp.  The war itself, a cooperative 
effort between the Indians and European Americans, was at its heart anti-nativist and 
maintained factionalism.  By trading with the British, Indian groups were able to punish 
the aggressive American government without uniting behind any pan-Indian ideology.  
For all intents and purposes, it was every Indian group for itself.  One historian has noted 
that the war provided certain Indian communities with an opportunity to fight the 
Americans who had earlier rejected a nativist alliance with the Prophet.  Indian 
communities “fought the Americans as British allies, not nativists.”69  These Indians used 
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the war and the opportunities to trade with the British to protect their interests, which 
prevented them from uniting with other disparate Indian groups near Prophetstown.  
The remarkable thing about the changes at Prophetstown was that the residents of 
Vincennes saw little to no difference between the pre- and post-Tippecanoe ers.  P ople 
in Vincennes related to Prophetstown through their factionalism and fears and tended to 
ignore the interests of the Indians.  For them, Prophetstown was static.  It either 
represented Harrison’s successes or failures.  Although the anti-Harrisonian  feared an 
Indian attack, many felt that if such a disaster occurred, it would be the fault of the 
governor’s corrupt diplomacy.  The battle at Tippecanoe convinced Albert Badollet that 
“the object of the Governor was to bring on an Indian war.”70  Like his son, John Badollet 
felt that the battle could “be considered in no other light than that of an outrageous 
aggression on an unoffending & peaceable neighbor, and a wanton waste of treasure and 
blood.”71  Yet, like the rest of the residents of Vincennes, he abandoned his house for 
more secure buildings like the church, Harrison’s mansion, or Nathaniel Ewing’s brick 
house.  
The residents of Vincennes feared the Indians who gathered north of their town 
“with a view it is said  . . . of retaliating upon [Vincennes] the inhuman burning of 
Prophet’s town.”72  They were right to fear an attack, but they were focused on the wrong 
enemy.  Main Poc’s Potawatomis had attacked several American farms throughout the 
area during the spring of 1812, which most Americans interpreted as a product of the 
Prophet’s teachings.  And so the Americans prepared for an attack.  Hundreds of settlers 
had left the area, including Harrison’s family, whom he sent to Cincinnati.  There was no 
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patrol or scouts to warn of an Indian approach and most of the settlers refused to venture 
outside.  Badollet hid at Ewing’s residence, which was situated “one mile off in very 
[thick] woods” but posed a problem for making it to his office in town because a mile 
walk would place him in “danger of an ambush.”73  Some residents built pickets around 
their homes in an effort to remain safe, but the danger they faced appeared, at least to 
men like Badollet, to be a product of Harrison’s abuses of leadership.  Harrison had done 
little to protect the town.  He was unsure how to handle the situation, even though he had 
been so direct in leading his forces against Prophetstown.  He described the abandoned 
farms with unplanted fields and the homes full of “wretched people crowded together in 
places almost destitute of ever necessary accommodation.”74  Writing to the Secretary of 
War, Harrison lamented that he was at a “loss as to the orders proper to be given in the 
present state of the country.”75  He did not “conceive” himself “authorized to order out 
any militia at the expense of the United States,” which meant that Vincennes would 
remain undefended.76  The anti-Harrisonians still believed that the Indian war “was the 
only means that [Governor] possessed of escaping censure & punishment” for his erratic 
governance and his costly attack on Prophetstown.77  The two American factions 
continued to challenge each other through Indian affairs.   
Elihu Stout played an important role in maintaining a militant characterization of 
Prophetstown during this period.  Rather than evaluate the various interests dividing 
Indian country, he communicated biased reports from Harrison and the French traders 
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while also communicating his own fears of an Indian attack.  His articles about the Indian 
council at the Missinewa River neglected to report much about opposing interests 
apparent in the Indian community.  The large meeting of Indians at the Missinewa 
produced some positive results for the Americans, including a greater understanding of 
which Indians were actually attacking European American settlements, but Stout failed to 
report the intricate dynamics evident during the council.  There were noticeable 
disagreements between the various Indian communities in the valley, but Stout’s article 
simply reported that the Indians remained militantly opposed to the Americans.  He 
continued to play politics with Indian affairs.  Stout did not print the accusations leveled 
by the Miami against the Potawatomi.  The Miami believed that a pro-American 
Potawatomi leader Winemak had instigated the murders on the frontier, an important 
piece of information considering that Harrison had favored Winemak and even invited 
him into Vincennes.  Nor did The Western Sun mention anything about the various Indian 
communities who advocated peace.  Such information might have strengthened the anti-
Harrisonians’ claims that the Prophet did not plan to attack Vincennes because it would 
invite retaliation against his town.  Stout simply concluded that there was no “evidence of 
the return of the Indians to a friendly disposition.”78  Like Harrison, Stout grouped the 
Wabash Indians as one entity, suggesting to his readers that the Indians were acting 
collectively.  This legitimized rumors that Prophetstown was indeed a threato the 
countryside. 
While Stout refrained to divulge many details about the Indian council, he had no 
qualms about spreading rumors that Americans were once again aiding the militant
Indians.  AWea leader, Lapoussier, knew that the governor had detained a Delaware 
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Indian and three children at Vincennes.  No Indians had visited Vincennes in the period 
after the arrival of the prisoners, and so, according to Stout, only a European American 
person could have shared the information with the Wea leader.79  Stout concluded that 
there was “some secret communication between some person here and the Indians, by 
which the latter are informed of every thing that passes amongst us.”80 Suggestions of 
treason were nothing new for The Western Sun, or were they anything new for 
Vincennes.  However, the likelihood that such a report could create violence had 
increased ten-fold in the period after the Battle of Tippecanoe.  The recent deadly Indian 
attacks put the residents on edge.  In such a situation, a traitor’s life was at st ke if the 
town uncovered his identity.  Intentional or not, Stout’s newspaper directed paranoid 
fears towards European Americans in Vincennes as much as it did Indians in the valley. 
Harrison’s efforts to control all facets of Indian affairs added to the contentious 
atmosphere surrounding the rumors that Americans were colluding with the Indians.  The 
governor challenged one of his Indian agents after it appeared that the agent undermined 
the governor’s leadership.  When Benjamin Stickney reported his intelligence to the 
Secretary of War without first consulting Harrison, the governor penned a letter accusing 
the agent of subterfuge.  Harrison argued that Stickney had already “produced mis hief” 
by abusing his powers.  He told Eustis that a Wea leader had recently informed Captain 
Zachary Taylor that the governor would “shortly be deprived of office” without any 
knowledge of who had given the Indian leader that information.  Even though Harrison 
stated that he had “no idea that Mr. Stickney [had] authorized such a report,” the 
governor was “convinced it had its origin in [Stickney’s] assertion of Independence” as 
                                                




Indian agent.81  Harrison believed that Stickney had operated outside the boundaries of 
his authority, and the governor questioned Stickney’s loyalty to the American 
government.  It was as though Harrison could not conduct territorial business unless he 
had absolute control and absolute obedience from other territorial officials.  The question 
remains, how much did Harrison’s personal ambition influence his handling of Indian 
affairs?   
The rumors spread by Harrison made residents of Vincennes scared that their own 
neighbors might attack them out of anger.  Harrison’s slanderous comments convinced 
nervous settlers that public officials within Vincennes had collaborated with the Wabash 
Indians in order to undermine Harrison’s authority.  Coupled with Stout’s biased 
newspaper articles, residents of Vincennes began to fear for their lives. Badollet worried 
that these rumors would persuade loyal Harrisonians or other people stricken with fear to 
“deprive us of our lives” while “under the appearance of an Indian.”82  John Badollet’s 
concern that someone might dress up as an Indian and murder him seems foolish and 
exaggerated considering his great distaste for Harrison and his supporters.  But Badollet’s 
fearful letter about enemies “playing Indian” represents something more than a paranoid 
remark.  Many of the residents had played Indian, including Harrison.  They had used 
Indian affairs and manipulated Indian identities as a means to fight political battles in 
town.  The governor’s policies concerning Prophetstown and the Wabash Indians lack 
credibility because he used Indian affairs as much to punish his enemies as he did to 
protect the territory.   
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Events that occurred during late August and the early fall of 1812 entirely 
refashioned the connections between the Americans, Prophetstown, and the Miami.  The 
war had altered the relationships so drastically that diplomacy no longer play d a part in 
the valley.  Harrison, Tecumseh, and the Prophet no longer gathered together in order to 
discuss territorial issues.  By September 3, 1812, Harrison had resolved to “commence 
offensive operations against [the Indians] immediately and to make a sweeping blow at 
them beginning with the Prophet at Tippecanoe & extending it up that river to the 
villages of the Putawattimies.”83  However, he never followed this course of action, and 
instead turned his army towards the Miami settlements in northeastern Indiaa.  
Harrison’s commission as a Major General effectively removed him as governor of the 
territory and gave him free reign to do as he pleased.  Also, William Wells’ d ath during 
the Battle of Fort Dearborn left Harrison’s forces free to rampage throug  the Wabash 
Valley communities without a check.  Harrison remained focused on northeastern Indiana 
even after a group of Indians from Prophetstown had attacked Fort Harrison and nearly 
taken it.  Several Wea and Miamis had warned Zachary Taylor’s command at Fort
Harrison of the impending attack, but Harrison disregarded the intelligence.  Rather, he 
instructed Colonel James Simrall’s four troops of Kentucky Dragoons  to destroy Lit le 
Turtle’s town even though he “had no evidence of the inhabitants of that Town having 
joined in the hostilities against” the Americans.84  Harrison feared that militant Indians 
might take the food and materials from Little Turtle’s town and use it to feed and arm a 
prolonged militancy.  William Clark, the governor of Illinois Territory, warned that many 
of the Indian towns would sue for peace and that “protection should be extended towards 
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84 Harrison to Eustis, WHH Papers, Reel 6, 203; September 21, 1812. 
 
260 
them.”85  Harrison, frustrated by the Indian raids on American settlements, abandoned 
any efforts to negotiate with the Wabash Indians.  He likely recognized that war with 
Britain and its Indian allies provided too great an opportunity to rid the valley of Indians 
once and for all. 
Attacking the British and the Indians served his purposes far more than bickering 
with his enemies in Vincennes.  Harrison had also concluded that it was “impossible to 
discriminate” between the peaceful and militant Indians.86  Although it is understandable 
that Harrison would want to take decisive steps towards the Wabash Indians as a way to 
force compliance with his policies, such behavior also reflected the governor’s tendency 
to interpret Indian behavior through racial terms.  It was easier for him to disregard 
cultural differences because they were less important, in his mind, than racial tendencies. 
The relationship between the Prophet and Harrison played an important part in 
instigating conflict between the two communities, but it was not the determining factor.  
The divisive nature of the region, amplified by the factional nature of the two towns, 
proved to be the driving strength behind the racial violence at Tippecanoe and during the 
War of 1812.  The Prophet, fighting to keep his town together, confronted several 
challenges to his authority.  They included a Miami Indian community desperate to 
protect their historic place in the valley by using Prophetstown as a way to challenge their 
fellow leaders.  The Miami used Prophetstown as a tool to express their grievances with 
each other and with the Americans.  The Miamis also manipulated intelligence as a 
means to compel the Americans into action against the Prophet rather than to risk it 
themselves.  Tenskwatawa’s rhetoric often aided their cause.  His polarizing words forced 
                                                




the Indians and the Americans into a more direct confrontation by convincing many 
settlers that he was as militant as the rumors suggested.  Far fewer Americans questioned 
the motives of their leader, often accepting Harrison’s policies regarding the Prophet and 
his brother Tecumseh.  Had more Americans done so, they might have recognized that 
the factional nature of Vincennes played an important part in Harrison’s diplomacy as 
well as their own perceptions of Prophetstown.  Added to the factionalism among the 
American community was the bias of the French traders on whom the Americans relied 
for intelligence about the Wabash Indians.  Their motives, much like Harrison’s and 
those of his enemies, were intensely personal.   
The National Trinity between the Miami, Americans, and Prophetstown, if there 
ever was one, collapsed by the fall of 1812.  Many of the actors and places that had been 
so central to the violence in the Wabash-Maumee Valley ceased to exist by 1813.  
Several of the major local actors were dead, Harrison was no longer the governor of the 
territory, and Vincennes had become just another frontier town.  Tecumseh and his 
brother effectively abandoned Prophetstown for an alliance with the British, never 
returning to their town or nativist agenda.  The National Trinity had proved as elusive as 
unity at Prophetstown.  It seems that the only person to benefit from the diplomatic crisis 
between Britain and the United States was William Henry Harrison.   He eventually used 
his wartime experience to become a U.S. Representative and U.S. Senator from Ohio, and 
then the President of the United States.   
Each Indian and European American group in the Wabash-Maumee Valley 
arrived at the War of 1812 for reasons far outside the international crisis that was so 
central to President Madison.  Most of Harrison’s militia joined his ranks because of 
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threats to their homes and to the capital of the territory - threats created by Harrison and 
his French sources.  Harrison was involved in the war in order to protect his influence in 
the territory and to avoid censure, but also because he believed the French traders who 
provided him with damning information regarding the Prophet.  The Miamis were there 
because they were involved in a civil dispute with their own people, few of whom wanted 
to cement Prophetstown as a fixture in Indiana society.  Tenskwatawa and other resid nts 
of Prophetstown were there because of the divisions within their community but also 
because they hoped to find some stability in a rapidly changing environment.   
Even after the Battle of Tippecanoe, even after the French traders fled and 
Harrison attacked the town, neither Vincennes nor Prophetstown united under a banner of 
racial unity.  The Prophet strove to unite his community, but watched as the Potawatomi 
and Miamis continued to challenge him.  Their desire to place local interests above racial 
and nativist ideals prolonged factionalism within the region.  If anything, Prophetstown, 
like Vincennes, was unable to change the historical dynamics and factional nature of the 
Wabash-Maumee Valley.  Local and cultural interests ruled the region for ver a century, 
and the two “new” towns simply could not overcome the issues fueling factionalism.  The 
Prophet and Harrison believed that they represented the racial interests of Indians and 
European Americans, respectively.  In fact, their interests, like their relationships, 
overshadowed the complicated relationships connecting Indian histories with European 
American ones.  Although the Prophet and Harrison likely looked at the War of 1812 as 
the logical result of their peoples’ inability to compromise, their beliefs did not reflect the 




In the decade after the War of 1812, Tenskwatawa and William Henry Harrison 
spent a great deal of their time trying to maintain, if not expand, the influence they 
enjoyed earlier.  Both men found their efforts frustrated.  The Prophet no longer had the 
support of his brother, Tecumseh, who had died at the Battle of the Thames in 1813.  
Many of the Prophet’s supporters had moved back to the Wabash-Maumee Valley, but 
Tenskwatawa was unable to move back because the federal government had banned him 
from returning to the United States.  Federal Indian agents feared that letting him to 
return to the Wabash-Maumee Valley would allow him to renew hostilities on American 
settlements.  They considered this a distinct possibility when some of his former 
supporters, including some Shawnees, Kickapoos, and Sac Indians resettled near the 
Tippecanoe River in 1816.1  These people were able to return to the territories they 
occupied before the war in compliance with the Treaty of Ghent, which stipulated that the 
United States must “restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessi ns, 
rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand 
eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities.”2  As head of the commission 
charged with negotiating the return of these Indian groups, Harrison must have 
questioned why he had fought so hard against the Indians only to see so many of them 
returning to Tippecanoe.  While the Prophet endured exile in Canada, Harrison’s 
livelihood suffered as well.  After the people of Ohio elected Harrison as a representative 
to Congress in 1816, he settled for serving in Ohio’s state senate in 1819 and 
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subsequently lost an election to Congress in 1822.  Despite their setbacks, however, both 
men found ways to use the American political structure to reassert their influence. 
During the summer of 1824, Lewis Cass, then Governor of Michigan Territory, 
sent a letter to the Prophet requesting his presence at Detroit.  Cass believed that the 
Prophet was “restless and discontented” and that the Shawnee leader had little left in ife 
but “disappointment.”3  Yet, Cass hoped that the isolated, aging, and politically weakened 
Prophet might aid the federal government’s removal efforts of Indians from the Ohio 
Valley.  Aiding Cass’s attempts to remove the Ohio Shawnees provided an excellent 
opportunity for Tenskwatawa to undercut the influence of an old Shawnee adversary, 
Black Hoof.  To a certain extent, Cass hoped for the same thing because Black Hoof’s 
Shawnees had proved resistant to removing from Ohio.  The Prophet had accepted the 
fact he would not return to Prophetstown, but he also recognized that aiding the 
Americans’ removal efforts provided an opportunity for him to reassert his authority 
within the Shawnee community.4  By moving west, he would be separate himself from 
the problematic Americans, while also being closer to the Kickapoos, Potawatomi, and 
other Indian communities that had lived with him at Prophetstown.  The meeting between 
Cass and the Prophet proved beneficial.  Cass recognized Tenskwatawa’s cooperative 
nature and stated that the aging Shawnee leader was “’radically cured . . . of his Anglo-
mania.’”5  In fact, the Prophet had grown increasingly angry with the British for not 
compensating him fully for his services during the war.  Cass believed that the Prophet 
would no longer represent a threat to American interests.   
                                                
3 Cass to Calhoun, November 21, 1819, Cass Papers, Burton Collection, Detroit Public Library; Cass to 
Calhoun, December 25, 1819, Shawnee File, Great Lakes Indian Archives; Johnson to Cass, November 9, 
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4 Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 170-174. 
5 Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 168. 
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Tenskwatawa had little choice but to pacify Cass in order to survive.  The Prophet 
deftly used Cass to work his way back into the United States.  The Prophet led a 
contingent of Shawnees west to the Kansas River in the late 1820s.  In 1828, he set up a 
village separate from other more influential Shawnee leaders like Cornstalk and Big 
Snake.  However, like at Prophetstown, many of the Indians at Tenkswatawa’s Kansas 
village soon departed because he could not provide them with the supplies necessary to 
survive.  Most traveled east to the Shawnee settlements in Missouri that were mor 
friendly to the Indian agents.   Two years later, a large contingent of Shawnee Indians 
arrived in Kansas from Ohio, but few cared to associate themselves with the Prophet.  He 
resented losing influence among his people so he moved east to present-day Kansas City, 
Kansas, where he constructed another village. 6     
Like Tenskwatawa, Harrison used his connections to Prophetstown as a means to 
improve his circumstances.  Rather than return to Vincennes after the War of 1812, 
Harrison hoped to exploit his experiences fighting the Indians and serving as a general
during the war to climb the political ladder.  After failing to win a Congressional seat in 
1822, Harrison won election to the United States Senate in 1824.  As a senator from 
Ohio, Harrison served as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, a post 
previously held by Andrew Jackson.  He became minister to Nueva Granada four years 
later, and retired from public life in 1829.  Frustrated at his lack of wealth, Harrison 
welcomed James Hall’s biography A Memoir of the Public Services of William Henry 
Harrison, from which he derived some profit.  In 1836, he ran for president and lost, but 
won the office in 1840, largely due to the popularization of American politics.  The Whig 
party recognized how Andrew Jackson used his identity as an Indian fighter to propel him 
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into office and party leaders hoped to do the same with Harrison.  By 1840, more than 
twelve biographies portrayed Harrison as a national hero.7  The Whig Party continued 
using this portrayal of Harrison and his famed efforts during the War of 1812 to get him 
elected to the White House.  As had been the case when he was territorial governor of 
Indiana, Harrison used the power of words to protect his interests and propel him into 
higher office.  
As Tenskwatawa constructed the last physical Prophetstown several hundred 
miles west of the original, Harrison built a symbolic Prophetstown for political purposes.  
Harrison capitalized on his connection to Prophetstown by organizing a presidential 
campaign built upon the myth of his victory at Tippecanoe.  National rallies of more than 
50,000 Whigs expressed their support for Harrison by singing the eight stanzas of 
“Tippecanoe and Tyler too.”  
What's the cause of this commotion, motion, motion, 
Our country through? 
It is the ball a-rolling on 
    For Tippecanoe and Tyler too. 
    For Tippecanoe and Tyler too. 
    And with them we'll beat little Van, Van, Van, 
    Van is a used up man. 
    And with them we'll beat little Van.8   
The song, like the campaign slogan, identified William Henry Harrison as 
“Tippecanoe” in order to remind Americans of Harrison’s “heroic” actions against the 
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Shawnee Prophet’s supporters.  However, the politicization of the town, river, and event 
that was Tippecanoe ignored the word’s historical context.  The nickname Tippecanoe 
recalled a famous Indian battle but made no mention of the public quarrel in Vincennes 
that led to it or resulted from it.  Tippecanoe was, in fact, the European American name 
for a small stream that ran perpendicular to the Wabash River.  The Prophet established 
Prophetstown at the confluence of these two rivers.  The Potawatomi Indians called it Ke-
tap-e-kon and the Miamis named it Ke-tap-kwa-na.  EuroAmericans identified the village 
at the mouth of the Tippecanoe as Ke-tap-e-kon-nong, which they corrupted initially as 
Keth-tip-pe-can-nunk and eventually as Tippecanoe.9  The various spellings reflect the 
different peoples that lived near these rivers.  The word Tippecanoe became synonymous 
with Harrison and heroism, not Tenskwatawa or the Wabash Indians or even the way in 
which Harrison provoked the Indians into fighting.  For Harrison and his supporters, 
Tippecanoe was about power, not place.  While Harrison’s nickname evoked faint 
memories of his battles against Indians during the War of 1812, by 1840 it largely 
symbolized national and racial values centered on the continued westward expansion of 
Anglo-Americans.  His supporters recognized that they could use the battle to refashion 
Harrison into a heroic Indian fighter much like Andrew Jackson.  They colonized the 
word much like they had colonized the Indians’ lands. 
Several biographies continued to refashion Harrison’s image.  One of the many 
biographies characterized Harrison as “the idol of the northwestern army” because “no 
general had a higher reputation for bravery, skill, and perseverance.”10  In fact, “they 
knew that if they were sick, they would not be left to suffer.  If there was only a crust of 
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bread, their general would share it with them.” 11  They hailed “the gallant Harrison!, 
Who often fought and ever won, The glorious wreath of victory.”12  Whig supporters 
mythologized Harrison through the Battle of Tippecanoe and the events surrounding it, 
which reflected more of the socio-political atmosphere of the late 1830s and 1840s than 
the reality of life in the Wabash-Maumee Valley during the early 1800s.  By 1840, the 
United States government had removed thousands of American Indians west of the 
Mississippi in order to create separate worlds for the two races.13  Harrison addressed 
Indians only by conjuring up images of the past to aid his political ambitions.  In many 
ways, he used his connection to Prophetstown to make himself into the Whig version of 
Andrew Jackson.  
Like Harrison, historians have neglected to tell the full story of the relationship 
between the European Americans at Vincennes and Indians at Prophetstown.  Many 
historians have characterized the relationship between the two towns as a product of the 
Prophet’s “Anglo-mania.” 14  Rather than thoroughly address the competing ethnic 
interests at Prophetstown and Vincennes, they have framed their analyses around a racial 
dichotomy embodied by the expansionist-minded Americans whom the confederated 
Indians opposed.  Such interpretive threads have prolonged characterizations that race 
chiefly shaped the relationship between the French, Americans and American Indians.  
My dissertation deconstructs the myth of the Prophet’s maniacal behavior and 
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emphasizes how intra-community factionalism determined the relationships between 
these two groups.   
The factionalism among Indian communities in the Wabash-Maumee Valley was 
largely the product of historical circumstances that prevented the full-scale unification of 
Indians as nations or as a race.  While Indian communities identified a common heritage 
with their brethren elsewhere, they rarely placed ethnic interests above those of their 
village or community.  Indians forged economic and diplomatic relationships with each 
other and Europeans based upon the needs of their village.  The French, British, and 
Americans prolonged this behavior by operating on the same terms as the Indians, which 
often meant that different villages of the same ethnic group had relationships with 
competing imperial powers.  It was common to have one Miami town trading with the 
French while another traded with the English.  This pattern persisted throughout the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century and did not change drastically until the United 
States government began identifying Indians as tribes in preparation for their removal.     
European Americans experienced similar degrees of factionalism within their own 
communities.  Both France and Britain settled in the valley to access the Indian trade, but 
by 1800, they had all but vanished from North America as imperial actors.   However, the 
relationships born out of the imperial dynamic continued.  French settlers and British
agents remained tied to the social bonds constructed under imperial rule and had little 
reason to change.  American immigrants desperately wanted to control and profit from 
the trading network in the valley, but found the French and their Indian neighbors 
resistant to change.  The French also refused to adapt to American cultural val es even 
when they could not afford to pay their taxes or lost influence within territorial politics.  
 
270 
Despite their common residence in places like Vincennes, the Americans and French 
remained determined to protect their cultural interests.  For most, race simply d d not 
matter in a world where multi-ethnic and multi-racial connections provided greater 
opportunities for security.   
It was in the period after the Revolutionary War that people began accepting and 
utilizing racial constructs more readily.  While nascent ideas of racial difference surfaced 
throughout the eighteenth century, most people believed that one’s environment produced 
physical and cultural differences.   Samuel Stanhope Smith’s lectures and Essay on the 
Causes of Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species supported this 
environmentalist perspective.  While lecturing to the American Philosophical Society in 
1787, Smith argued that the physical features of a young Indian by the name of George
Morgan White Eyes had become more Anglo-American since joining Princeton.  White
Eyes’ environment at college was noticeably less Indian and Stanhope argued that Whi e 
Eyes’ physical characteristics changed accordingly. 15  However, Smith’s viewpoint was 
the exception to the rule.  By 1800, more European Americans and many American 
Indians believed that their differences were tied to their genesis.  While Stanhope Smith 
argued that Indians and European Americans could trace their ancestry to a shared 
creation, larger numbers of people after 1800 believed that multiple creations produced 
the various Indian, European, and African races throughout the world.  Indians and 
European Americans had identified themselves differently from one another for 
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centuries, but the shift towards identifying difference as innate was largely the product of 
nineteenth century circumstances.16 
Indians and European Americans collectively constructed the racial categories 
reflecting innate differences.  Indians in the southeast had historically identified 
themselves as “Red” in relation to the European Americans for its symbolic value.17  
However, beginning in the nineteenth century these same Indians started explaining their 
origins and redness as a product of their separate creation from European Amricans.  
European Americans followed a similar path but began differentiating themselves by 
refashioning what it meant to be Indian and what it meant to be African in order to justify 
their treatment of slaves and Indians.  Rationalizing that both races were inferior to 
whites allowed European Americans to abuse African labor and take Indian land.   
These racial categories most certainly surfaced in Prophetstown and Vincennes.18   
Like many racist European Americans, Tenskwatawa believed that the Creator had 
created Indians separately from whites and that the intermixing of the two races had 
greatly undermined Indian culture.  The Great Spirit told the Prophet that the “whitman 
was not made by himself but by another spirit who made & governed the whites.”19  
While Tenskwatawa and his brother preached to their fellow Indians not to associate with 
non-Indians, European Americans did much the same.  William Henry Harrison publicly 
stated his views that Indians were innately predisposed to warfare and that their bility to 
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construct unified societies often collapsed under juvenile jealousies.  Harrison believed 
that it was impossible for Indians and European Americans to live together because 
Indians would never stop raiding non-Indian settlements.   
The racial rhetoric from both groups was mutually complementary.  Yet, as raci l 
categories hardened during the first twenty years of the nineteenth century, residents of 
Vincennes and Prophetstown continued to emphasize and defend their ethnic rather than 
racial interests.  Even though racial boundaries became increasingly apparent, few people 
saw race as the key to constructing their ideal society.  Examining these issues on the 
local level shows that people in both towns used, but were not wedded to, racial ideology.  
While inhabitants of the valley certainly used race to promote their interests at times, they 
also found other avenues that were as effective.   
The manner in which people used race and the point at which it crystallized in a 
given area depended upon spatial factors.  Historians have begun to address these spatial 
factors, although in regional, rather than local, terms.  Nancy Shoemaker examined the 
ways in which American Indians in the southeast identified themselves as “Red” in the 
forty years before the American Revolution.20  Indians used this term not only for its 
cultural significance, but also to differentiate themselves from African slave  and 
European colonists.  While the southeastern Indians did not initially identify as red to
denote their race, it eventually became a signifier of racial differenc.  Surprisingly, the 
Indians of the southeast made such color distinctions decades before Indians to the north.  
Likewise, Patrick Griffin analyzes racial relationships to the north in the O io Valley and 
argues that ideas of innate difference crystallized in that region in the three decades after 
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the end of the Seven Years War.21  Hardening racial constructs were largely the result of 
the polarizing effects that the constant violence and warfare had upon the inhabitants of 
the region.  As frontier settlers fought for economic and political independence in a world 
full of violence and death, they grudgingly recognized their common racial heritage with 
the revolutionaries further east and decided to sacrifice some of their autonomy in 
exchange for protection from their newly independent government.  Peter Silver second  
much of Griffin’s analysis.  He states that residents of the middle colonies dev lop d a 
common racial identity because of their shared victimization from Indian att cks.22  
These historians highlight the ways in which Indians and European Americans adopted 
racial identities during the latter half of the eighteenth century becaus of varying spatial 
factors. 
While violence along the frontier played an important part in the Wabash-
Maumee Valley, it did not necessarily lead to greater racial solidarity.  This is not to say 
that racial identities did not gain greater definition during this period, but that protecting 
one’s racial heritage did not always serve the local interests of the people involved.  The 
French recognized that giving the Americans carte-blanche in the region would mean that 
they would lose any remaining diplomatic influence and economic potential.  French 
traders willingly altered intelligence regarding the Indian threat on Vincennes in order to 
protect their trading and familial connections with the Miamis.  This was as true for 
Indian inhabitants of the region as well.  Despite their shared racial heritage with the 
nativist Indians at Prophetstown, the Miamis believed that maintaining their etn c 
heritage was more important than defending the interests of all Indians.  Rather th n 
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cooperate with the Prophet after the Treaty of Fort Wayne, Pacanne marched his 
supporters to meet with the British.  Their historical connection to the British trumped 
their racial connections with the Indians at Prophetstown.  Although the nascent racial 
ideology of the colonial era gained greater definition during the early republic, it did not 
necessarily provide the tools and intellectual groundwork for Indians and European 
Americans to protect their worlds.  During an era of such vast change, most communities 
looked for security rather than risk further displacement.  The ideology of race explain d 
“why” Indians and European Americans were in their present situations, but it did not 
provide the methods for “how” these communities could survive.   
Inhabitants of Prophetstown often behaved in direct contradiction to what racial 
ideology would suggest.  While many different groups of Indians arrived at Prophetst wn 
and heard Tenskwatawa’s proclamations about protecting the Indian race, they also grew 
weary of his message after starving through a winter and confronting other Indians with 
whom they had historical grievances.  The continued problems at Prophetstown 
convinced many Indians that the racial message shared by the Shawnee brothers was 
irrelevant for survival in the region.  Other Indians simply were not willing to in re their 
historic relationships with other native communities.  Prophetstown remained divided 
because there was no clear-cut benefit to ignoring ethnic traditions in favor of racial 
unity.  Indians hoped that racial unity would allow them greater protection, but in the end, 
they wanted that protection to defend their distinct cultural identities.  Unifying at the 
expense of one’s ethnic identity seemed as destructive as assimilating into European 
American culture.  It was not enough to think racially.  In order for people to act on racial 
ideology, they had to derive some sort of practical advantage from it.   
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Ethnic interests were not the only reason inhabitants of the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley resisted racial unification.  Residents of Vincennes favored national issues and 
national identity above racial unity because local issues like the legalization of slavery 
proved more important than the removal of Indians from the region.  The debate over 
slavery so divided the American community in Vincennes that they openly manipulated 
issues pertaining to Indian affairs and the security of the town to promote their visions for 
the territory.  Such behavior came at the expense of their fellow citizens, when it would 
have seemed logical to unify against the Indian menace to their north.  Issues surrounding 
the legalization of slavery in the territory, and not one’s racial heritage, determined how 
Americans dealt with their Indian neighbors.  In Vincennes, racial relationships were 
often contingent upon one’s vision for the nation’s future. 
The tendency of American Indians and European Americans to resist racial and 
ethnic unification after 1800 was no where more apparent than at Prophetstown and 
Vincennes.  The atmosphere in both towns was heavily racist, but the behavior of the 
people living in both towns was often not so.  One could spend a day at Prophetstown and 
hear Tenskwatawa and his brother Tecumseh deliver lengthy diatribes about how Indians
and European Americans had been created separately and how European American 
culture was undermining and destroying Indian kind.  Yet, after hearing Tenskwatawa’s 
speeches, many of the Indians at Prophetstown ignored his stipulations and acted in a 
fashion that threatened the racial vision embodied by Prophetstown.  The town of 
Vincennes was quite similar in many respects.  Weekly newspaper sermons published y 
the ever-paranoid Elihu Stout announced the diabolical plans of the nearby Indians who 
hoped to destroy Vincennes.  Governor Harrison paraded the militia around town to 
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emphasize the threat posed by the Prophet’s forces.  Nonetheless, residents of Vincennes 
willingly aided the Indians throughout the region in order to protect their cultural and 
national identities.  It was impossible for anyone to escape the racial dialogues and 
hatreds present in both towns, but it was relatively easy for both Indians and European 
Americans to circumvent the issue. 
Life in the Wabash-Maumee Valley was too complicated for people to rely on a 
hard-and-fast system of racial classification.  Racial ideology rests on a simplistic notion 
that humans originated from separate creations, but identities in the Wabash-Maumee 
Valley were often contingent on a variety of relationships unrelated to racial histories.  
Few residents thought racial theory would improve their lives.  Harrison’s and 
Tenskwatawa’s efforts to rework territorial relationships proved impossible because they 
had to convince their supporters that their racial vision was the best possible means to 
promote peace, economic development, and political progress.  While racial violence did 
erupt periodically in the valley, it was largely due to the intra-community fac ionalism at 
Prophetstown and Vincennes.  Most communities were unable to reconcile the racial 
rhetoric of their leaders with the practical realities of life. 
William Henry Harrison and Tenskwatawa simply had different agendas than the 
majority of people living in their communities.  Rather than adjusting to the needs of the 
people in their towns, the two men often ignored and even undermined their community 
members in order to maintain power.  For Harrison and Tenskwatawa, the relationship 
between Prophetstown and Vincennes was fundamentally a racial one.  Harrison’s 
community represented the expansionist European Americans who continued to swindle
and murder the Indians and the Prophet’s town symbolized the bloodthirsty savage who 
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had failed to assimilate into European American culture.  Harrison and the Prophet were 
too engrossed in a rhetorical battle over the rights Indians possessed to consider that most 
people were not thinking along racial lines.  Their stubborn behavior continued even 
decades after the war.  Tenskwatawa removed himself from his fellow Indians who 
accommodated the American agents and Harrison built a political career based on his 
false perceptions of the Battle of Tippecanoe.  Both refused to understand the problems 
within their own community and to evaluate those who opposed them. 
Few people at Vincennes and Prophetstown shared the same meaning of place, 
which undercut Harrison and the Prophet’s attempts to unite their respective communities 
ideologically.  The construction of place is a process given meaning by the tribulations 
and experiences of human populations, but few residents at Vincennes and Prophetstown 
shared the same past experiences.23  A noted geographer, John Harner states that “place 
identity is a cultural value shared by the community, a collective understanding about 
social identity intertwined with place meaning.”24  Both towns divided over place 
identity.  The French had been at Vincennes for almost a century and their construction of 
place depended upon familial and economic relations with the Indians.  Such a place was 
unfathomable for Harrison and his supporters.  In similar fashion, the Shawnee at 
Prophetstown refused to operate on Miami terms and disregarded the extent to which the 
Miami constructed their identity by incorporating people into the Wabash-Maumee trade 
network.  Harner contends that “place identity arises when the shared beliefs about pl ce 
                                                
23 John Harner in “Place Identity and Copper Mining i Sonora, Mexico,” Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), 680 argues that “Place is a process, and it is human 




meaning for the majority match the ideological beliefs of those in power.”25  Such a 
relationship did not exist at Prophetstown or Vincennes.  The Prophet and Harrison never 
fully understood that their policies and rhetoric were in many ways an assault on how the 
Kickapoos, Miamis, Potawatomis, and French constructed place and thus constructed 
their identities.  Tenskwatawa and Harrison, thus, were not simply at odds with their 
followers over the practicality of racial ideology.  They divided over the construction of 
place.    
Both Harrison and the Prophet ended their lives in much the same way they had 
lived while in Indiana Territory.  Tenskwatawa remained at his final Prophetstown near 
the Argentine district of present-day Kansas City, Kansas, until his death in 1836.  He 
isolated himself from the majority of the Shawnees who had begun working with the 
missionaries and government agents.  Few Indians sought his council largely because he 
did not support any sort of collaboration with the Americans.  He spent his last few years 
in relative obscurity.26  Harrison failed to win the presidency the same month that 
Tenskwatawa died, but continued his efforts and won the presidential election in 1840.  A 
few months later, Harrison stood on the east portico of the Capitol building where Chief 
Justice Roger Taney administered the oath of office.  Shortly thereafter, Harrison, then 
sixty-eight years old, delivered an inaugural address that lasted almost two hours.  Of the 
almost 8,500 words Harrison spoke in his speech, only once did he mention “aboriginal” 
peoples.  His imagined nation, like his community at Vincennes, simply had no room for 
them.  Harrison contracted a cold during his first month in office and his condition 
                                                
25 John Harner in “Place Identity and Copper Mining i Sonora, Mexico,” Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), 680. 
26 Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 187. 
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deteriorated quickly into full-blown pneumonia.  He passed away thirty days into his term 
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